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INTRODUCTION
In 1596, Shakespeare depicted the unsavory creditor in the
person of Shylock,' who demanded a pound of a desperate bor-
rower's flesh as collateral for his loan.2 Illiterate street hoodlums
in the early part of this century slurred the term "shylock" into
"shark." : Thus was born the work "loanshark," denoting the
lender who demands the borrower's body as security for repayment.4
1 W. SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE
247 (I. Ribner & G. Kittredge eds. 1971).
2 W. SHAKESPEARE, The Merchant of Venice, supra note 1, at Act I, Scene III, lines 141-
46:
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Express'd in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me.
(Shylock to Bassanio)
3 This etymology may be more a matter of lore than fact. Others have indicated that
the work "loanshark" derives from the illicit lenders' shark-like characteristics; loansharks
like their acquatic namesakes prey on people and are given to violence. The term "shark"
has long denoted a greedy and parasitic person-a meaning which, some linguists theorize,
preceded and accounted for the name assigned the fish. See E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A
SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 614 (1958); W. W. SKEAT,
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 545 (1882); E. WEEKLY,
ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 1328 (1921). Given this meaning of the
word "shark," it seems likely that the work "loanshark" is a simple compound tying the
characteristics of the "shark" to the practice of making loans.
4 Impact of Crime on Small Business: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Busi-
ness, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1968) (statement of Charles Siragusa, Executive Dir., Ill.
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The term "loanshark" lacks a precise definition; neither lin-
guists nor lawyers have concentrated on the term,5 and different
generations have assigned the term differing connotations.6
There was no common-law crime of "loansharking," and modern
statutes aimed at the problem proscribe a wide array of practices.
In current usage, however, "loansharking" plainly embodies two
central features: the assessment of exorbitant interest rates in ex-
tending loans and the use of threats and violence in collecting
them. 8
Contemporary loansharking, however defined, exacts
significant social costs. Estimates in 1967 placed loansharking as
the fifth-ranking crime in financial cost to society. 9 In addition to
transferring wealth to criminal elements and burdening law en-
forcement budgets, loansharking causes economic inefficiencies.' °
Moreover, loansharking feeds upon and reinforces the climate of
violence and fear perpetuated by organized crime." For many
Crime Investigating Comm'n) [hereinafter cited as Small Business Hearings].
I Neither BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) nor BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY
(3d ed. 1969) define the word "loanshark." The RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966) defines "loanshark" as "a person who lends money at excessive
rates of interest; usurer" (id. at 840), and "shark" as, "a person who preys greedily on
others, as by cheating or usury" (id. at 1311). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1326 (3d ed. 1961) defines "loan shark" as "one who lends money to individu-
als at extortionate interest rates." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 712 (Supp. 1971) de-
fines the term as one "who exacts usurious rates of interest from the person of small
means.
See generally notes 57-87 and accompanying text infra.
7 Relevant laws prohibit criminal usury, extortionate lending, extortionate collecting,
receiving profits of illicit credit transactions, and financing illicit loans. See Appendix A
infra.
I One commentator has identified the three major elements of modern loansharking
as:
(1) the lending of cash at very high rates of interest;
(2) a borrower-lender agreement based on the borrower's willingness to
put up his own and his family's physical well-being as collateral; and
(3) the borrower's belief that the lender is connected with ruthless criminal
organizations.
See Seidl, "Upon the Hip"-A Study of the Criminal Loan-Shark Industry 30 (Dec. 1968)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Harvard University Library).
I U.S. TASK FORCE ON ASSESSMENT, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & An-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT
43 n.6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
'o Undoubtedly some element of monopoly power, possibly transient, exists in most
loansharking transactions. Interest rates are accordingly higher than those in a more per-
fect market, even allowing for the risky nature of most of the loans involved. Profits are
too high, credit is misallocated, and there is "dead-weight" economic loss. See E. GELLHORN,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 94-97 (1976).
" Recent decisions are replete with examples of loanshark threats ranging from subtle
"encouragement" to graphic descriptions of the price of nonpayment. See United States v.
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borrowers, especially the poor, the offspring of loansharking is
hopelessness, which fuels the fires of inner city unrest and breeds
additional crime. 12  Finally, loansharking provides organized
crime with a steady supply of capital with which to finance other
illegal operations.13
This Article discusses the origins of, practices typifying, and
laws directed at contemporary loansharking. Loansharks prosper
by exploiting their victims' fears, and in case after case this same
fear threatens to silence key government witnesses. The result is
problems for the prosecutor, who must attempt to protect his wit-
nesses and develop alternative methods of proof. The Article
explores prosecutorial difficulties caused by witness fear and iden-
tifies options the prosecutor may use in attempting to neutralize
the problem.
Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1166 (2d Cir. 1975) (debtor told "he had better come up with the
money ... or ... Natale 'will just waste you, and not worry about the money at all.' "), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976); United States v. Bowdach, 501 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1974)
("[we are] going to bring him back and shoot him and cut his balls off and hang them in [a
local bar]"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d 289,
293 (5th Cir.) ("you better have our money there at one o'clock or I'll feed you your
eyeballs"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); United States v. Keresty, 465 F.2d 36, 39 (3d
Cir.) (introduced friend to debtor as "a syndicate enforcer," made blatant, threatening de-
mands for repayment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States v. Palmieri, 456 F.2d
9, 11 (2d Cir.) (threats to "hang [borrowers] from the rafters" if they did not pay), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972).
12 A report entitled Study of Organized Crime and the Urban Poor, submitted by a group
of congressmen to the House of Representatives, alleged that loansharks take over $350
million a year from the American poor. 113 CONG. REc. 24460, 24461 (1967), cited in Perez
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). Furthermore, "victims are often coerced into
the commission of criminal acts in order to repay their loans .... " Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. at 156. For example:
The gambling in the plant-mainly on sports-had been taken over by a
Mafia mobster. Over a month John X overextended himself and lost much
more than he could afford. The underworld character was willing to loan him
$100 but John X would have to pay back $125 at the end of the week. He
couldn't. Another loan. The debt grew. The threats came. Two musclemen vis-
ited X's home at dinnertime. They threatened X's wife and children. The next
day an envoy from the mobster met him with a smile. "Everything will be con-
sidered square," he said, if X would finger the next shipment of television sets.
X was so frightened that he did it. The hijacking misfired and X was arrested.
Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcommittee #5 of the House of Representatives, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 423 (1970) (quoting five part series by H. Kelly for Hearst newspapers, pt.
4) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee #5 Hearings]. See United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401,
1403 (2d Cir. 1972) (borrower forced to assist in truck hijacking and bank robbery to pay
off loan).
3 See 114 CONG. REC. 14490 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire) ("One of the principal
sources of revenue of organized crime comes from loan sharking."). See also note 19 infra.
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CONTEMPORARY LOANSHARKING: ORIGINS,
EFFECTS, AND METHODS OF OPERATION
A. The Dominant Role of Organized Crime
Organized crime dominates contemporary loansharking. 14
Syndicate access to vast stores of capital allows the underworld to
pour substantial amounts of cash into the credit market.' 5 The
strength and reputation of organized operations lends credence to
threats of reprisals, thereby producing the aura of fear critical to
success in the loansharking business.' 6 And organized crime's
intolerance of competition militates strongly against successful
independent operations.' 7
The demand for credit by the underworld further ensures
the preeminence of organized crime in the loansharking market;
underworld criminals frequently seek, as well as provide, illegal
credit. Organized loansharks are likely to have contacts with these
,4 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 46, 147 n.1 (1971); see also F. IANNI, A FAMILY
BUSINESS 6 (1972).
15 See Seidl, supra note 8 at 33-34.
Huge amounts of cash from illegal sources pose two problems. Its true owner-
ship must be hidden, and it must be put to work. The greedy overlords con-
sider the need to put the money to work quickly equal in importance to the
need to hide its ownership. The money mover provides this service.... Loan-
sharks often play the role of Money Mover, and in this regard they have be-
come at least as important as "toughs."
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 54 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED
CRIME].
16 Creditors who would ordinarily appear to be incapable of collection can successfully
instill fear in the debtor by making known their syndicate connections. The Chicago Tribune
reported:
Prosecutors played dramatic tape recordings ... in which a blind reputed
mobster threatened to cut out the eyes and tongue of a man who owed him
$18,000.
"I will have your tongue. That's all I want is your tongue and maybe your
eyes. And I'll teach you how to walk as a blind man," shouted a voice identified
as that of Louis "Blind Louie" Cavallaro, 36, who lost his eyesight because of
diabetes 13 years ago.
Chicago Tribune, June 22, 1978, § 3, at 1.
17 "Independent operators like fences and loansharks are known to La Cosa Nostra,
and when their business becomes significant, they are absorbed." Furstenberg, Violence and
Organized Crime, in 13 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE-A STAFF REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NAT'L
COMM'N ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE app. 18, at 922 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as CRIMES OF VIOLENCE].
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prospective borrowers, who generate a ready market for syndicate
loansharking services.' 8 Just as important, mob-backed borrow-
ers are unlikely to repay loans obtained from independent
operators; indeed, the syndicate may use this tactic to squeeze
competitors out of business.
Organized crime's infatuation with loansharking rests on both
its inherent profitability and its potential for supporting or
facilitating other illicit activities. The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1968 pegged
loansharking as the second most profitable branch of organized
crime 19-an industry viewed as skimming off as much as two per-
cent of the gross national product.20  Other observers estimated
that the loansharking business produces over $10 billion a year on
a $5 billion investment.2' Current income from loansharking is
uncertain, but there is no indication that the growth of illegal
lending has abated. Indeed, increased law enforcement efforts to
curb other criminal ventures may be channeling underworld activ-
ity into lending and increasing the loansharking take.22
In addition to providing direct income, loansharking in-
creases the scope and profitability of the underworld's other illicit
enterprises. 23  A distinguishing feature of organized crime is the
ability of syndicate members to capitalize on opportunities that re-
sult from connections with diverse actors and activities.2 4  Loan-
"s See N.Y. COMM. OF INVESTIGATION, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LOAN-SHARK RACKET
13 (1965) (noting strong connection between loansharking and illicit operations in need of
quick financing) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. COmmsISIdN].
Loansharking is generally believed to be the second largest revenue source for
organized crime. This is an immensely profitable business where interest rates
vary from 1 to 150 percent per week with 20 percent being common for small
borrowers. Profit margins are thought to be higher than gambling and many
officials classify the business in the billion dollar or higher range. At a minimum
the amount exceeds the $350 million narcotics figure.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 53 (footnote omitted). See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
189 (1968); R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, THE CRIME CONFEDERATION 228 (1969).
20 Note, Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 91, 92 n.8 (1969).
1I R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, supra note 19, at 228.
22 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 100.
2 See Grutzner, How to Lockout the Mafia, 48 HARV. Bus. REV. No. 2, at 49 (1970).
24 An example set forth before the National Wiretap commission serves to illustrate this
point. A New York mob figure who had obtained counterfeit United States currency
printed in Canada (the connection was an out-of-town associate of the subject's boss):
(1) used it to purchase drugs smuggled from South America (the connection
was a European forger with whom the subject had personal dealings);
19801
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sharking expands and reinforces syndicate contacts with illegiti-
mate and quasi-legitimate businesses and individuals, especially
since such borrowers can seldom turn to legitimate lenders.
More importantly, loansharking allows syndicate members to
extract profits from a variety of illicit businesses while avoiding
the ownership or control that previously exposed them to
prosecution. The syndicate remains in the background, insulation
and security are increased, and profits remain high. In fact, a
monopoly on the financing of a business may provide the syndi-
cate with most of the profits usually available through direct con-
trol of the underlying operation.25
Extortionate credit transactions also provide underworld ele-
ments with an ideal vehicle for infiltrating legitimate businesses
and gaining control over "outside" individuals.26 Once in the
grip of organized crime, businesses may be run legitimately as
fronts, run for profit with illegal competitive advantages, or
stripped of assets at the expense of unsuspecting creditors.27  In-
dividuals may be forced to commit crimes, abuse their discretion
(2) arranged to sell it on the Japanese black market (the connection was a
Californian who dealt in stolen credit cards with an acquaintance of the sub-
ject); and
(3) distributed it within the United States (the connection was a Philadelphian
who had been involved with the subject in security swindles).
1 NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF FED. & STATE LAWS RELATING TO WIRETAPPING &
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, COMMISSION HEARINGS 413-74 (1976).
For a discussion of the relationship of enterprises to syndicates, see G.R. Blakey & R.
Goldstock, Techniques in the Investiation and Prosecution of Organized Crime: Manuals
of Law and Procedure 4-13 (1977) (unpublished manual of Cornell Institute on Or-
ganized Crime).
" Phillip Areeda explains how monopolists can "reach through" an intervening vertical
level of distribution:
[Clonsider the costs of producing ingot and pipe .... The cost of producing an
ingot is $40 and the cost of fabricating it into pipe is $35. If the profit-
maximizing price for a monopolist producing both ingot and pipe is $100, the
monopoly profit is $25. Observe that the sole seller of ingot can sell ingot for
$65 to fabricators who, if they are numerous, will compete vigorously, thereby
forcing pipe prices down to their $100 production cost.
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 675 n.35 (1974) (emphasis in original).
26 Organized crime has infiltrated a significant number of legitimate businesses. One
newspaper report claimed that organized crime has a strong influence in over 10,000
"legitimate" businesses, including construction companies, bakeries, and banks. The ac-
count cites two reasons for this development. First, profits from organized crime's other
illicit activities are too great to merely reinvest in those activities. Second, involvement in
legitimate businesses decreases the possibility of detection by law enforcement officials.
Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1968, at 48, col. 1. See also notes 176-79 and accompanying text infra.
27 See notes 170-75, 180-85 and accompanying text infra.
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as public servants,"8 or provide other useful services for the loan-
shark.2
9
B. The Economics of Loansharking
As with all markets, economic analysis of lending focuses on
the dynamics of supply and demand. In simplest terms, loan-
sharking exists because a demand for the loanshark's services
exists. This demand results at least in part from legally im-
posed interest-rate ceilings that preclude legal lenders from satis-
fying the demand of high-risk borrowers.3' A free market would
respond to such demand by generating high-interest loans. Usury
laws, however, prohibit financial institutions from servicing these
borrowers. The loanshark fills the resulting gap between market
demand and legal supply.
Factors other than the borrowers' inability to obtain legal
credit help explain the intense demand for loanshark services.
Complexity, formality, and a lack of secrecy drive some borrowers
away from financial institutions to uncomplicated, convenient
transactions with loansharks.3 2  Rarely, however, do the advan-
tages of loanshark transactions outweigh the exorbitant rates and
risk of violence that mark this form of borrowing. Desperation,
not convenience, accounts for the prosperity of the 'juice man."
As one former loanshark stated:
People who borrow from a juice operation do so only be-
cause they really need it after they have been frozen out of
28 See, e.g., McClellan, Weak Link in Our War on the Mafia, READERS DIGEST REPRINT,
reprinted in Subcommittee #5 Hearings, supra note 12, at 112-13 (New York City Water Com-
missioner forced to give $40,000 kickback).
29 See notes 134-39, 171-79 and accompanying text infra.
30 No comprehensive analysis has ever been made of what kinds of customers
loan sharks have, or of how much or how often each kind borrows. Enforce-
ment officials and other investigators do have some information. Gamblers
borrow to pay gambling losses; narcotics users borrow to purchase heroin.
Some small businessmen borrow from loan sharks when legitimate credit
channels are closed. The same men who take bets from employees in mass
employment industries also serve at times as loan sharks whose money enables
the employees to pay off their gambling debts or meet household needs.
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 15, at 3 footnotes omitted).
31 See Seidl, supra note 8, at 88-89.
32 Id. at 90-95. Seidl cites four characteristics as important to the loanshark's success:
secrecy of the transaction, informality, speed and convenience, and regular availability of
funds. Id. See also Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 925-26: "Usury is a crime, but there are
thousands of Americans-businessmen, consumers, gamblers-who need short-term credit
without reference, collateral, or questions.... As long as Americans enact their consciences
and live their tastes organized crime will be needed."
1980]
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other sources for money. They mostly figure that the only time
you can get a bank to loan you money is when you can prove
you don't need it.aS
Ironically, usury laws are commonly justified as useful weapons in
the fight against illicit lending.3 4 While the desirability of usury
laws depends on more than their causal relation to criminal activ-
ity, 35 there can be little doubt that they help create the market the
loanshark supplies. 6
Rates charged by loansharks vary considerably- from less
than 52% to more than 1000% per year. 7 The absence of a
well-defined market in which supply and demand functions can
be reasonably ascertained partially explains this wide variation.
The credit market is composed of submarkets, each defined by
the status of the borrower-his ability to repay, his planned use
for the money, and assorted other variables. Furthermore, the des-
peration of the loanshark's customers and their inability to obtain
legal credit make the demand for illicit funds highly inelastic.
Loansharks thus have a substantial range within which to set their
prices.
Other, more subtle factors may also influence loanshark in-
terest rates. For example, territorial allocations or spheres of in-
fluence within certain industries often give the loanshark a
quasi-monopolistic position.3 8  Consequently, variations in loan-
shark interest rates may result from price discrimination facili-
tated by localized monopolies. In addition, interest assessments
may reflect goals other than mere monetary return on invest-
ments. The loanshark may, for example, adjust interest charges to
" The Confessions of a 6for 5 'juice Man," BURROUGHS CLEARING HOUSE, April 1965, at
40-41.
" See N.Y. COmMIssION, supra note 18, at 82-83; Note, supra note 20, at 105-06; Com-
ment, Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New York's Usury Statute, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 167, 170
(1966).
35 See Nugent, The Loan Shark Problem, 8 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 12-13 (1941) (usury
laws help equalize bargaining power between lender and borrower and protect borrower's
family, employer, and community from ripple effect created by his imprudent indebted-
ness).
" See generally North & Miller, The Economics of Usury Laws, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF CRIME 193 (L. Kaplan & D. Kessler eds. 1976).
3' See notes 89-91 and accompanying text infra.
" See generally Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 915: "The loanshark operating outside of
[La Cosa Nostra] can be brought under its control by the promise of protection from law
enforcement (bought with money), additional working capital, and an exclusive and secure
franchise on his territory."
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increase his chances of making a loan and gaining a toehold in
the business of a borrower.
C. The History of Loansharking
1. Early History of Interest Assessments
Since the earliest codes of the ancient Babylonians, lawmakers
have imposed interest ceilings 39 in an attempt to protect debtors
from overbearing moneylenders.40 Although the Old Testament
prohibited the charging of interest, 41 the New Testament
apparently condoned the practice at a commercial level. 42  The
Greeks allowed the charging of interest despite Aristotle's protes-
3' The terms "interest" and "usury" have not always had their modern meanings.
In Roman law, interest (id quod interest) meant the compensation for damage or
loss suffered by the creditor resulting from the debtor's failure to return the
loan (itself gratuitous in principle) at the date specified by the contract. This
payment of compensation might be agreed upon in the original contract or be
made the subject of a lawful claim after the contract had expired. Such was the
usage until the close of the Middle Ages. "Usury" (Latin usura sometimes also
called foenus and in Greek tokos, i.e., "issue" or "produce" after Aristotle's des-
ignation of "breed of barren metal"), on the other hand, signified a payment
for the "use" of money itself. In its broader sense, "usury" included a charge
for the loan of any good that fell within the class of mutuum, i.e., a loan of a
consumption or "fungible" good. But as a loan of money was classified as a
mutuum, and in practice became the most common form of this type of loan,
the term generally expressed in popular usage its narrower signification of a
charge for the use of money. Only after the repeal of the prohibitions of in-
terest (i.e., of "usury" in the above sense) and the establishment of a legal rate,
did "usury" receive its present meaning of an exorbitant charge for a money
loan or a charge that exceeds the legal rate. Meanwhile the former usage has
been superseded by an extension of the original concept of "interest" which
now means a price for the loan of money (or of any present goods) or a pre-
mium or deviation from par of the price of present money in terms of future
money.
T. DIVINE, INTEREST 3-4 (1959). In the text above, the term "interest" is used in its modern
sense. In order to avoid confusion, the term "usury" is not used in this section until its
meaning (in the "excessive interest" sense) is clear.
40 J. PRITCHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 169
(1955) (translating Code of Hammurabi 88, 90) (footnotes omitted):
If a merchant [lent] grain at interest, he shall receive sixty qu of grain per
kur as interest. If he lent money at interest, he shall receive one-sixth (shekel)
six se (i.e. one-fifth shekel) per shekel of silver as interest.
If the merchant increased the interest beyond [sixty qu] per kur [of grain]
(or) one-sixth (shekel) six se [per shekel of money] and has collected (it), he
shall forfeit whatever he lent.
4' Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 25:35-37; Deuteronomy 23:19. But see Deuteronomy 23:20.
42 Matthew 25:27; Luke 19:23.
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tations, 43 but sometimes established maximum rates. 44  The Ro-
mans similarly tolerated interest charges while regulating per-
missible rates.45
Early Christian teaching uniformly condemned the charging
of interest, and clerics who ignored the ban risked excommunica-
tion.46 In the eighth century, Charlemagne implemented church
policy by making assessment of interest a criminal offense.4 7
Papal pronouncements through the twelfth and thirteenth cen-
turies repeatedly declared interest transactions legally void and
provided for restitution.48 In 1311, Pope Clement V authorized
the excommunication of any civil authority who enacted legisla-
tion authorizing the charging or collection of interest.49
Clerical condemnation, however, gradually gave way to
economic forces. By the twelfth century, the emergence of a
commercial class and the development of banking and money
markets had changed the character and perception of credit.50
Traditionalists could no longer condemn capital as "barren" since
it was frequently used for productive purposes. As loans became
less personal and began to be viewed as crucial to the advance-
ment of trade, toleration of interest assessments increased. The
Church, keeping abreast of these trends, in 1515 formally au-
thorized low-interest charges to cover the operating costs of lend-
ing to the poor 51 and by the 1700's explicitly refused to interfere
in civil decisions regarding commercial assessments of interest. "5 2
The modern distinction between "usury" and "interest"5 3
emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and by the
'3 Aristotle based his objections in part on the theory that money was barren, i.e., un-
like a flock or a field, it produced nothing; it was merely a medium of exchange. See T.
DIVINE, supra note 39, at 11-19.
"' For a table of interest rates charged at various times in the history of the world,
see R. JOHNSON, THE REALITIES OF MAXIMUM CEILINGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CHARGES
7-8 (1969).
5 A prohibition of interest, instituted in 342 B.C., was uniformly evaded through the
use of non-Roman "fronts." After corrective legislation failed to end abuses, a legal rate
was again established in 88 B.C. T. DIVINE, supra note 39, at 20.
46 Id. at 34-35.
47 A. BIRNIE, THE HISTORY AND ETHICS OF INTEREST 4 (1952).
48 T. DIVINE, supra note 39, at 60-62.
49 Id. at 63.
11 R. JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 10-11.
51 T. DIVINE, supra note 39, at 58.
52 R. JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 10.
11 See note 39 supra.
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eighteenth century, economists began to question the soundness
of usury laws.54 Nevertheless, English law continued to recognize
the offense of usury.5 The American colonies initially enforced
the English rules and eventually enacted their own legislation im-
posing interest rate ceilings.5 6
2. Loansharking in America
Loansharking in the United States has gone through three
distinct stages.5 7 Although the types of loansharking activities
characterizing each period shade into one another, this break-
down reflects logical distinctions and historical reality. The three-
stage breakdown also corresponds with the three most significant
efforts to explore and control loansharking activity in the United
States: the Russell Sage Foundation's investigatory and reform ef-
forts from 1905 to 1915; the pre-World War II prosecution of
New York loansharks by Thomas E. Dewey; and the investigatory
efforts of congressional and state committees as well as a presi-
dential task force during the early 1960's.58 At each of these
junctures, loansharking in the United States had a different
character.
a. The Post-Civil War Period: The Salary Lender. Following the
Civil War, the forces of industrialization, urbanization, and im-
migration changed the face of the American economy. With this
transition came an unprecedented demand for credit. Consumers
as well as businessmen fueled this demand, .seeking credit for
purposes other than investment.
Against this backdrop of increased demand, two forces
catalyzed the development of loansharking in America. First,
longstanding religious and social beliefs continued to condemn
consumer borrowing as immoral or indicative of the borrower's
-" Skeptics included Bentham, Turgot and Hume. See T. DIVINE, supra note 39, at 98-
102; Kaplan & Matteis, The Economics of Loansharking, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME
178, 180 (L. Kaplan & D. Kessler eds. 1976).
55 J. MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF USURY 33-52 (1866).
56 Id. at 68-69.
57 The section on the history of loansharking in the United States draws heavily on
Haller & Alviti, Loansharking in American Cities: Historical Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise, 21
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125 (1977).
8 For a discussion of investigations of loansharking over the last three decades, see
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 15, at 10-14. For a discussion of con-
gressional investigations, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE
NATION, 1945-1964, at 599-600, 700-01 (1965).
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inability to manage his budget.59  Second, low-limit usury laws
pervaded state statute books. ° Since financial institutions found
consumer lending neither respectable nor profitable,6' numerous
upstanding citizens who were sound risks found themselves
foreclosed from legitimate sources of credit. The market re-
sponded to this unsatisfied demand with "salary lending," a new
credit device that prospered from about 1880 through 1915.62
Unlike modern day loansharks, who run patently illegal, covert
businesses, salary lenders operated on the fringe of the law and
often advertised in urban newspapers.6 3 Salary lenders screened
their customers carefully, requiring references and employing de-
tailed application and agreement forms4.6  They relied on legal
artifices and bargaining superiority rather than the loanshark's
strong-arm tactics to exploit their customers. To avert the reach
of state usury laws, salary lenders often structured transactions as
"purchases" of a portion of the borrower's future salary-thus the
name "salary lending." 65 In addition, lenders often required
wage assignments from "guarantors," usually friends or relatives
of the borrower. 66
Once in the salary lender's net, the borrower rarely escaped.
Salary lenders, like contemporary loansharks, relied heavily on
fear to ensure collection of debts. But unlike modern loansharks,
salary lenders rested their threats on legal consequences, not phys-
ical violence. Salary lenders would threaten to sue for breach of
contract, to garnish the debtor's wages, or to simply contact the
debtor's employer.67 Such threats impressed upon the hapless
debtor the disastrous specter of losing his job; employers-
solicitous of their employees' moral standing, averse to the ex-
pense and risks of handling wage assignments, and fearful of po-
59 Haller & Alviti, supra note 57, at 127.
60 For a discussion of usury statutes in each of the states in the 1800's, see J. MURRAY,
supra note 55, at 70-91.
61 Haller & Alviti, supra note 57, at 127.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 129. Salary lenders placed newspaper ads that resembled those of regular small
businesses: "The City Credit Company will advance money to salaried people on their note
without security. Lowest rates-strictly confidential." Id.
64 Id. at 131.
65 Nugent, supra note 35, at 10-11.
66 Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 132.
61 See Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 78, 83-84
(1941).
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tential embezzlements-often adopted a policy of releasing all
employees discovered to be in debt.68
Other factors abetted these threats in rendering customer de-
faults uncommon. First, the quasi-legal nature of salary-loan
transactions and the seeming propriety of salary-lender operations
impressed the debtor with the sense of a legal and moral obliga-
tion to repay.69  Second, despite the dubious legality of their en-
terprise, salary lenders could 'frequently invoke judicial processes
with success.7 0  Finally, salary lenders frequently provided debtors
with refinancings or extensions rather than demanding immediate
payment upon default. 71  Imposition of hefty penalties, accumu-
lation of interest into principal, and "chain debts" whereby the
debtor continued to pay interest with little hope of retiring the
principal commonly entangled short-term borrowers in long-term
obligations. 71
Reform efforts aimed at salary lending-largely the product
of the Russell Sage Foundation-commenced at the beginning of
68 See Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 134: "[Tlhe borrower's chief fear, quite often,
was that an attempt by the lender to enforce the wage assignment would cause the
employer to fire him ... " But see Birkhead, supra note 67, at 83: "Few employers, how-
ever, will knowingly aid an outlaw lender. When an anti-loan shark campaign exposes the
money-lending racket preying on working people, almost all companies give whole-hearted
support to the drive and help the oppressed employees every way they can."
'9 Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 134.
71 Much of the success of the salary lender in court resulted from the advantages
that he wielded as a legal adversary. The lender produced complicated forms
signed by the borrower; he often had a power of attorney, so that he could
appear for the borrower and confess judgment; and the borrower, already un-
able to make payments on a small loan, was seldom able to hire an attorney.
Indeed, in those few cases in which a borrower had legal representation, the
lender would normally withdraw the suit and negotiate a settlement. Secondly,
the success of salary lenders reflected the structure of the lower courts, which
were staffed by justices of the peace or magistrates who seldom had legal train-
ing and whose incomes derived from fees for handling cases. Justices who
found for salary lenders could often attract a good deal of business and thus
earn tidy sums, so that it was in the economic interest of justices to look with
favor upon suits by lenders. Hence, salary lenders, as regular and experienced
users of the courts, often enforced illegal contracts against their customers who,
as inexperienced and unrepresented defendants, were unable effectively to as-
sert their legal rights.
Id. at 134-35.
71 "However high its rates of charge, the loan-shark business would not have created
so much distress if borrowers had been able to pay off their loans when due. But lenders
seeking volume, encouraged renewals or made it difficult for borrowers to repay the prin-
cipal." Nugent, supra note 35, at 5.
72 Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 133.
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the twentieth century.73 The principal result of reform was the
widespread adoption of small loan acts. Massachusetts adopted the
first such act in 1911. New York passed a comprehensive bill in
1915, and Illinois followed suit three years later. By 1933, a
majority of states had adopted legislation requiring licensing of
small lenders, proscribing charges exceeding stated interest, and
raising the legal ceiling on small loans, commonly to a monthly
rate of 3 percent.74
Passage of small loan acts sounded the death knell of salary
lending. As reformers predicted, such laws generated new and
legal sources of consumer credit; credit unions, savings banks,
fraternal organizations, and commercial banks soon sought to
satisfy consumer credit demand.7 5  But not withstanding the best
efforts of reformers, adoption of small loan acts contributed to a
disastrous development: the entry of organized crime into the il-
licit credit business. 6
b. 1915-1935: Organized Crime and Consumer Credit. Small loan
acts eliminated salary lending. No longer could salary lenders rely
on the legal ambiguities that previously had lent them credence.
Public opinion now held them in disfavor, and heightened penal-
ties for illegal extensions of credit deterred brushes with the
newly extended reach of the law. The lending institutions
7' The Russell Sage Foundation undertook extensive studies of the loansharking prob-
lem and drafted a model small loan law to encourage passage of such laws in the states. See
Kaplan & Matteis, supra note 54, at 182; Nugent, supra note 35, at 6-7.
71 See Hubachek, The Development oJ Regulatory Small Loans, 8 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
108, 111-14 (1941).
7- Newspapers ran these and similar headlines when the National City Bank of New
York entered the personal loan field in 1928:
Loan Sharks Doom Sounded by Big Bankers
Nation's Biggest Bank Fights Loan Sharks
Usury Dealt Heavy Blow by Bank's Action
Miller, The Impingement of Loansharking on the Banking Industry, in AN ECONOMIc ANALYSIS
OF CRIME 198 (L. Kaplan & D. Kessler eds. 1976).
76 There are indications that some variation of organized crime was involved with early
loansharking activities prior to the adoption of small loan acts. See F. IANNI, supra note 14,
at 66. For example, Guiseppe, an immigrant from Sicily, set up a "bank" in his home in
New York's lower East Side, and lent money to neighbors.
No one talks directly about what occurred when someone defaulted, but there
are suggestions that Guiseppe was tied in with one of the Sicilian Black Hand
gangs, and those unfortunate immigrants who were unwilling to repay him
would themselves be repaid with physical violence and in some cases even
death.
Id. See also H. NELLI, THE BUSINESS OF CRIME 110 (1976).
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spawned by the small loan acts, however, only partially filled the
void created by the elimination of the salary lenders. One factor
accounting for this result was that the fixed costs of making any
loan-such as labor costs associated with investigation and
collection-were approximately the same regardless of the size of
the loan. Thus, the smaller the loan, the higher the ratio of fixed
costs to principal lent.7 7  Because small loan acts precluded lend-
ers from compensating for these disproportionate costs by charg-
ing service fees or profitable interest rates, legitimate credit
sources often found it unprofitable to make small loans. 78
Thus, even after enactment of small loan legislation, large
numbers of consumer borrowers remained without access to
credit. Above-board lenders restricted consumer credit to "a
newly-created, somewhat more affluent class of borrowers who
desired larger loans and had the financial stability to make re-
payments. . . . Because the needs of small borrowers were often
unmet by legal lenders," the demand for small loans remained un-
satisfied in major cities.7 9  This unmet demand gave rise to a
breed of creditor wholly unlike the salary lender. No longer did
illicit lending wear the trappings of legality. Nor did openness and
threats of mere legal sanctions characterize consumer lending.
Loansharking became the province of organized crime, and fear
of physical reprisals for nonpayment became its predominant fea-
ture.8 0  In response to this development, then-special prosecutor
Thomas E. Dewey initiated a wave of prosecutions in 1935 aimed
at racketeers providing illegal credit-and often bloody
77 North & Miller, supra note 36, at 195.
7' Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 140. Loansharks quickly stepped into this gap. "No
loan seems to have been too small for Guiseppe's consideration in the early days; one
informant reports that he always borrowed $2.00 from Guiseppe on Wednesdays and re-
paid $2.50 on Saturdays. Some loans were as low as fifty cents in the days before 1920." F.
IANNI, supra note 14, at 96.
7' Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 141; see also Nugent, supra note 35, at 7 (enactment
of small loan acts in certain states increased loansharking activities in unregulated areas).
One commentator has argued, questionably, that small loan laws had only a limited effect
on the incursion of organized crime into loansharking. See Note, supra note 20, at 103.
80 Thomas Dewey described the violence used by the new breed of loansharks:
The loan sharks organized their racket into a big business. The gangsters
broke heads and cut men with knives and made their victims lose their jobs....
[A] man had paid $40 on a $20 loan and was still $8.00 behind in the
payments. The loan shark walked right into the apartment with two thugs. He
took the man's pants off the bed and took the money right out of the pocket.
When the man's wife tried to stop him the shark threatened to cut her throat.
T. DEWEY, TWENTY AGAINST THE UNDERWORLD 181 (R. Campbell ed. 1974).
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beatings-to consumer borrowers. 81  Despite Dewey's efforts,
syndicate loansharking proliferated.
c. Post-1935: The Maturation of Organized Loansharking. Loan-
sharking in the early 1930's was characterized by large-scale illicit
consumer lending. Once established, however, consumer-oriented
loansharking enterprises expanded into new markets. Although
historians have documented incidents of underworld loans to
legitimate businesses and criminal borrowers as early as the
1920's,"' a marked expansion in this area occurred during the next
decade. The repeal of prohibition in 1933 and the proliferation of
gambling and narcotics trafficking increased the pool of capital
and personnel available for carrying on the loansharking activities
of organized crime.8 3  Furthermore, the Depression caused both
a scarcity of capital for legal loans and a staggering demand for
credit, particularly among undercapitalized small businesses.8 4
These factors allowed organized crime to make substantial in-
roads into markets other than consumer credit. Most importantly,
racketeer loansharks began pouring cash into legitimate
businesses. The growing gambling industry also produced two
significant new groups of customers: unlucky (or unskilled) bet-
tors and bet-takers.8s Syndicate members thus began lending to
Dewey's own account is informative:
In our first sudden swoop, in a field nobody knew we were even looking
into, our rackets investigation arrested twenty-two loan sharks in New York
City. We held them on 252 counts in 126 meticulously prepared indictments.
With the cases parceled out among several deputy assistants, we brought
the loan sharks to trial one by one. Within a month they had all been convicted,
save one who escaped on a minor technical mistake .... During the trials, more
complaints were brought in against more loan sharks, and we went out and
made more arrests. Before we were through, thirty-six of the sharks had been
convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from two to five years' imprison-
ment.
Id. at 180, 182-83.
82 See Hailer & Alviti, supra note 57, at 141; N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 7.
83 N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 7. Richard Hammer has also recognized this
point. R. HAMMER, PLAYBOY'S ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME 136 (1965).
("[T]he underworld during the depression probably had the biggest stash of liquid assets
in the nation. It was money waiting to be put to work to earn even more money in an
upward-spiraling cycle.").
84 See R. HAMMER, supra note 83, at 137 ("[A]fter the Wall Street debacle, the shylocks'
clientele expanded to include many respectable men in business and industry who had
nowhere else to turn .... ").
85 See N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 7; R. HAMMER, supra note 83, at 133.
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each other, a development that radically altered the nature and
extent of loansharking in the United States. By the 1950's sub-
stantial loansharking operations existed in numerous American
cities.8 6  In 1964 one state investigatory commission concluded
that loansharking had become "a major and most lucrative opera-
tion of the criminal underworld," 87 and three years later a presi-
dential commission estimated the volume of the loanshark busi-
ness to be in the "multi-billion dollar range." 88
D. Loansharking Operations
1. The Transaction
The classic street transaction is the six-for-five loan in which a
"steerer" refers a prospective customer to the local loanshark.
Bartenders, doormen, cab drivers, and others in daily contact with
potential borrowers receive a small fee for this service.8 9  The
loanshark, upon making the loan, instructs the borrower to return
one week later with six dollars for each five dollars borrowed.
The six-for-five is an example of a "vig" loan, requiring pay-
ment of a weekly interest charge, with principal to be repaid in a
single lump sum. The other common type loan, the "knockdown,"
involves a specified schedule of repayment, including both interest
and principal; a $1,000 loan, for example, might be repaid in
thirteen weekly installments of $100.90
As previously noted, interest rates vary widely for both types
of loans. A favorable relationship with the loanshark or a reputa-
tion for punctual payments may entitle the borrower to lower
rates. Sizeable loans to businesses or prominent individuals also
bear lower rates, and the loanshark will frequently consider the
intended use of the money when assessing interest on substantial
loans.9 '
6 See Seidl, supra note 8, at 62-79.
87 N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 7.
88 "[T~he President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
declined to specify profits obtained from loan-sharking, except to 'classify the business in
the multi-billion-dollar range.'" H. NELLI, supra note 76, at 262 (footnote omitted).
s9 N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 7.
50 See United States v. Annoreno, 460 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 852 (1972).
9 See D. CREsSEY, THEFr OF THE NATION 81 (1969). But see JOEY, KILLER: AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY OF A MAFIA Hrr-MAN 95 (1974): "When you borrow money from a shy he doesn't
ask you what it's for, he couldn't care less. You use it for whatever you want. All he's
interested in is how is he going to be paid back, and how fast."
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2. Collection of the Debt
On the whole, however, credentials and collateral are second-
ary considerations to the loanshark; he holds the physical well-
being of the borrower and his family as security for the loan.92
One loanshark frankly advised a prospective customer that "[y]our
body is your collateral." 93  A confessed mob hitman described his
own technique of collection; after cutting off a portion of the
debtor's ear, he would explain: "If you pay me you can keep the rest
of your ear. If you don't pay me I'll have to take it with me. Then
the next day I'll take your other ear. Then we'll start on your
fingers." 94
Such graphic expressions provide effective tools for increas-
ing the likelihood of repayment. In most instances, however,
loansharks need rely only on threats and innuendo. Usually the
lender's reputation for violence suffices to ensure prompt re-
payment. 95 Alternatively, the loanshark's physique, weapons, or
92 See United States v. Marchesani, 457 F.2d 1291, 1293 (6th Cir. 1972) (loanshark gave
examples of fate of others who failed in repaying loan, then added: "Worse things can
happen to you. You've got a nice family and a couple of kids."); United States v. De-
Stafano, 429 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1970) (loanshark threatened father of debtor who fled:
get son to return or he "would be killed so that his son would come home for the fun-
eral"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971). See also 11 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 17, at
196-97 (footnote omitted):
... [A] woman['s] husband was loaned $300 for medical bills. He frequently had
difficulty meeting the 10-percent weekly interest payments. One night he was
dropped at their doorstep badly beaten. In May 1964, the shark to whom they
were in debt tried to kidnap their 5-year-old son, and the wife begged $30
from her employer after a threatening telephone call. On another occasion she
was told that, if they continued to have difficulty meeting the payments,
enough male customers would be found to enable her to earn $100 a day as a
prostitute. Eventually, the husband, having paid $1,000 in interest without ever
having reduced the principal, despaired and committed suicide.
'3 Cook, Just Call "The Doctor"for a Loan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1968, § 6 (Magazine),
at 19, 68.
91 JOEY, supra note 91, at 97.
95 One shark said that he couldn't afford to permit any default. Although $100
meant nothing to him, "If you let $100 slip by, soon $200 accounts slip by. You
can't let anybody slip by. So we kill for $100." This man became known as the
toughest loanshark in his city; and people who borrowed from him understood
that defaulting was out of the question.
Furstenberg. supra note 17, at 915-16 (emphasis in original).
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accomplices 96 may instill the necessary fear in borrowers reluctant
to repay.:5
7
Threats of violence, more than beatings or murders, protect
the financial interests of the loanshark; borrowers are far more
likely to repay their loans if kept alive and working. Although
occasional violence maintains the reputation of the loanshark 98
and discourages default,99 excessive force intimidates prospective
borrowers and increases the likelihood of police investigations.' 00
9, "Charles Stein, one of the biggest loansharks in New York City, would say to debt-
ors, 'If you can't meet the payment this week, Jiggs [Nicholas Forlano] will be around
next week.' Jiggs seldom had to come around." Id. at 934 n.21.
97 JOEY, supra note 91 at 95-96:
If you lend money out you'd better be strong enough to collect it. The
ability to apply the proper amount of muscle is what separates the amateurs
from the professionals....
... Once a customer is convinced the muscle is there he'll almost always
pay. It's only when he doubts that it is there that muscle has to be applied.
See also Seidl, supra note 8, at 51 n.3.
98 As one prosecutor has observed:
The juice victim is taken for a ride, riddled with bullets, and thrown into the
trunk of his own car. The juice gangsters arrange for the car to be parked so
that the police find it. Discovery of the murder is a warning to other delinquent
juice customers. They get the message with stark emphasis. The news headlines
don't cost these gangsters a dime of advertising space.
Small Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 109 (statement of Charles Siragusa, Executive Di-
rector, I11. Crime Investigating Comm'n), quoted in Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 917-18.
99 "The use of violence by syndicated criminal groups has been careful, calcu-
lated, and controlled ... [and] has been so successful that the fear instilled by
it has actually reduced the need to use force." ... Organized crime need not
make good its threats in every case. That it does so in a few is sufficient to
compel obedience nearly all the time. Henry Ruth wrote, "Selective fulfillment
of threats gives the appearance of an ability to make any threat an actuality.
Thus, only occasional violence is needed by organized crime to exploit in full
the opportunities that the threat of violence affords.
Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 915-16 (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Ben-
edetto, 558 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977) (debtor threatened with pistol, struck on head,
"smacked around," house ransacked).
00 With no objective yearly estimates of the violence due to organized crime, there
can obviously be no rigorous national approximations of trends. Nonetheless,
there is nearly unanimous agreement by law enforcement officials and other
experts on the basis of case experience that there has been a distinct decline in
the most serious forms of organized violence-gangland beatings and killings.
In Chicago, where organized crime was probably more violent than in many
other places, there were 765 "gang murders" between 1919 and 1934, an aver-
age of 38 per year. From 1935 to 1967, a period twice as long, there were 229
such murders, an average of seven per year.
The reason for the decline is not that [organized crime] is reducing its
activities-on the contrary, the above observations have indicated that its bases
have broadened and strengthened-but simply that it has changed to more
sophisticated management techniques. Its leaders have learned that violence
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Rather than inflict serious physical damage, the loanshark prefers
to impose financial penalties on the delinquent borrower.1 1 By
adding missed interest payments to the principal outstanding, the
loanshark increases both the regular interest due and the amount
of the loan to be repaid.'0 2
Loansharks can also protect themselves by requiring the equiv-
alent of a cosigner for loans to first-time borrowers. The
cosigner is often the individual who introduces the borrower to
the loanshark; he vouches for the borrower and becomes liable to
the loanshark in the event of default. This approach reflects the
business-like trend in loansharking techniques. As Joseph Valachi
stated in describing his loansharking enterprise, "I tried to run it
as a business. I'm not looking to beat up somebody." 103
Occasionally, a loanshark customer unable to meet his obliga-
tion is allowed to renegotiate his loan through the device of a
"sit-down." Although sit-downs are used primarily to resolve in-
trasyndicate disputes,' 1 4 loansharks sometimes direct delinquent
outsiders to this forum to be "let off the hook." 105  In these sit-
downs, a syndicate arbitrator establishes a figure for full settle-
ment. This figure normally exceeds the initial loan and often
ranges as high as three to four times that amount. 0 6
In lieu of a final settlement at a sit-down, a loanshark who
has stripped the borrower of all resources may agree to "stop the
clock." ' By temporarily suspending "vigorish" payments, 10 8 the
loanshark allows the borrower to improve his financial position.
only exposes them to public attention and law enforcement pressure. A con-
tinuing effort has been made to avoid violence, and much of the actual force
has been replaced by a system of rational alternatives, which apply to both
external and internal organized violence.
11 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 17, at 201-02 (footnote omitted). See also F. GRAHAM,
THE ALIAS PROGRAM 19 (1976) (victim of loansharks wrote letters to F.B.I. after receiving
threats of death and mutilation).
,", See, e.g., United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401, 1402-03 (2d Cir. 1972) (after payment
missed, principal and interest treated as new loan with new interest added on).
102 Joseph Valachi explained, "You find, as you go along, that most of these people get
in the habit of reborrowing before they pay up." P. MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS 161
(1968).
103 P. MAAS, supra note 102, at 159-60.
104 See M. HELLERMAN & T. RENNER, WALL STREET SWINDLER 178 (1977).
,o. But see United States v. DeCarlo, 458 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1972) (victim beaten at
"sit down" and told "to pay $5,000 every Thursday and the entire $200,000 by December
13, 1968 or [he] 'would be dead.' "), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
,on N.Y. COMIMISSION, supra note 18, at 13. See also F. GRAHAM, supra note 100, at 18.
"07 Small Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 6 (statement of Ralph F. Salerno, Consultant,
Nat'l Council on Crime and Delinquency).
,08 See text accompanying note 90 supra.
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After a set period of time, however, the borrower must resume
repayment. Generous loansharks will not compound interest dur-
ing the leniency period. 10 9 Frequently, however, loansharks add
missed vigorish to the principal, thereby increasing both future
installments and the balance of the loan.' 10
3. The Structure of the Operation
Profits produced by loansharking and other illicit underworld
operations provide organized crime with large cash reserves with
which to finance lending operations. Loansharks, however, may
also utilize legitimate lending institutions to generate capital."1 '
The New York State Commission of Investigation disclosed a
racket whereby John "Gentleman Johnny" Massiello used at least
$1.5 million from a single branch bank to finance his loanshark-
ing operations." 2 Shunned by commercial creditors, a borrower
sought a business loan from Massiello. In exchange for a $6,000
loan, Massiello demanded a promissory note for $8,000. The note
was taken to the bank, where, with the assistance of a corrupt
bank officer, the note was discounted at a rate of six percent.
Massiello gave $6,000 to the borrower, and pocketed $1,520.
Thus Massiello received instant repayment of principal plus a
generous rate of interest; meanwhile, collection was deferred to
the bank. In addition to discounting third-party notes, Massiello
and the corrupt loan officer, using dummy corporations and a
variety of names, engineered over $750,000 in loans, thus vastly
expanding the capital base of their loansharking enterprise." 3
Unlike some activities of organized crime, loansharking re-
quires no extensive operational organization; nor does it require
1 D. CRESSY, supra note 91, at 84.
110 Organized crime figures in Massachusetts do not appear to believe in "stopping the
clock." Charles Rogovin, expert on organized crime for the Massachusetts attorney general,
stated:
All other Mafia families have a tradition which they call "stopping the
clock." That is, when you're bled dry, they stop the clock on the interest and
just let you give back the principal. They stop short of killing, on the theory
that a dead man can't pay. But not here. They're totally ruthless about loan-
shark debts.
E. REID, THE GRIM REAPERS 66 (1969).
I Working with the cooperation of a corrupted bank officer, the loanshark secures
credit for the borrower at a commercial bank or thrift institution. A service fee, the loan-
shark's instant vigorish, is" skimmed off the top. The borrower is responsible only to the
bank, and the loanshark has completed his transaction at no personal risk. See N.Y. Com-
MISSION, supra note 18, at 73-75; Seidl, supra note 8, at 33-34.
112 N.Y. CoMuIssIoN, supra note 18, at 72-73.
113 Id.
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an established facility, a marked degree of experience, or
specialized training. Access to capital generally suffices to operate
a loansharking business. Organized crime contacts or affiliations,
however, are helpful and frequently necessary to ensure collection
of overdue accounts.
As in almost all sophisticated syndicate crime, the major
figures who profit from loansharking are well insulated. The boss
receives a substantial return at minimum risk by entrusting money
to his lieutenants, commonly assessing interest of 1 percent per
week." 4 In larger corporate loans, lieutenants often deal directly
with the ultimate borrower. More often, however, lieutenants
serve only as middlemen, passing money along to soldiers and
street distributors at 1.5 to 2.5 percent weekly.' 1 5  This "third
echelon" handles street loans and is free to charge whatever rate
of interest the market will bear. 16
Each participant in the hierarchy of distribution is an inde-
pendent contractor, responsible for full repayment of financial ob-
ligations. By lending a boss's money, however, the loanshark
benefits from his superior's backing and position of authority and
influence should a borrower default or an intrasyndicate dispute
arise. Such support may evaporate when a syndicate loanshark
lends his own money and fails to share the profits with his
bosses.1
1 7
At the lowest levels of loansharking, distributors sometimes
press delinquent debtors into soliciting new business as part of
"I See 115 CONG. REC. 5874 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); R. SALERNO & J.
TOMPKINS, supra note 19, at 229, 232:
The Boss invited ten of his trusted lieutenants to a Christmas party at his
home. After an excellent dinner he had a suitcase brought into the dining
room and counted out $100,000 in cash for each of the ten men. He said: "I
want 1 percent a week for this. I don't care what you get for it .... "
He did not record any names; they were all old friends. He did not have to
record the amount given out. His only problem at the next party will be finding
more good men to lend out the money that he will earn during the year.
115 Note, supra note 20, at 94.
116 R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, supra note 19, at 229.
117 Some underworld figures like to have it both ways:
Lombardo ... lied to Buster constantly about the loan-shark money they
had on the street together. He'd put out forty shylock loans at say $5,000
apiece and then he'd call Buster up and tell him he'd just put out ten loans at
$5,000. Buster would mark it down in his book since he was supposed to get a
percentage of all of Lombardo's business. Now if any of the forty loans went
bad, Lombardo would tell Buster that the bad loans were among the ten he'd
told him about.
M. HELLERMAN & T. RENNER, supra note 104, at 219.
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their obligation."1 Alternatively, loansharks may utilize contacts
in the community to track down prospective borrowers. These
"runners," frequently employed in factories or in service indus-
tries, work for the loanshark on a part-time basis. A working man
temporarily in need of cash will seek out the familiar runner. For
his part in the transaction, the runner receives a small percentage
of the profit."19
Despite the similarities in the organization of their operations,
individual loansharks tend to cater to specialized types of clients.
While some deal only with legitimate businessmen, others prefer
outlaw entrepreneurs. One medium-level loanshark dealt mainly
with fur dealers; another lent funds almost solely to bookmakers.
The reasons for this phenomenon probably relate to the loan-
shark's connections (persons tend to refer new customers from
their own industry), his geographical domain (for example, the
waterfront), and his area of expertise (which facilitates evaluation
of credit risks and disposition of collateral).
E. Loansharking Customers
1. The Legitimate Individual
Driven from legitimate credit sources as poor risks,
respectable members of the community may be compelled to turn
to the loanshark. Usually considered a "victim" rather than a "cus-
tomer," the individual borrower is often unaware that illicit ac-
tivities provide the source of the loanshark's capital. 2 ° Similarly,
the customer frequently fails to recognize that the extortionate in-
terest he surrenders contributes to the capital base supporting
further illegal operations. 2'
118 One heavily indebted borrower, Nathan Sackin, agreed to become a "frontman" for
his loanshark, John Sonny Franzese. Sackin recruited Gerald Wolff. When Wolff fell be-
hind in his payments, he in turn was forced to recruit new customers for Sackin. Small
Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 40 (statement of Michael H. Metzger, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
N.Y. County). See also id. at 67.
119 Kapland & Matteis, supra note 54, at 183.
120 "In one documented case a New York bank loan official turned down loan applicants
and at the same time he indicated that a certain loanshark might be able to help the
prospective borrowers. For his cooperation, the bank officer received a finder's fee."
SENATE SELECT Comm. ON SMALL BUSINESS, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 627.
91st Cong., Ist Sess. 67 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SMALL BUSINESS REPORT]. See also Small
Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 9-10 (statement of Ralph F. Salerno, Consultant, Nat'l
Council on Crime and Delinquency).
122 See ITT RESEARCH INST. & CHICAGO CRIME COIM'N, A STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME
IN ILLINOIS 148 (1971).
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Typically, the individual borrower seeking non-business credit
is a lower class urban laborer.' 22 For years, the waterfront has
provided a lucrative market for loansharks extending small per-
sonal loans. 123  Underworld financiers provide a "book," or
operating capital, to pier guards, checkers, hiring agents, or other
longshoremen who have easy access to workers on the docks. 124
The pier operator, known as the "pusher," must account to the
financier for profits on a weekly basis. The pusher charges a
standard interest rate and is fully responsible for the collection of
payments.125  Late fees, penalty charges, and occasional strong-
arming are employed to encourage prompt payments. 26
Another collection technique draws directly upon the
longshoreman's salary. Because of the transient nature of his job,
the longshoreman is known to his employers primarily by his so-
cial security number. Employers credit earnings to this number,
and the worker collects his wages by presenting a payroll identifi-
cation card. By confiscating the delinquent worker's card, the
loanshark can take payments directly from the employer. 12 7
The docks have proven especially lucrative for the loanshark.
Although individual loans are small, the large volume of pushers
generates sizeable profits.' 28 Longshoremen's access to cargo may
122 Note, supra note 20, at 97.
The urban poor can be victim-criminal, but they are, as well, purely vic-
tims. Five uneducated laborers, employees of a glue factory, got usurious loans
from a clothing store at which they shopped. They agreed to pay 20 percent
interest per week, and signed blank wage assignments, which were served on
their employer. Each week, 15 percent of their salaries was withdrawn, and
paid to the clothing store through which they had taken the loans. One of them
had been the subject of wage assignments for 19 years, the entire length of his
employment; the others for 10 years.
Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 924 (footnote omitted).
12' F. IANNI, supra note 14, at 97-98. But see id. at 99 (comments of Patsy Lupollo, Brook-
lyn loanshark):
I wouldn't put out any money even at 15 percent now because operating costs
are so high. Half the guys who borrow are on dope and, no matter what you
do, they aren't going to pay you back because they end up on Rikers Island or
getting shot by the cops.
124 N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 77.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 78.
12' Two brothers working as dock watchmen in New York were estimated to have oper-
ated a $150,000-per-year racket. When the brothers were arrested, they had close to $4,000 in
their pockets-a significant sum for men earning only $4,400 a year in their legitimate
employment. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1958, at 54, col. 6.
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also attract the loanshark; pilfered goods are frequently accepted
in settlement of overdue debts. The longshoreman delivers the
stolen merchandise to the loanshark who credits the borrower's
overdue account with a fraction of the goods' legitimate value. 2 9
Prominent citizens impoverished by gambling debts are
another profitable source of non-business loans. Operators of
bookmaking rings often enter into ongoing relationships with
loansharks 130 to whom losers, unable to pay, are referred for im-
mediate credit. Other loansharks station themselves at dice and
card games to assist unlucky players.' 31 Resulting on-the-spot
loans, sometimes payable within 24 hours, involve interest rates as
high as ten percent. 32
Tactics in collecting non-business loans are often ruthless.
One man who borrowed $1,900, paid $14,000, and still owed
$5,000 in late fees and penalties. The loanshark offered the
hopelessly indebted victim a solution. Following the accidental
electrocution of the borrower's son in a railroad yard, the loan-
shark persuaded the borrower to sue the property owner and as-
sign the damages recovered to the shark.133
Loansharks frequently coerce delinquent customers into
committing criminal acts to satisfy their debts. Individuals working
at brokerage houses are forced to steal or sell stolen negotiable
securities.' 34 In one case, a loanshark forced an attorney to serve
as a bookmaker in repayment of his debt.1 35 A sportscaster un-
able to meet his loan obligations was asked to steer affluent as-
sociates to a fixed dice game.' 36  A hairdresser with a wealthy
clientele provided inside information-such as descriptions of a
customer's jewelry, her maid's day off, and her husband's working
hours-to an organized burglary ring.' 37 A city commissioner
awarded lucrative public contracts to a loanshark's designee.' 38
129 N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 79.
120 Seidl, supra note 8, at 46.
131 F. IANNI, supra note 14, at 97.
132 D. CRESSEY, supra note 91, at 80.
133 Small Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 53 (statement of Michael H. Metzger, Asst.
Dist. Atty., N.Y. County).
134 Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 915; see also 115 CONG. Rac. 5874 (1969) (remarks of
Sen. McClellan).
135 D. CRFSSEY, supra note 91, at 85.
136 Id.
131 N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 42.
138 United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1969).
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And a businessman offered to burn down his establishment in order
to collect the insurance proceeds to satisfy his debt.139
2. The Criminal Borrower
Joseph Valachi, in explaining his technique for selecting
customers, indicated a preference for lending to fellow crim-
inals: "At one time I had around 150 regular customers. I got
rid of the ones that were headaches and kept the ones that
were no trouble-bookmakers, numbers runners, guys in illegal
stuff . " 140
The loanshark provides necessary working capital and
emergency funds to the criminal who is largely foreclosed from
obtaining capital from legitimate sources.1 4 1  This monetary web,
woven among loansharks and criminal borrowers, supports a vast
array of criminal ventures, bolstering and stabilizing the under-
world economy.142
Bookmakers in particular depend on the loanshark. Despite
his edge, the bookmaker may absorb periodic losses of tens of
thousands of dollars. 143  At three to four percent interest per
week, the cost of a sizeable loan may ultimately channel the long-
term gambling profits into the pockets of the loanshark.144
Drying up capital supplies by investigating and prosecuting
loansharks may thus have unique adverse effects on other crimi-
nal activities; the bookmaker who cannot cover losses, for exam-
ple, will not stay in business long.
Successful investigation of loansharks can also provide valu-
able leads and evidence for prosecuting other criminals. 145  In
one case, records confiscated from a Chicago loansharking opera-
tion listed 25 previously unknown criminals among customers
with outstanding obligations. 46
139 Transcripts of the conversations of Samuel DeCavalcante, June 3, 1965 (on file at
Cornell Institute on Organized Crime).
140 P. MAs, supra note 102, at 160.
141 See Note, supra note 20, at 98-99: "The loanshark also provides capital and
emergency funds to professional criminals not directly connected with the organized crime
family for purposes including purchase of tools, bribery of officials, and payment of bail
and legal costs."
142 See TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 15, at 43.
143 JoEY, supra note 91, at 89.
144 Goldstock, Letting the Loan Shark off the Hook, Newsday, Sept. 9, 1977, at 67.
145 See T. DEWEY, supra note 80, at 183: "Our sudden foray into loan sharking also gave
us valuable leads into our chosen major target areas of organized crime and political cor-
ruption."
146 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 6, 1974, at 7, col. 2.
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3. The Legitimate Businessman
Conventional credit markets, with the assistance of the Small
Business Administration, serve the financing needs of most of the
nation's small businesses. As in the consumer context, however,
restrictions on legitimate credit foster loansharking incursions into
business markets. Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital and small
businessmen in need of operating funds often secure usurious
loans by providing as collateral the very businesses they seek to
advance.1 47
Businesses characterized by chronic cash flow problems are
particularly vulnerable to loanshark predation. Garment manufac-
turers, for example, produce seasonal fashions well in advance of
sales. The volatility of fashions renders the goods unattractive col-
lateral for conventional loans. Large orders and incoming ship-
ments, however, require significant cash outlays. 148  Cash-short
dealers may not qualify for legitimate loans to cover outstanding
checks, and even creditworthy merchants may be hampered by
time constraints. Rather than ruin relationships with suppliers and
legitimate creditors, the merchant turns to the loanshark to obtain
necessary working capital. 149 When the merchant sells his newly
purchased goods, his revenues amply cover the principal and in-
terest. Fashion trends or business fluctuations, however, may
delay disposal of merchandise and prevent timely repayment.
Scissored by exorbitant interest rates and an inability to move his
merchandise, the overextended businessman may become an un-
willing partner of the loanshark.
Regardless of his creditworthiness, any businessman may oc-
casionally meet with unexpected but urgent capital demands. The
businessman may therefore seek short-term funding from the
loanshark while arranging for long-term legitimate financing. In
one case, a manufacturer of double knit clothing had purchased
eight machines for $128,000. The seller provided temporary
financing, taking notes payable on demand. The double knit
business prospered, but the manufacturer, scrambling to meet or-
'47 "[Firequently the loanshark is the only available source of a needed loan. Like his
ocean dwelling namesake, the loanshark feeds upon the weak victims. A business in finan-
cial trouble is the natural prey of a loanshark." SMALL BUSINEsS REPORT, supra note 120, at
67 (testimony of Michael Metzger, Ass't. Dist. Atty., N.Y. County).
148 Small Business Hearings, Supra note 4, at 66 (statement of Louis C. Cottell, Chief,
Central Investigation Bureau, N.Y. Police Dep't).
149 Miller, supra note 75, at 202-03.
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ders, found itself in a cash-short position. The seller, probably
contacted by a potential buyer, demanded immediate payment of
the notes or return of the machines. The manufacturer, an honest
businessman desperately in need of $80,000, faced two unpleasant
alternatives: employ the services of a loanshark or submit to the
ruination of his business. Charging five percent weekly interest,
the loanshark was expensive. In two weeks, however, the man-
ufacturer secured legitimate bank financing and eliminated his
diebt. He was fortunate; his gamble culminated in the satisfaction
of all parties and only cost him $8,000.15°
The susceptibility of businesses to loansharks, however, is not
confined to companies confronting cash-flow difficulties. Personal
loans to owners, officers, or key employees may provide the step-
ping stone for infiltration of legitimate enterprises. Money bor-
rowed from loansharks by businessmen for personal reasons such
as gambling debts or hospital bills can precipitate business disas-
ter.
F. Loanshark Infiltration of Businesses
The syndicate dabbles in a wide range of businesses.' 51 In
1951, the Kefauver Committee of the United States Senate iden-
tified approximately fifty industries infiltrated by organized
crime. 152  This list runs the gamut of American businesses-
among them manufacturing, services, finance, entertainment, and
media. The business affiliations of criminals attending the 1957
meeting at the Apalachin estate of underworld figure Joseph Bar-
bara illustrate the scope of legitimate business infiltration. Nine
men present operated coin-machine businesses; sixteen were in
the garment industry; ten owned grocery stores; seventeen ran
bars or restaurants; eleven were in the olive oil and cheese im-
porting business; nine were in the construction business; others
held interests in automobile agencies, coal companies, entertain-
is0 JOEY, supra note 91, at 91-92.
For three brothers in business together, financial obligations to a loanshark proved less
satisfactory. After borrowing $165,000 from a loanshark for a business venture, they al-
lowed the interest to accumulate. Within a year, having paid $163,000 in principal and
interest, the brothers still owed $124,000. After kidnapping two of the brothers, the loan-
shark demanded and received an additional promissory note for $140,000. Small Business
Hearings, supra note 4, at 114-19 (statement of Robert J. Walker, Chief Investigator, Ill.
Crime Investigation Comm'n).
5, See McClellan, Weak Link in Our War on the Mafia, READERS DIGEST REPORT, reprinted
in Subcommittee #5 Hearings, supra note 12, at 112-13; see also text accompanying notes
169-88 infra.
152 SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1951).
[Vol. 65:127
1980] LOANSHARKING 159
ment, funeral homes, horses and racetracks, linen and laundry
enterprises, trucking, waterfront activities, and bakeries.1 53  Or-
ganized crime's business operations clearly constitute a sizeable in-
trusion into the marketplace; 154 some observers contend that or-
ganized crime's profits from legitimate operations surpass those
from its illegal activities.' 55
153 D. CRESSEY, supra note 91, at 100; N.Y. COMM'R OF INVESTIGATION, REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATIONS OF PERSONS IDENTIFIED AS PRESENT AT THE RESIDENCE OF
JOSEPH BARBARA, SR., AT APALACHIN, NEW YORK, ON NOVEMBER 14, 1957, AND THE
REASONS FOR THEIR PRESENCE (1958).
154 "The cumulative effect of the infiltration of legitimate business in America cannot
be measured. Law enforcement officials agree that entry into legitimate business is con-
tinually increasing and that it has not decreased organized crime's control over gambling,
usury and other profitable, low-risk criminal enterprises." See TASK FORCE REPORT:
ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 15, at 5 (footnote omitted). Loansharking also provides a
vehicle for taking over small independent criminal ventures. Id. at 3 n.33.
155 Grutzner, supra note 23, at 49.
While this Article focuses on extortionate and usurious credit transactions, loanshark-
ing is only one tool employed by organized crime to penetrate the business community. See
Woetzel, An Overview of Organized Crime: Mores versus Morality, 347 ANNALS 1, 6-7 (1963);
see also Peterson, Chicago: Shades of Capone, 347 ANNALS 30, 32-39 (1963). The syndicate has
infiltrated the marketplace through legitimate purchases of ongoing businesses, although
less amicable tactics are usually employed. Regardless of the technique used, the businesses
targeted for infiltration invariably possess one or more of the following characteristics:
(1) Unorganized, inaccurate bookkeeping and records. Using embezzle-
ment, theft, and pilferage, employees connected with organized crime can
siphon off business assets. Stock brokerage houses, plagued by internal security
problems, often fall into this category. W. MULLAN, THE THEFT AND DIS-
POSITION OF SECURITIES BY ORGANIZED CRIME 24 (1975).
(2) Inventory or cash control difficulties. These problems typically occur
in businesses like discotheques, restaurants and bars, and facilitate "skimming"
of profits through pilferage and fraud. Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 917.
(3) Dependence upon a single supplier. By establishing localized
monopolies, the syndicate forces businessmen to turn to it to obtain products
otherwise unobtainable. This leverage is then employed gradually to take over
the business.
(4) Dealings with powerful unions. By dominating local unions, syndicates
can force profitable concessions from businesses forced to deal with unions but
eager to avoid labor problems. For example, Terry and Gene Catena, owners of
the Best Sales Company, attempted to market detergent to the Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Company. The expected commissions for the transaction to-
taled $1.5 million over ten years. "Sales agents" Joe Pecora and Irving Kaplan
negotiated for Best Sales. Pecora, an organized crime figure, was the boss of
Teamster Local 863; Kaplan headed Amalgamated Meat Cutter's Local 464 and
supervised contracts with A&P. Kaplan advised A&P officials that the upcoming
renegotiation of the meat cutters' contract might be hindered if the detergent
were not purchased. Pecora asserted that Teamsters would not cross meat cut-
ters' picket lines. Melvin, Mafia War on the A&P, Readers Digest, July, 1970, at
71-76.
(5) Substantial credit buying. Businesses that normally carry large accounts
payable provide excellent vehicles for bankruptcy schemes and other frauds. See
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1. Methods of Loanshark Infiltration
Using ostensibly legitimate means, the loanshark may simply
assume ownership of a business in satisfaction of the owner's
debt.156  For example, Joseph Valachi, in need of a tax cover to
explain his affluent lifestyle, entered the dress manufacturing in-
dustry. A Bronx factory owner, a regular customer of Valachi's
loansharking operation, was delinquent in his weekly payments.
Valachi supplied additional investment capital and labor "counsel-
ing" 15' and cancelled the manufacturer's debt in return for full
partnership status. 158
The loanshark can also infiltrate a business through strategic
placement of a confederate.' 59 In the million-dollar Murray
Packing "bust-out," 160 Joseph Pagano played this role for a high
ranking syndicate member.
In other cases, loansharks infiltrate businesses secretly. An
employee of a "target" business may steal company property or
surreptitiously provide company services to satisfy his obligation
to the loanshark. 1 61 Inadequately protected secu'rities kept in
generally N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 68; notes 148-49 and accompany-
ing text supra.
(6) Fronts for illegal activities. Hotels, bars, nightclubs, and small store-
fronts facilitate a variety of organized crime activities. Central locations and
numerous patrons make these facilities well-suited for gambling, loansharking,
and narcotics operations. See K. BERS, THE PENETRATION OF LEGITIMATE
BUSINESS BY ORGANIZED CRIME 31 (1970); Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 917.
'56 See F. IANNI, supra note 14, at 98; TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note
15, at 4.
' P. MAAS, supra note 102, at 166-68. Valachi's "counseling" included preventing union
workers from entering the shop.
158 Id.
159 "One organized crime group offered to lend money to a business on condition that a
racketeer be appointed to the company's board of directors and that a nominee for the
lenders be given first option to purchase if there were any outside sale of the company's
stock." TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 15, at 4 (footnote omitted).
"I R. SALERNO & J. TOMPKINS, supra note 19, at 235; see text accompanying notes 181-83
infra.
161 An employee of the Gilette Safety Razor Company regularly paid off his debt by
setting up weekly thefts of razor blades.
Gillette's practice of "dumping" obsolete blades at sea when the company introduced a
new model led to a major coup by the loansharks. Informed by the debtor-employee that
the blades had been shipped to a salvage company in Boston Harbor, the shark arranged
to buy millions of blades for a half a cent each. He eventually sold them for 2.5 cents each,
a 400% profit. V. TERESA, My LIFE IN THE MAFIA 135-36 (1973).
In another case "hijackers learned that a night supervisor was heavily in debt. A con-
tact man approached him with a $500 loan. When the supervisor could not pay it off he
was forced to let the hijackers load up a trailer from the warehouse." Each trailer load was
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brokerage houses are prime targets.'r 6 To satisfy his debt, the
brokerage house employee delivers stolen securities to the loan-
shark, who reduces the borrower's obligation by a small percen-
tage of the securities' value.'6 3  A more invidious form of infiltra-
tion occurs when the insider pays his debt by manipulating the
securities markets.1
6 4
Infiltration is the product of keen opportunism and other
criminal activities may set the stage for loanshark takeovers. The
Nylo-Thane Plastics infiltration, coupling an old-fashioned
kidnap-extortion plot with a sophisticated loansharking operation,
illustrates how the loanshark can capitalize on other criminal
plots.1 65  Maurice Minuto, the president of Nylo-Thane Plastics
Corp., required capital for a business expansion.' 66  Minuto con-
tacted Julius Klein, who had been identified to Minuto as a possi-
ble investor. At a restaurant meeting between the prospective bus-
iness parties, Klein and his accomplices confronted Minuto with
knives and a gun, and announced, "We're going to kill you unless
you give us $25,000." 167
estimated to be worth $15,000-S18,000. Subcommittee #5 Hearings, supra note 12, at
421-22 (citing Kelley, Washington Star, Mar. 11, 1970).
162 Organized Crime and Stolen Securities: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1971) (testimony of
Murray J. Gross, Asst. Dist. Atty., N.Y. County) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on
Organized Crime].
63 Bull Market on Thievery, FORBES, Dec. 15, 1968, at 34-37.
Former Attorney General John Mitchell estimated that in 1969 and 1970, $400 million
worth of securities were stolen from brokerage houses. W. MULLAN, supra note 155, at 22.
In one case, for example, an employee working for an organized crime figure walked out
of his company's brokerage office with $2.5 million worth of securities in his briefcase.
Senate Hearings on Organized Crime, supra note 162, at 74 (testimony of Murray J. Gross,
Asst. Dist. Atty., N.Y. County).
164 Mob figure Arthur Tortorello, using a loan to an indebted broker as leverage, ar-
ranged for the brokerage house to sell stock in a worthless company. The potential loss to
the public during the first year of this scheme was estimated at $1 million. N.Y.
COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 59-65. Such shams are, unfortunately, very common.
The mob's shylocks for years have had a field day on the Street lending money
to clerks and brokers who can't get money from banks or who have their credit
stretched too thin to make ends mett. How else do you think the mob was able
to steal billions of dollars worth of securities from Wall Street in the last dec-
ade? How else could a swindler like myself move stocks, get them placed on
the pink sheets, and manipulate the prices?
M. HELLERMAN & T. RENNER, supra note 104, at 363.
"', The description of the Nylo-Thane Plastics infiltration is taken from K. BERs, supra
note 155, at 18-19.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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After a night's confinement in a motel room, Minuto issued a
$25,000 Nylo-Thane check to his captors. To arrange for the
reimbursement of the company, Minuto visited John "Gentleman
Johnny" Masiello, a major loanshark. Masiello directed Minuto to
the Royal National Bank whose president and board chairman
was a friend of Masiello. Masiello received more than half of
Minuto's $50,000 loan in payment for his services. Induced by
Masiello, Minuto borrowed additional funds from Royal National,
eventually assuming obligations to the bank for $515,000, of
which he received only $13,500. In the meantime, Minuto had
given to Massiello, and pledged to the bank, Nylo-Thane stock
worth $1.3 million.1 68
2. Purposes of Syndicate Infiltration of Businesses
The syndicate has numerous reasons for infiltrating legiti-
mate businesses. The four most common are: (a) establishing a
"front" to conceal illicit activities, (b) obtaining specific services or
concessions from employees or other insiders, (c) "busting out"
the business to profit at the expense of company creditors, and
(d) "skimming" pre-tax dollars from company profits. 6 9
a. Operating a "Front." Frequently the loanshark will continue
the legitimate operations of an infiltrated business as a "front" for
illegitimate activities. By maintaining an interest in a legitimate en-
terprise, the loanshark generates a legal income to display to the
Internal Revenue Service. 170  Should the IRS question bank ac-
counts or expensive living habits, the loanshark can point to his
ownership of or employment by a legitimate company. Moreover,
a "legitimate" company with unfair competitive advantages, such
as control of well-placed labor officials 17 or access to stolen prop-
168 Id.
1'9 Of course, infiltrators may simply run the business for profit. Such entrepreneurial
moves are often accompanied by the use of extortion to create a monopoly and reap
oligopolistic profits. "When organized crime moves into a business, it usually brings to that
venture all the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal
businesses." 115 CONG REc. 5874 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
170 See generally R.A. Nossen, The Seventh Basic Investigation Technique, Analyzing Financial
Transactions in the Investigation of Organized and White-Collar Crimes, in LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE INVESTIGATION OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIME app. D (1977).
"' Access to the right person may prove extremely beneficial to a businessman. For
example, in 1970, the T.W. Bateson Company, a general contractor, hired members of
Union Local 210 of the International Hod Carriers, Building, and Common Laborers of
America to construct a federal office building in Buffalo, New York. Labor problems
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erty for inventory,' 72 may prove highly profitable in and of itself.
The operation of legitimate businesses can conceal illegality in
other ways. Loansharks and other racketeers can use these
businesses to launder illegally obtained cash. Similarly, by serving
as highly paid "consultants" to these businesses, they can collect
loansharked debts or receive extorted payments with ostensible
legitimacy. 173
Contact with a legitimate business also creates an air of re-
spectability for the organized crime figure. After acquiring the
Lido, a fashionable restaurant, Joseph Valachi said, "As far as the
neighbors are concerned, I was always a gentleman ... Mildred
[Valachi's wife] told them that I had the Lido, so they figured I
was just a guy who ran a restaurant." 174 More importantly, a
legitimate business gives the racketeer a place to hang his hat and
a reason for engaging in otherwise suspect activities. As a "front,"
any business provides the loanshark with an office to conduct his
illicit operations, a secure location to hold meetings, and an
explanation for contacts with businessmen, other criminals, or
public officials. 7 5
b. Obtaining Services and Concessions. Small-scale infiltrations
can also generate large-scale profits for the loanshark. Such ar-
rangements usually involve neither racketeer ownership nor
racketeer control; rather, the legitimate businessman grants spe-
plagued the construction; absenteeism, padded payrolls, pilferage, timeclock cheating and
slow work were rampant. Bateson's efforts to resolve the problems resulted in labor walk-
outs, threats of violence and a mysterious on-site fire. At the suggestion of union members,
Bateson hired John Cammillieri, a reputed "capo" in Buffalo's Magadino crime family.
Cammillieri was paid $7.10 an hour for his assistance as a "job coordinator." Almost im-
mediately, the laborers resumed work with greater efficiency than even the Bateson offi-
cials had anticipated. TIME, Aug. 30, 1971, at 21.
272 "Hijacking is big business for the mob. Most of the hijack loads, whether it's
cigarettes, liquor, furs, appliances, or food, are shipped by the mob to discount stores they
own or have connections with." V. TERESA, supra note 161, at 137.
173 One indebted restaurant owner was required to "employ" SGS Associates, a labor
relations firm fronting for Carlo Gambino. Despite the absence of any labor problems, the
owner paid $1,000 a month for this service. Small Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 48-49
(statement of Michael H. Metzger, Asst. Dist. Atty., N.Y. County).
174 P. MAAS, supra note 102, at 207.
175 The infiltration of a small luncheonette exemplifies this technique. The luncheonette,
started by a middle-aged couple in 1960, prospered until a nearby construction project cost
the owners a substantial part of their trade. The proprietors, desperately in need of work-
ing capital, borrowed from a local loanshark at rates of up to twenty-five percent interest
per week. The couple's debt was taken over by a syndicate lieutenant who was expanding
his bookmaking and loansharking activities in the area. Predictably, this new creditor began
to use the luncheonette as a front for his bookmaking and loansharking business, forcing
the proprietors to handle bets. N.Y. COMMISSION, supra note 18, at 45-50.
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cial concessions to his loanshark regarding the use or operation of
company's facilities.176 Examples are numerous. A Louisiana
man loaned money to restaurant and tavern owners, who in turn
accepted cigarette machines, jukeboxes, and pinball machines
from a syndicate supplier.177  The owner of a warehouse deeply
in debt to a loanshark, allowed the shark to use his facility to store
hijacked trucks and merchandise.'7 8  A Philadelphia restaurant
owner, in debt to a loanshark, explained why he bought a particu-
lar product: "If I bought another brand, my restaurant would be
a parking lot tomorrow morning." 119
c. "Busting Out" a Legitimate Business. Syndicates will some-
times infiltrate a business intending to pirate the company's assets
and force it into bankruptcy. Such schemes to defraud company
creditors are known as "bust-outs" or "scams." Loansharking often
provides the requisite toehold for initiating a "bust-out." 180
The procedure is well illustrated by the Murray Packing
scandal. 8' Murray Packing supplied meat, poultry, and eggs to
New York area supermarkets. The company had purchased goods
176 It has transferred to the legitimate field of business the same strong-arm prac-
tices which have proved so successful in the past. A manufacturer who will not
use a syndicate-owned trucking firm finds his life in danger or his family
threatened. A bar or restaurant operator who will not rent a syndicate-owned
jukebox finds that his waiters go on strike. A grocery store owner who will not
buy a syndicate-controlled line of imported food may be burned out. Further-
more, in its legitimate business enterprises, organized crime frequently de-
mands a higher price for its goods and services than is generally obtainable on
the open market, and provides a lower quality of products.
Subcommittee #5 Hearings, supra note 12, at 153 (statement of John N. Mitchell, United
States Atty. Gen.).
One restaurant owner who fell into arrears on his loanshark debt purchased, at the
suggestion of the loanshark, his meat and liquor from new suppliers at prices well above
competitive standards. The restaurant became an outlet for stolen and diseased meat, as
well as hijacked liquor shipments. A new headwaiter, the son of one of the "investors," was
taken on as a lookout for the restaurant's newly established bookmaking operation. Small
Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 48-49 (statement of Michael H. Metzger, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
N.Y. County).
177 Id. at 20 (statement of Henry S. Ruth, Jr., Prof., Univ. of Pa. Law School).
178 Id. at 11 (statement of Ralph F. Salerno, Consultant, Nat'l Council on Crime and
Delinquency).
179 Id. at 20 (statement of Henry S. Ruth, Jr., Prof., Univ. of Pa. Law School).
180 Id. at 49 (statement of Michael H. Metzger, Asst. Dist. Atty., N.Y. County). "An esti-
mated 250 such scam operations are pulled off each year, netting around $200,000 per
job." 115 CONG. REC. 5874 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
181 The description of the Murray Packing bust-out is taken from R. SALERNO & J.
TOMPKINS, supra note 19, at 235-36, and E. DEFRANCO, ANATOMY OF A SCAM: A CASE STUDY
OF A PLANNED BANKRUPTCY BY ORGANIZED CRIME (1973).
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on credit above the level of its cash resources. Within a year of its
incorporation, the business stood on the brink of bankruptcy. A
salesman for Murray Packing, Joseph Pagano, 8" promising a solu-
tion to the company's financial problem, steered the company's
managers to an alleged lieutenant in New York's Gambino family,
a man named Castellana. 18 3
To "save" the faltering company, Murray's principals took an
$8,500 loan from Castellana. The one-percent weekly interest
rate, although modest by loansharking standards, nonetheless
proved unduly burdensome for the cash-strapped company. Un-
able to meet their financial obligations to either Castellana or
other creditors, Murray's managers acceded to an imposed settle-
ment. Pagano became one-third owner and president of the com-
pany and received authority to write checks and transact company
business. During January, February, and March of 1961, Murray
Packing reestablished its credit by paying suppliers promptly. The
company then drastically increased its meat and poultry credit
purchases. These supplies were promptly transferred to Pride
Wholesale Meat and Poultry Co., a concern owned by Castellana.
The sales to Pride Wholesale, however, were below cost. Further-
more, as revenues entered the Murray Packing account, Pagano
withdrew them-issuing personal notes to the company.
In May, 1961, Murray Packing was adjudicated bankrupt.
The company's liabilities totaled approximately $1,300,000, repre-
senting debts to 85 creditors. Assets amounted to $1,060,422, in-
cluding $750,000 in promissory notes from Joseph Pagano.
Pagano and Castellana-as well as principals in the original
business-were convicted of conspiracy to violate bankruptcy
laws. 18 4
The Murray Packing "bust out" illustrates the perils to the
small businessman of taking usurious loans. It also illustrates the
potential profitability of such transactions; from a small loan
generating $85 a week interest, organized crime figures were able
182 Joseph Pagano was identified as a "soldier" in the Genovese family. See Organized
Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1963) (as noted on Commit-
tee chart of Genovese family verified during testimony of John F. Stanley, Deputy Chief
Inspector, Central Investigations Bureau, N.Y. Police Dep't).
183 Id. at 294 (as noted on Committee chart of Gambino family verified during testimony
of John F. Stanley, Deputy Chief Inspector, Central Investigations Bureau, N.Y. Police
Dep't).
184 United States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1965).
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to bankrupt a company and defraud legitimate businesses of over
one million dollars. 185
d. Skimming Company Profits. Organized crime figures will fre-
quently permit a controlled business to operate and use sham
transactions to "skim off" its income or assets. Commonly, such
schemes presage a bust-out although some involve more limited
incursions. A syndicate figure who has gained control of a busi-
ness may put himself on the payroll or bill the company for phan-
tom services or supplies.'8 6  Such payments provide the syndicate
member with a steady flow of income and the business with tax
deductions. In some cases, a controlled company instead of sup-
plying cash may channel its products to the loanshark's designees
for nonexistent or inadequate consideration.18 7
A classic "skim off" involved the Progressive Drug Com-
pany.18 8  Pawnee Drug Company purchased Progressive, a legiti-
mate family enterprise. Pawnee, created exclusively for the acqui-
sition of Progressive, was owned by Twentieth Century Industries,
a conglomerate whose officers were associates of known organized
crime figures. The new ownership quickly switched the company's
185 Even if loansharking does not provide the initial entry in a bust-out, it may prove
useful in consummating the fraud. In the case of the Falcone Dairy, for example, loan-
sharking supplied the means for disposing of "skimmed off" products.
Joseph and Vincent Falcone, known Mafia members, operated Falcone Dairy Products,
a wholesale distributor of soft cheeses in Brooklyn. In 1967, the Falcones and Joseph Cur-
reri opened a soft cheese factory in Alburg, Vermont. The Alburg factory purchased milk
from Vermont farmers and shipped its products to Falcone Dairy. The farmers' coopera-
tives billed Alburg directly for milk, and Alburg billed Falcone for cheese. By 1973, Alburg
owed $500,000 to the dairy cooperatives. Shortly after the farmers demanded payment, the
Alburg plant burned and the corporation entered bankruptcy proceedings.
Alburg had made shipments to Falcone Dairy valued at approximately $1,600,000 per
year. Most of these shipments had never been paid for, however. When the creditors de-
manded payment, Falcone asserted that 400,000 pounds of the purchased cheese had been
rancid. Falcone claimed damages of an amount in excess of the purchase price due.
The scam succeeded because Falcone was able to dispose of the "rancid" cheese with-
out showing a sale on its books. The loansharking operations of the syndicate facilitated
this process. Illegal aliens, using loanshark funds, had established pizza parlors in New
York and New Jersey. The loansharks collected their debt by selling the "rancid" cheese to
the aliens at exorbitant prices. Kwitny, Pizza Putsch: Vermont's Daiymen Won't Soon Forget the
Mafia's Arrival, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
186 One investigation involving a wholesale provision business turned up two hoodlums
on the payroll for $200 a week as "truck spotters." When questioned, they had absolutely
no idea of what their duties were supposed to be. The owner of the business was drawing
only $150 a week. Small Business Hearings, supra note 4, at 65 (statement of Louis C. Cottell,
Chief, Central Investigation Bureau, N.Y. Police Dep't); see also note 173 supra.
"" See notes 181-84 and accompanying text supra.
188 The description of the Progressive Drug Company "skim-off" is taken from Grutz-
ner, supra note 23, at 46.
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labor contract from a reputable union to a local of another union.
They ordered the vice president of Progressive to add Dominick
"Nicky" Bando to the payrolls of the company. Bando received
$150 a week as a "warehouse guard," and an additional $100 per
week to maintain labor peace. The new management also re-
quired Progressive's vice president to authorize case disburse-
ments for merchandise never delivered and services never
rendered. Progressive "was milked dry for the benefit of under-
world figures and other subsidiaries of Twentieth Century Indus-
tries"; 189 suppliers who had sold Progressive merchandise on
credit eventually absorbed the losses.
These examples of infiltration reflect a pattern of ever-
increasing importance in loanshark operations.
Today the professionals clearly prefer the quiet rustle of ex-
changing deeds and titles to the crunch of bones and the explo-
sion of gunpowder. "Why beat the guy to death," says one Bal-
timore loan shark, "when we can beat him for his business?" 190
II
THE LAW OF LOANSHARKING
A growing body of state and federal law addresses the prob-
lem of loansharking. Recently enacted laws prohibit extortionate
lending and collection practices. Other provisions seek to reach
the criminal hierarchy that finances and profits from illegal credit
transactions. In some states these fresh attempts to control the
loanshark complement long-enforced criminal usury and extor-
tion statutes. Where in force together, these provisions are well-
adapted to the practical difficulties involved in prosecuting the
wide variety of illicit lending activities.
A. Extortionate Credit Transaction Laws
1. Historical Development and Basic Principles
Extortionate credit transaction (ECT) laws aim directly at the
modern loanshark. 19i The ECT approach first surfaced in the
189 Id.
190 T. PLATE, CRIME PAYS! 147 (1975).
191 See United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 147 (1971) (holding federal ECT and com-
panion provisions constitutional exercise of Commerce power to attack loansharks).
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federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968;"92 since then,
several states have enacted similar statutes.1 93
ECT statutes are not usury laws.'9 4 Criminal usury statutes
forbid loans accompanied by excessive interest, while ECT laws
proscribe any loan consummated against a backdrop of violence.
The two types of statutes thus separately condemn the two central
objectionable characteristics of loanshark transactions.
All ECT laws share one pivotal requirement: the presence of
an extortionate "understanding" with regard to an extension of
credit.1 95
One commentator has called the federal ECT statute "curi-
ous," '6 and federal courts have encountered considerable diffi-
culty in deciphering its meaning. State courts have had no chance
to examine state ECT provisions closely. However, the federal and
state ECT statutes are strikingly similar. This fact, coupled with
the federal provision's progenitor role, renders federal authorities
highly relevant in deciphering the meaning of state ECT laws.
2. Elements of the Offense
Courts that have analyzed the federal ECT statute have iden-
tified three elements of the crime it defines: (1) making an exten-
sion of credit, (2) with the requisite extortionate understanding,
while (3) acting intentionally and knowingly.'97 Although the stat-
192 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1691 and 18 U.S.C. 33 891-894, 896 (1976).
,93 See, e.g., AiZ REV STAT. ANN. § 13-2302 (Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-102
(1978); CONN. GEN STAT. § 53-390 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(4) (West
Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.2 (Purdon 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 943.28(2) (West Supp. 1979).
194 H.R. REP. No. 1397, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2021, 2029 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
195 Definitions of the term "understanding" differ slightly among jurisdictions. Compare
ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(A)(3) (Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-102 (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-389(6) (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(1)(e) (West
Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.1(f) (Purdon 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 943.28(1)(b) (West Supp. 1979). The federal version, however, is typical:
An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect to
which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is
made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could re-
sult in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person,
reputation, or property of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976).
,' Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1969).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1977).
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ute aims mainly at professional loansharks, courts have found its
language and legislative history broad enough to bring all lenders
within its sweep. 198
a. Conduct. All ECT laws established a conduct requirement
of making an extension of credit. The federal definition is typical:
"To extend credit means to make or renew any loan, or to enter
into any agreement, tacit or express, whereby the repayment or
satisfaction of debt or claim, whether acknowledged or disputed,
valid or invalid, and however arising, may or will be deferred." 199
Courts have read the words "any loan ... valid or invalid ...
however arising," to cover atypical loans.2 00  For example, gam-
bling debts are included, 20 1 as are obligations arising from unau-
thorized use of credit cards 202 or the misappropriation of partner-
ship funds.2 0 3  In United States v. Bufalino,20 4 the Second Circuit
held that an "extension of credit" arose 20 5 when the "victim," a
swindler, obtained $25,000 worth of diamonds "in exchange for a
series of promises and a worthless check." 206 In the court's opin-
ion, "Congress took an exceedingly broad view of what it is 'to
extend credit,'"207 So that even illicit transactions would come
within the reach of the statute.
An even broader reading of the statute appears in United
States v. Totaro,20 8 where the loan proceeds were never trans-
ferred:
There is no doubt that [the defendants] entered into an agree-
ment to make the extortionate loan of $2500. Although the
loan may have been invalid because the check was not paid,
nevertheless the credit agreement was entered into. We think that is
all the statute requires, and that when the agreement was made
151 See, e.g., United States v. Keresty, 465 F.2d 36, 40-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
991 (1972).
199 18 U.S.C. § 891(1) (1976). Florida defines "extension of credit" as the "mak[ing] or
renew[ing] [of] a loan of money or any agreement for forbearance to enforce the collec-
tion of such loan." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.070(1)(d) (West Supp. 1978). The Wisconsin
ECT provision provides no definition. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.28 (West Supp. 1979).
200 E.g., United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1166 (7th Cir. 1974).
201 E.g., United States v. Mase, 556 F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
916 (1978).
202 United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1166 (7th Cir. 1974).
203 Id.
204 576 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.). cert denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978).
205 Id. at 452.
206 Id. at 448.
207 Id. at 452.
208 550 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977).
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the crime was complete so that the fact the check delivered to
[the borrower] was bad would not serve to exonerate [the de-
fendants]. 20 9
b. The Creditor's Understanding. The ECT laws require proof
that there was an "understanding of the creditor and debtor at the
time [they entered into the loan] ... that delay in making repay-
ment or failure to make repayment could result in the use of vio-
lence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, repu-
tation, or property of any person." 210 To determine whether this
understanding was present, a court must examine the state of
mind of both parties when they entered into the transaction.2 1 '
The primary difficulty with the statute rests in this inquiry.
Because the required understanding primarily involves the
possibility of violence or physical harm to the defaulting debtor,
proof of the creditor's manifestation of this element would typi-
cally consist of threats made to the alleged debtor. Congress did
not use the term "threat," however, although most traditional ex-
tortion statutes specifically require proof of threats.2 12 By requir-
ing only an understanding of possible harmful consequences,
Congress attempted to spare prosecutors the potentially difficult
task of proving that the defendant explicitly threatened the
debtor. The Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose in-
dicate that the statute is aimed at transactions which are charac-
terized by the use of implicit or explicit threats of violence.2 1 3
Congress thus recognized that loansharks do not always openly
threaten their victims, but often operate on the basis of implica-
tion and veiled suggestion.
Courts have also recognized that the understanding element
requires proof of something less than full-blown threats. In United
States v. Annoreno,2 1 4 for example, the defendants argued that
since no government witnesses had testified as to express threats,
there could be no conviction. The court's response was direct:
"Clearly, Congress could not have intended to punish only those
209 Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
210 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976) (emphasis added).
211 See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1977).
212 See notes 377-81 and accompanying text infra.
213 Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 201, 82 Stat. 146, 159 (1968),
reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 891 note (1976).
214 460 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972).
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loansharks foolish enough to make the terms of the loan explicit
and to exempt those who convey the nature of the transaction by
subtle hints and innuendo." 21 5 The court went on to set out an
objective standard of proof for the understanding requirement,
holding that the prosecutor need only show circumstances which
indicate that an atmosphere of threats surrounded the transac-
tion:
Thus, the inquiry into whether the borrowers had a factual
basis for their comprehension of the consequences of default
need not be restricted to a search of the record for explicit
threats. On the contrary, the inquiry should be whether the record
as a whole discloses a reasonable basis upon which the borrowers
might have predicated their fear that default or delinquency
might result in harm to themselves or their families. 216
Special evidentiary provisions in the federal ECT statute
further support this view of the understanding requirement. In
making out a prima facie case of an extortionate transaction, the
prosecutor can rely on specified kinds of circumstantial evi-
dence,217 none of which necessarily lead to the inference that
open threats were used.
Courts have effectuated this congressional extension of the
reach of anti-loansharking laws by defining understanding as a
"meeting of the minds" between the two parties. The prosecutor
is not required to show that the defendant and his victim ex-
pressly agreed that violent consequences would follow default; 218
the proof need only consist of evidence that the parties com-
prehended 219 or were aware 220 that violent collection tactics
would be used.
c. The Debtor's Understanding. Proof that the debtor feared vio-
lent or criminal retaliation would tend to show the required un-
derstanding on his part. Congress, however, again deliberately
chose not to draw on the extortion statutes and specifically re-
215 Id. at 1309.
216 Id. (footnote omitted).
217 18 U.S.C. §§ 892(b)-892(c) (1976). For a discussion of these provisions and their use
in proving the understanding element, see notes 453-66 and accompanying text inia.
218 See United States v. Annoreno, 460 F.2d 1303, 1308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
852 (1972).
219 Id.
2' See United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1977).
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quire proof of fear on the victim's part. 22 ' The standard of
proof concerning the debtor's half of the transaction thus does
not require proof of fear: "Where the threat of violence exists and
is comprehended by the victim, the extortionate nature of the
transaction is present and punishable under this statute." 222  The
important element is thus not fear, but only an awareness that the
transaction was backed by implicit threats of violence. 223
d. State of Mind. Perhaps because the understanding element
requires a subjective inquiry, the ECT statute fails to specify a
state-of-mind requirement. Courts interpreting the federal provi-
sion, however, have held that the defendant must act "intention-
ally and knowingly." 224  In United States v. Nakaladski,225 an ECT
conspiracy case, the court fleshed out this standard: "[T]he gov-
ernment [must] prove only that [the] appellants had planned and
intended that [the debtor] would understand the possibility that
harmful consequences could [follow]." 226  This broad standard is
appropriate, since it includes those who do not actually intend to
use force but do intend to convey that possibility to the bor-
rower.
2 2 7
221 Some extortion statutes use the term "fear" as well as the term "threat." See, e.g.,
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 518, 519 (West 1970);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2801, 18-2802 (1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-77 (1972).
222 United States v. Annoreno, 460 F.2d 1303, 1309 (7th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972). The defendants in Annoreno were convicted only of conspiracy
to violate the ECT statute. Id. at 1305. Therefore, the understanding of the victims was not
strictly at issue, and the court's statement could be considered dictum. The court felt com-
pelled to consider the nature of the debtor's understanding, however, since it required the
government to prove "that the defendants planned and intended that those to whom they
extended credit would understand the possible harmful consequences of default or delin-
quency." Id. at 1309 n.7.
221 See United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 1977).
The absence of a fear requirement eliminates a potential prosecutorial problem if its
only witness is a government agent who posed as a borrower. The agent could fully under-
stand that nonrepayment could result in violence, but experience no fear because he knows
the lender will be arrested. Cf United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1267 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976) (prosecution under Hobbs Act, federal extortion
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)).
224 United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1977).
225 481 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
226 Id. at 297.
227 The standard is arguably overbroad, however, since it would also take in the bluffer
who plans and intends to create the required understanding, but has no intention of actu-
ally harming the borrower upon default. On these facts, the lender arguably has no "un-
derstanding" that illegal collection tactics "could result." See 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976).
The phrase "understanding of the creditor and the debtor" (id.) should cover the bluf-
fer, however, for three reasons. First, this construction is compatible with the statute's gen-
eral purpose of eradicating loans consummated against a backdrop of violence. See note
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B. Laws Prohibiting the Collection of Credit by Extortionate Means
1. Historical Development and Basic Principles
Most ECT jurisdictions have complemented extortionate lend-
ing provisions with companion laws prohibiting the collection of
debts 228 by extortionate means (hereinafter, collection laws). 229
Such a provision first appeared in Title II of the federal Con-
sumer Credit Code of 1968: 230
Whoever knowingly participates in any way, or conspires to do
so, in the use of any extortionate means
(1) to collect or attempt to collect any extension of credit,
or
(2) to punish any person for the nonrepayment thereof,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.
23
'
A few states have since passed similar statutes. 232  While the ECT
law focuses on circumstances surrounding the extension of credit,
"it is the use of extortion in the course of loan collections which is
... made unlawful by [the collection law]... ," 233
2. Elements of the Offense
The heart of the collection offense is the use, or threatened
use, of force or violence as a means of collecting money lent. "It is
the effort of usurious money lenders, or 'loan sharks,' to seek ex-
212 and accompanying text supra. Whether or not the lender actually intends to use vio-
lence, veiled threats will be equally successful in instilling fear, the evil the statute was
designed to eradicate. Second, the ECT statute deals only with the circumstances when the
loan is made; a separate provision prohibits extortionate collection tactics. See notes 228-
33 and accompanying text infra. Third, even phony threats will often harm the debtor by
instilling mental anxiety when he defaults. Since the creditor expects this result, he
"understands" that default "could result in the use of... other criminal means," i.e., the
threats which the debtor recalls, to cause harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976).
228 For an explanation of the various terms used in this Article to refer to the collection
process, see note 237 infra.
229 See, e.g., ARiz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13-2304 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-107
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-392 (1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.6 (Purdon
1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.28(4) (West Supp. 1979). Florida has an ECT law (FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 687.071(4) (West Supp. 1978)), but no collection law.
230 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894, 896 (1976).
231 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) (1976).
232 See note 229 supra.
233 United States v. Biancofiori, 422 F.2d 584, 585 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942
(1970). The two statutes cover distinct facets of the same problem. A lender, for example,
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tralegal methods of enforcing their unconscionable agreements
which this statute is designed to restrain."234
The elements of the offense are: "(1) that there was principal
or interest outstanding on the loans, (2) that the defendants actu-
ally collected or attempted to collect sums due, and (3) that the
defendants employed extortionate means to collect [the] same." 23 5
Reading a state-of-mind requirement into the statute, courts
have insisted upon knowing participation by the defendant. 236
The statute applies not only to participants in organized crime,
but to anyone using extortionate means to collect an extension 237
of credit. 238
a. Conduct. The primary conduct prohibited by the statute is
collecting, attempting to collect, or punishing for nonpayment.239  Few
decisions have turned on the definitions of these terms; their
meaning in the context of prosecutions under the collection law is
may not intend to use force in collecting a debt, or he may not intend to suggest the
possibility that force will be used. When the debtor defaults, however, the lender may
become incensed and threaten violence if the debtor does not repay. On these facts, these
would be no violation of the ECT law, but the lender could be convicted for using extor-
tionate means to collect. See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 177 n.3, 178
(3d Cir. 1977). On the other hand, an extortionate understanding may accompany the loan
agreement, but outside events, such as arrest or repayment, may preclude the.use of extor-
tionate collection techniques. On these facts, there would presumably be a violation of the
ECT law, but no collection law violation.
The federal collection law, 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1976), has proven to be a valuable com-
plement to the ECT law as a weapon against loansharking and organized crime. In fact,
there are considerably more cases under the federal collection law than under the compan-
ion ECT statute.
234 United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1165 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950
(1976).
235 Id. at 1166.
236 See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 1977).
237 The phrase "to collect an extension of credit" is imprecise; "extension of credit" re-
fers to the agreement to enter into the loan or other transaction, and the agreement itself is
not collected. See note 199 and accompanying text supra. The statute itself, however, uses
this imprecise language. 18 U.S.C. § 894(a). In addition, to refer to the collection of
"debts" would be misleading, since the collection law also applies to transactions that are
not debts in the traditional sense of the term. See notes 199-209 and accompanying text
SUpra.
Throughout this Article, therefore, the phrases "collection of debts," "collection of
credit," and "collection of an extension of credit" are variously used to refer to the collec-
tion process within the meaning of the collection laws.
231 E.g., United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1974).
23.9 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) (1976). 18 U.S.C. § 891(5) contains this definition: "To collect an
extension of credit means to induce in any way any person to make repayment thereof."
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usually self-evident. In United States v. Papia,24 ° for example,
ample evidence suggested that the defendants conspired to burn
down a restaurant, kidnap its owner, and break his wrists after he
defaulted on a $5,000 loan.24' The court found this evidence
sufficient to support the charge of conspiracy to collect the debt
and to punish the failure to repay the loan.242
b. Attendant Circumstances. Two attendant circumstances are
prerequisites to conviction under the collection law: (1) the exis-
tence of an extension of credit, and (2) the participation "in any
way ... in the use of any extortionate means . . . " to collect.243
The extension-of-credit requirement is identical to that im-
posed by the ECT law; 244 thus, the courts read the requirement
broadly. In United States v. Briola,245 for example, where the evi-
dence showed that during a meeting with the victim, the defen-
dants beat him and kneed him in the groin, the defendants did
not contest the fact that they punished the victim. 2 4 6  Instead,
they contended that the beating was punishment for a theft rather
than for nonrepayment of a loan.247  The victim, an employee in
a bookmaking operation, had placed bets of his own in someone
else's name, had lost, and then had claimed that the bettor would
not pay.248 The court stated that "extension of credit" was not
limited to a loan "in the sense of money passing," but was "di-
rected to the use of extortionate means . . . to collect monies
[owed], regardless of whether the loan arose from a traditional
type of loan." 24 9 The loan itself need not have been extortionate
at the outset.250  In fact, the prosecutor need not even prove that
the alleged debtor admitted his liability for the obligation.25'
240 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977).
241 Id. at 832-33.
242 Id. at 834.
243 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) (1976).
244 in the federal law "to extend credit" is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 891(1) (1976), and the
definition applies to both the ECT and collection provisions. See notes 195-209 and accom-
panying text supra.
245 465 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
24r Id. at 1020-21.
247 Id. at 1021.
248 Id. at 1020.
249 Id. at 1021.
20 See, e.g., id. (collection law "directed to the use of extortionate means ... to collect ...
regardless of whether the loan ... resulted from the assumption of responsibility as a
result of force or threats"); United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1165-66 (7th Cir.
1974); note 233 and accompanying text supra.
2"1 E.g., United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Interpretation of the second attendant circumstance, partici-
pation in the use of "extortionate means," pivots on the statutory
definition of that term: "any means which involves the use, or an
express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal
means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of
any person." 252
The cases suggest four ways to satisfy the extortionate means
requirement: (1) by collecting or attempting to collect an extor-
tionate loan, (2) by making an implicit threat, (3) by making an
explicit threat, or (4) by using violence or other criminal means.
(i) Collection of an Extortionate Loan. According to the court in
United States v. Nakaladski,253 if the collector of a loan knows that
the loan was extortionate when made (i.e., that the requisite un-
derstanding existed), then he violates the law either by attempting
to collect in any way or even by accepting payments.254 Accord-
ing to this reasoning, it is not necessary to show use or threatened
use of violence; collection of a loan known to be extortionate, by
definition, constitutes an extortionate collection. 255  The borrower
will recall the extortionate understanding that was present when
the loan was made, and he will suffer the type of pressure that
the collection law was intended to eradicate. 56
(ii) Implicit Threats. In United States v. Curcio,251 the court
struggled with the statutory language "implicit threat," which was
under attack as unconstitutionally vague.258 Declaring that Con-
gress, in using this language, "simply incorporated well established
federal decisional law of extortion into the Act," 259 the court con-
cluded:
Acts or statements constitute implicit threats only if they instill
fear in the person to whom they are directed or are reasonably
calculated to do so in light of the surrounding circumstances
and there is an intent on the part of the person who performs
the act or makes the statement to instill fear.260
252 18 U.S.C. § 891(7) (1976).
253 481 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
254 Id. at 298.
255 Id.
256 See note 227 supra.
257 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Conn. 1970).
258 Id. at 356. The defendant claimed that the vagueness of this language rendered the
provision void under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 357 (citation omitted).
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In recognition of the problems of proof that the language
"implicit threat" presents, the statute provides for the introduction
of evidence of the victim's knowledge of past extortionate collec-
tions by the defendant.2 1 ' When direct evidence of the actual
belief of the debtor is not available and the prosecution meets
certain other conditions, 2 ' evidence of the defendant's reputation
in any community of which the victim was a member is admissi-
ble.263  The court in United States v. Largent 264 held that introduc-
tion of evidence under this provision is consistent with Federal
Rule of Evidence 404.265 The court also stated, however, that to
be admissible, the reputation evidence "must be substantially simi-
lar and near in time to the offense charged, must be in issue, and
must have more probative value than prejudicial impact."266
The minimum requirement for an implicit threat is that "the
actor knows that his words or act ought reasonably to be
taken as a threat." 267  Proof of threats may come from testimony
261 18 U.S.C. § 894(b) (1976).
262 The federal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 894(c) (1976), is typical. It conditions admission of
reputation evidence on a showing either that the extension of credit is unenforceable
through the civil judicial process or that the annual rate of interest exceeds 45%.
263 See notes 454-55 and accompanying text supra.
264 545 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977).
265 Id. at 1043 (citations omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 404 states:
Evidence of prior conduct is not admissible to prove the character of a person
or another crime, but rather is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
266 Id. (citation omitted). Cf. United States v. Joines, 327 F. Supp. 253, 255-56 (D. Del.
1971) (court notes in dicta that Congress, in this provision, intended to broaden rules of
evidence and by-pass some strict exclusionary rules); Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 201, 82 Stat.
146, 159 (1968) (congressional finding that "[a]mong the factors which have rendered past
efforts at prosecution almost wholly ineffective has been the existence of exclusionary rules
of evidence stricter than necessary for the protection of constitutional rights.").
267 United States v. DeStafano, 429 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
972 (1971).
The DeStafano formulation of the state-of-mind requirement differs from the court's
interpretation in United States v. Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351 (D. Conn. 1970):
Acts or statements constitute implicit threats only if they instill fear in the per-
son to whom they are directed or are reasonably calculated to do so in light of
the surrounding circumstances and there is an intent on the part of the person who
performs the act or makes the statement to instill fear.
Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
The DeStafano formulation requires that the defendant knew that he was making a
threat, while the Curcio interpretation requires that he intended to instill fear. If a lender
intends to place another in fear, however, surely he knows that his acts or statements are
threats. If the "intent" standard is used, therefore, there is no need to instruct the jury
concerning a "knowledge" requirement.
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of the defendant's reputation for using violent collection tac-
tics. 268  As the court remarked in United States v. Spears,26 9 the
"threat of violent consequences comes from the general nature of
all the loan and collection transactions, and from defendant's
reputation in the community."270
(iii) Explicit Threats. A court can find that a lender used
explicit threats as a collection tactic even if the defendant actually
intended no harm. In United States v. Sears,27' for example, the
defendant approached the debtor and demanded repayment, say-
ing "'[i]f you don't have that money by Friday, I am coming to
your house with my piece and I am going to blow you away.' "272
The defendant testified that he had intended his words to have a
" 'psychological' effect on [the debtor] which would induce him to
repay the loan." 273  He sought to escape conviction, however, by
arguing that he never "owned a gun and ... [had] never intended
to harm [the debtor]." 2 74 The court upheld the trial judge's jury
instruction that the issue was whether or not the defendant "in-
tend[ed] to put [the debtor] in fear.... [or] use his language ...
to force him to pay."275  The fact that he intended no harm was
immaterial. "Fear must be the intended result of the defendant's
act." 276
It is possible to convict for a collection offense even if the
alleged victim denies that the defendant ever made the threat, as
long as there is sufficient other evidence. 277  "[T]he silencing of a
victim" 278 by fear does not foreclose conviction.
(iv) Actual Use of Violence or Other Criminal Means. The collec-
tion statute includes in its definition of extortionate means the
268 See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 568 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
839 (1978) (testimony that defendants "'climbed on people,' frightening them about receiv-
ing their money"); United States v. Frazier, 479 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (victims'
testimony that they observed defendants administer beatings to other recalcitrant debtors).
269 568 F.2d 799 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 839 (1978).
270 Id. at 802.
271 544 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1976).
272 Id. at 586.
273 Id. at 587.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 588.
277 See, e.g., United States v. DeLutro, 435 F.2d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 983 (1971) (victim denied threats made, but testimony of FBI agent and recordings of
telephone conversations concerning victim's fear held sufficient).
278 Id. at 257
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"use ... of violence." 2 7' 9  Thus, the collection law goes beyond
mere threats to encompass the actual causing of harm. 8 ° In this
respect, the law resembles unusual Massachusetts and Rhode Is-
land statutes, which prohibit assault and battery committed for the
purpose of collecting a loan.28
1
c. Result. While it is necessary that fear be an intended con-
sequence of a threat under this law, the statute, properly read,
does not require that fear or even "comprehension" result. In this
respect, the collection law differs from the ECT laws. 82 At least
one court has misread the statute and the decisions interpreting it
to impose a fear result.28 3 The statute, in fact, neither mentions
fear nor requires an inquiry into the victim's state of mind, except
when evidence of the victim's, knowledge of the defendant's past
conduct is introduced to show that the defendant intended to
threaten the victim. 2 8 4  "[I]t is the threat of harm which is prohib-
ited ... , actual fear is not an element of the offense." 285
d. State of Mind. The collection statute requires that the de-
fendant have "knowingly participate[d] ... in the use of any ex-
tortionate means. ' 2 86  Courts have read this language as requir-
ing an intent to "put [the victim] in fear"2 87 and not the actual
intent to harm.2 8 8  The statute punishes only the knowing use of
279 18 U.S.C. § 891(7) (1976) (emphasis added).
280 See United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1978).
28 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13C (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-6
(Supp. 1978).
282 See notes 218-20 and accompanying text supira.
283 See United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1977). The Nace court found
that "fear is an essential element of the crime charged," citing United States v. Curcio, 310
F. Supp. 351 (D. Conn. 1970). Curcio, however, does not command this result:
Acts or statements constitute implicit threats only if they instill fear in the per-
son to whom they are directed or are reasonably calculated to do so in light of the
surrounding circumstances and there is an intent on the part of the person who
performs the act or makes the statement to instill fear.
Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
284 See 18 U.S.C. § 894(b) (1976). See also note 438 and accompanying text infra.
28 United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1168 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950
(1976) (emphasis added).
288 See 18 U.S.C. § 894(a) (1976).
287 United States v. Sears, 544 F.2d 585, 587 (2d Cir. 1976).
288 See, e.g., United States v. Sears, 544 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[flear must be the
intended result . .. "); United States v. Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Conn. 1970)
("intent ... to instill fear").
There seems to be at least semantic disagreement over the state-of-mind requirement
imposed by § 894. While United States v. DeStefano, 429 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
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extortionate means 289 and the only state-of-mind requirement in
the usual case is the intent to instill fear. The knowing participa-
tion requirement, however, covers not only those who intend to
induce fear, but also those who assist the other participants with
knowledge of their designs.290
C. Criminal Usury
1. Historical Development and Basic Principles
Despite the ancient heritage of usury proscriptions, criminal
usury statutes lack common-law lineage.29' The earliest systema-
tic legislative efforts to criminalize usurious lending in America
were the small loan acts passed in the early twentieth century.292
Recently, however, states have supplemented or strengthened
these statutes with specific criminal usury proscriptions. These
laws responded to an obvious yet intransigent problem:
"the creditor's power over the necessitous to extort oppressive
terms.... 293
denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971), seems to require no more than knowledge that acts will be
reasonably read as threats, Curcio specifically requires a specific intent to instill fear. See
note 260 and accompanying text supra. We see no practical distinction between these stan-
dards. If the provocateur knows that the listener will reasonably construe his actions as a
threat, surely he intends to instill fear. We advise use of the "intent" formulation in fram-
ing instructions since "knowledge" of a "reasonable tendency" is a slippery concept, likely
to confuse jurors. DeStefano could be read as identifying a state-of-mind requirement in
addition to the intent to instill fear, relating only to the conduct element of "threaten"-i.e.,
the defendant must know that he is threatening. But if a defendant intends to place
another in fear, surely he knows that his acts are threats. Therefore, we see no need to
instruct the jury on any separate state-of-mind requirement relating to this element of the
crime. Indeed, the intent element renders the "reasonable tendency" conduct requirement
virtually irrelevant as a practical matter because it is difficult to conceive of a situation in
which one would intend to instill fear, undertake conduct to achieve that goal, but not
engage in conduct with a tendency to instill fear. In light of this observation it seems that
the "reasonable tendency" requirement serves no purpose save to complicate and lengthen
jury instructions in these cases. These observations are not limited to § 894; they apply as
well to traditional extortion statutes.
28' See note 267 and accompanying text supra.
290 For a conspiracy prosecution, the jury need only find that "it was the intent of [the
defendants] to use threats or actual violence .... " United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d
289, 298 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
291 See Matlack Properties, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 120 Fla. 77, 80, 162 So. 148,
150 (1935); Crisman v. Corbin, 169 Or. 332, 341, 128 P.2d 959, 962 (1942).
292 See Haller and Alviti, supra note 57, at 137; note 73 and accompanying text supra.
292 Benson v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 105 Fla. 135, 148, 134 So. 493, 498 (1931) (quot-
ing I J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 318, at 999 (4th ed. 1916)),
modified, 105 Fla. 135, 142 So. 887 (1932). But see notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra
(suggesting that usury laws, in combination with other economic factors, could drive
desperate borrowers to loansharks).
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Some usury statutes impose felony penalties,294 while others
condemn criminal usury as a misdemeanor.2 95 Some states have
combined a criminal usury statute with laws prohibiting extortion-
ate credit transactions and other loansharking activities; 296 federal
law, however, does not contain a criminal usury provision.
2. Elements of the Offense
Although usury statutes vary and have caused confusion
among courts, 297 it is possible to generalize about the elements of
the usury offense. The Florida Supreme Court summarized the
typical elements of a usurious transaction:
(1) There must be a loan express or implied; (2) An under-
standing between the parties that the money lent shall be re-
turned; (3) That for such a loan a greater rate of interest than
is allowed by law shall be paid or agreed to be paid, as the case
may be; and (4) There must exist a corrupt intent to take more
than the legal rate for the use of the money loaned.29
a. Conduct. Criminal usury statutes typically contain a two-
fold conduct requirement: (1) making a loan and (2) charging,
taking, agreeing to take, or receiving interest.29 9  Although at
least one statute requires that a transaction meet a detailed defini-
tion of "extension of credit," 3 00 most simply refer to a "loan or
forbearance of any money or other property." 301 Regardless of
294 See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1916-3(b) (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
687.071(3) (West Supp. 1979) (45% per annum interest); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(a)
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.15(51) (1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 190.40 (second degree), 190.42 (first degree) (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
29' See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 37-4, 37-7 (1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(2) (West
Supp. 1979) (25% per annum interest); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-117, 57-9901 (1977); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 478-6 (1976); IOWA CODE § 535.6 (1979-80); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.095
(Vernon 1979).
2 9 See, e.g., statutes cited in note 193 supra.
297 See Owens v. State, 63 Fla. 26, 33, 58 So. 125, 127 (1912) ("The question of usury
generally has given the courts much trouble.").
2 9 Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis in original).
299 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-104(1) (1978) ("charges, takes, or receives"); CONN.
GEM. STAT. § 37-4 (1969) ("charge, demand, accept or make any agreement to receive");
GA. CODE ANN. § 57-117 (1977) ("reserve, charge, or take"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
39-1(a) (1975) ("contracts for or receives from"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(a)
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979) ("contracts for, charges, takes or receives").
300 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(1)(d) (West Supp. 1978).
"01 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.40, 190.42 (McKinney Supp. 1977). See, e.g., CON. GEN.
STAT. § 37-4 (1969) (loan of money); GA. CODE ANN. § 57-117 (1977) ("loan or advance of
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the conduct they require, usury statutes do not usually reach sales
transactions; if a sale is legitimate and not used to camouflage a
usurious loan, even a great disparity between purchase price and
actual value will not qualify as usury.30 2  The law is aware, how-
ever, of the many disguises usurious transactions may assume. As
one court poetically stated, "[Tihe concealment of the needle of
usury in a haystack of subterfuge will not avail to prevent its
pricking the body of the law into action."' 30 3
By proscribing both "charging" or "agreeing to take" and
"taking" or "receiving more than the legal rate of interest," 304 the
typical usury statute reaches any usurious agreement whether or
not the lender actually collects the interest or principal. As one
court observed, "Clearly, the ordinary meaning of 'charge' [does
not require] ... actual payment."305 Acceleration clauses, how-
ever, are an exception to this rule; some states consider them
usurious only if the lender actually receives the accelerated in-
terest.30 6 Although this interpretation may be just and, under
money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of money"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 39-1 (a) (1975) ("a loan of money or other property or forbearance from the collection
of such a loan"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979) ("a
loan of money or other property").
302 See, e.g., Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 487-88, 122 N.W.2d, 528, 532-33 (1963) (time
sale not usurious, although difference between time price and cash price may exceed legal
rate of interest), cert. dismissed, 377 U.S. 973 (1964); Levine v. Nolan Motors, Inc., 169 Misc.
1025, 1026, 8 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312-13 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. 1938) (credit sale where total
price exceeded cash price by more than legal rate held nonusurious) (alternative holding).
303 Kay v. Amendola, 129 So. 2d 170, 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
304 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-15-104(1) (1978) ("charges, takes, or receives"); CONN.
GEN. STAr. § 37-4 (1969) ("charge, demand, accept or make any agreement to receive");
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979) ("contracts for, charges,
takes or recieves").
305 American Acceptance Corp. v. Schoenthaler, 391 F.2d 64, 74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 928 (1968). Courts usually look to the total benefits which the lender would
receive in determining the interest rate charged. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dugger, 96 F.2d 727,
729 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 623 (1938).
306 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 88 F.2d 449, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1937) (apply-
ing Mississippi law); Smith v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 87 F.2d 839, 841-42 (5th Cir.
1937) (applying Kansas law).
The Florida Supreme Court has fashioned a slightly different rule. Under its reason-
ing, an unexercised acceleration clause does not render the transaction usurious. But if the
clause is exercised the loan becomes usurious even if the lender does not claim the entire
amount of the unearned interest. If the amount of interest which the lender could have
collected under the clause exceeds the legal rate, the mere exercise of the clause renders
the transaction criminally usurious. Home Credit Co. v. Brown, 148 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla.
1962).
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some state formulations, comport with statutory language, 30 7 in
most cases the exception for acceleration clauses imposes an addi-
tional conduct requirement or disregards language sufficiently
broad 308 to cover such clauses.
b. Attendant Circumstances. The critical attendant circumstance
under usury statutes is the designated interest ceiling. Prohibited
interest levels vary greatly, ranging from six percent in Tennes-
see 309 and twelve percent in Arizona 310 to fifty percent in New
Jersey.31' Some statutes exempt those authorized or permitted by
law to charge what otherwise would be usurious interest rates.31 2
c. Result. The typical usury statute requires no result. If the
original agreement is usurious, repayment is unnecessary for con-
viction of the lender.313
d. State of Mind. Because usury is "largely a matter of in-
tent,",314 its proof generally requires a determination of the lend-
er's state of mind. In some states, the lender must intentionally
charge interest which he knows is in excess of the legal rate. 31 5
Florida courts will presume that a lender is acting in good faith,
but will allow this presumption to be rebutted by evidence that the
lender knew the rate of interest he charged was illegal. 31 6  The
307 See, e.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 54-3-9 (1967) (requiring receipt as element of
criminal usury).
308 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 478-6 (1976) (anyone "who, by any method or device what-
soever, receives or arranges for the receipt of interest, increase, or profit at a greater rate than
one per cent a month ... shall be guilty of usury") (emphasis added).
309 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4601 (1975).
310 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1202 (Supp. 1978-79).
311 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:21-19(a) (West Supp. 1979).
312 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 438.41 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.15(51) (Callaghan
1975)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19(a) (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 190.40,
190.42 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4601 (1975).
For examples of statutes authorizing interest rates higher than the usury ceiling, see,
e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 438.31 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.15(1) (Callaghan 1975)); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-147-103, 47-14-104 (1975).
313 See notes 305-06 and accompanying text supra.
'14 Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1973).
'11 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-104(1) (1978); FIA. STAT. ANN. §§ 687.071(2),
687.071(3) (West Supp. 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 39-1(a) (1975); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 271, § 49(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979).
316 See, e.g., River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So. 2d 415, 424-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966). This case involved the use of a criminal usury provision (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.07
(1966) (repealed 1969)) as a defense in a civil action.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lender then must come forward with evidence of his good faith in
order to defend against the charge of usury. 17
New Jersey courts do not investigate the lender's state of
mind, thereby placing even less of a burden on the state. In State
v. Tillem,31 8 the court stated:
There are areas where the evil or danger sought to be pre-
vented is so great that the Legislature may, as a matter of pub-
lic policy, declare an act unlawful without proof of a wrongful
intent. ... We believe the Legislature felt loan sharking is of
that invidious caliber. We would have to be very naive to be-
lieve that one who loans money to individuals at annual interest
rates in excess of the lawful rates (here it was 200-300%) does
not know he is violating the law. 1 9
This approach appears reasonable in light of New Jersey's
high ceiling for interest rates (fifty percent) 320 and may have
made sense in the particular fact situation facing the court. A
strict-liability approach, however, will occasionally condemn "good
faith" transactions between innocent parties, and thereby work
unfair results.3 2 '
D. Other Loansharking Laws
Several other statutory provisions are available to fight loan-
sharking, although few have yet surfaced in reported decisions.
1. Laws Prohibiting Financing Extortionate Extensions of Credit
Title II of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of
1968322 contains a provision prohibiting the financing of extor-
tionate extensions of credit (hereinafter, financing laws). Most
states that have enacted provisions modeled on the federal ECT
statute have also adopted financing laws. 323  A few states have
'117 See Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 452-53, 146 So. 551, 552 (1933). In a crimi-
nal prosecution, the Florida approach may raise problems of unconstitutional burden-
shifting. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6,
36 (1969).
318 127 N.J. Super. 421, 317 A.2d 738 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
319 Id. at 426, 317 A.2d at 741.
... See note 311 and accompanying text supra.
"' See, e.g., Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973) (borrower set interest rate on
own initiative and rejected lender's advice to obtain legal counsel).
322 18 U.S.C. § 893 (1976).
323 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2303 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-105
(1973).
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enacted laws prohibiting both the financing of criminal usury and
the financing of extortionate credit transactions. 24  Most state
financing provisions are similar to the federal statute, which
reads:
Whoever willfully advances money or property, whether as a
gift, as a loan, as an investment, pursuant to a partnership or
profit-sharing agreement, or otherwise, to any person, with
reasonable grounds to believe that it is the intention of that
person to use the money or property so advanced directly or
indirectly for the purpose of making extortionate extensions of
credit, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or an amount not
exceeding twice the value of the money or property so ad-
vanced, whichever is greater, or shall be imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.325
The goal of the financing laws is ambitious: "to make possible
the prosecution of the upper levels of the criminal hierarchy." 326
The legislators recognized the "immense practical difficulties
which attend [this] effort" 327 but, nonetheless, hoped that the law
would be "a worthwhile weapon to add to the Government's arse-
nal." 328  The legislative history highlights the potentially trouble-
some state-of-mind element of the crime:
To come within the prohibition of [the financing law], the
financier" must have had reasonable grounds to believe that it
was the intention of the lender to use the funds for extortionate
extensions of credit; that is, extensions of credit whose extor-
tionate character is known to both the borrower and the lender
at their inception.3 29
Proof of this element will surely prove difficult, especially in light
of the high degree of insulation in the upper levels of the crimi-
nal hierarchy.
'24 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2208 (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-106
(1973).
325 18 U.S.C. § 893 (1976).
326 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 194, at 30, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2027.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 30, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2028.
329 Id. at 30, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEws at 2028 (emphasis in
original).
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2. Laws Prohibiting Receipt of Loansharking Proceeds
Pennsylvania alone prohibits the receipt of proceeds of extor-
tionate extensions of credit, proceeds of collections of extensions
of credit by extortionate means,330 and proceeds of criminal us-
ury.331  Like financing provisions, 332 this "receiving law" aims at
the higher echelons of organized crime. The total absence of re-
ported cases on the provision, however, suggests the ambitious-
ness of this task.
3. Laws Proscribing the Possession of Records of Loansharking
Transactions
A few states have enacted laws prohibiting the possession of
records of loans violating either the usury laws, the ECT laws, or
both (hereinafter, possession laws).3 33  Florida's possession law is
typical:
Books of account or other documents recording [usurious] ex-
tensions of credit are declared to be contraband, and any per-
son, other than a public officer in the performance of his duty,
and other than the person charged such usurious interest and
person acting on his behalf, who shall knowingly and willfully
possess or maintain such books of account or other documents,
or conspire so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree. 334
4. Miscellaneous Provisions
Two other types of statutes are potentially useful in loan-
sharking prosecutions: small loan laws and general racketeering
laws. Most states have enacted small loan laws making it a mis-
demeanor either to engage in the small loan business without first
obtaining a license or to charge more than a certain interest
rate.335  At least one case involves the use of a small loan law in a
330 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.7 (Purdon 1973).
331 Id. § 4806.8.
332 See text accompanying note 326 supra.
333 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-108 (1978) (records of "criminally usurious trans-
actions"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(5) (West Supp. 1978) (records of either criminally
usurious transaction or extortionate extension of credit); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-19(C)
(West Supp. 1979) (records of "criminally usurious transactions"); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
190.45 (McKinney 1975) ("possession of usurious loan records"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-9
(Supp. 1978) (records of usurious transactions).
314 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(5) (West Supp. 1979).
335 See note 737 infra.
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loansharking prosecution. 33" Especially in the many states that
have no statutes aimed at extortionate or usurious credit transac-
tions, 3 37 the small loan laws could be more widely used in the
prosecution of loansharks.
Another law which relates to loansharking activities is the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
statute.338  Although Congress designed RICO to control all
facets of organized crime, 339 Congress recognized that "organized
crime derives a major portion of its power through money ob-
tained from such illegal endeavors as ... loansharking." 340 Some
states have passed RICO laws patterned after this statute. 341
The federal RICO statute prohibits the use and investment of
income derived "from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt." 342  It defines "racketeer-
ing activity" to include any act in violation of the ECT, financing,
or collection laws. 343  "Unlawful debt" includes any debt "unen-
forceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to
principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury." 344
E. Extortion
1. Historical Development
At common law, the crime of extortion focused on official
misbehavior, rather than private wrongdoing. "[A]ny officer's un-
lawful taking, by color of his office, from any man, any money or
thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is due, or
before it is due" 345 constituted the common law misdemeanor of'
extortion.3 41 Common law courts extended the official-oriented
31 Commonwealth v. Douglas, 354 Mass. 212, 236 N.E.2d 865 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 960 (1969).
31 See Appendix A infra.
338 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976).
339 "It is the purpose of this Act ... to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strenghening [sic] the legal tools." Congressional Statement of Findings and Pur-
pose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(emphasis added), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1976).
340 Id.
341 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.46-.464 (West Supp. 1979).
342 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976).
343 Id. § 1961(1).
344 Id. § 1961(6).
345 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 141.
346 In addition to proscribing such official misconduct, Parliament published precisely
how much was due an officer performing a particular function. 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES
*467.
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misdemeanor of extortion to fill loopholes in the law of larceny.
Thus the term "extortion" today applies to private citizens as well
as public officers and denotes a form of aggravated theft.
Robbery, the oldest form of aggravated theft, originally was
limited to larceny by violence or threat of immediate violence to
the victim.3 47  Robbery eventually encompassed two additional
threats that could be used to force victims to surrender their
property. First, some English cases held that the offense embraced
a threat to destroy the victim's home. 348  Bishop thought that this
was rational, since "one without habitation is exposed to the in-
clement elements; so that to deprive a man of his house is equiva-
lent to inflicting personal injury upon him."'3 49 Second, in 1776,
the court in Rex v. Jones 350 held that threats to accuse a man of
sodomy were sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery. 5
The fact that extortion embraced such threatened allegations con-
founded Bishop, who commented that the rule was an "excres-
cence on the law." 3 52
Paralleling these developments in the common law of rob-
bery, several statutes passed during the reigns of George I and
George II expanded the offense of extortion by punishing at-
tempts to obtain money by sending letters threatening accusation
of crimes. 353  A later provision 354 was held to apply to threats to
expose a clergyman's sexual activities to the church hierarchy and
in the' newspapers. 55 These "blackmail" statutes did not, how-
ever, encompass verbal threats.5
This curious mixture of threats to injure person or property,
to accuse of a crime or to expose a shameful act, forms the core
of modern extortion law. Modern statutes also proscribe threats to
expose any secret tending to lower a person's esteem in the com-
... See Note, A Rationale of the Law of Aggravated Theft, 54 COLUMN. L. REV. 84, 84 (1954).
346 2 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 648-49 (6th ed. 1877).
349 Id. at 649.
350 1 Leach 139, 168 Eng. Rep. 171 (1776).
351 Id. at 142, 168 Eng. Rep. at 173; see 3J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 149 (1883).
352 2 J. BISHOP, supra note 348, at 649.
3 See, e.g., 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 351, at 149-50 (listing statutes).
354 24& 25 Vict., c. 96, § 46; see 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 2006, at 2321 (12th ed.
1932).
Rex v. Miard, 1 Cox Cr. Cas. 22 (1844); see 2 F. WHARTON, supra note 354, § 2006, at
2321.
356 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 35 1, at 149.
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munity or to impair his business reputation.3 57 In addition,
threats of personal injury are not limited to the person of the
victim, 358 and some novel suggestions of harm have been recog-
nized as extortionate.35 9 To paraphrase Stephen, the whole sub-
ject has been elaborated in a way shown by experience to be
3~60necessary.
2. Elements of the Offense
a. Conduct and Result. Extortion statutes fall into two major
categories. A bare majority of jurisdictions require the appropria-
tion of the victim's property by the defendant.361 The minority
proscribe the mere making of a threat with the intent to approp-
riate.362 Some of the majority also require that the defendant
instill a fear that compels or induces delivery of property by the
victim. 3 63  A focus on fear can either expand or contract the
scope of punishable conduct. It may expand it to embrace most
conduct that in fact induces fear.364 Alternatively, it may contract
the ambit of punishable behavior by "protecting" otherwise extor-
tionate threats that fail to inspire fear in the victim. 36 5  The latter
M See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 519(4) (West 1970) ("any secret affecting him or them");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 570.010(4) (d), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1979) ("expose ... to hatred, contempt
or ridicule; or ... harm the credit or business repute."
3" See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-513(b), 28-513(f) (Supp. 1978) (expose to hatred; take
action as public official; bring about strike or boycott; testify or refuse to testify); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 155.05(2) (e) (ii), (iii) (McKinney 1975) ("[clause damage to property; or ...
[e]ngage in other conduct constituting a crime").
351 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted in text ac-
companying note 373 infra).
360 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 351, at 150.
361 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-13 (1975) ("obtains by threat control over the property
of another"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West 1970) ("obtaining of property from another");
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-513 (Supt. 1978) ("obtains property of another"); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1481 (West 1958) ("obtaining of property from another"). For a complete listing
of the state extortion statutes, see Appendix B infra.
362 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.4 (West Special Pamphlet 1978); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14.66 (West 1974). See also Appendix B infra.
363 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a- 119(5) (1979) ("by means of instilling ... a fear");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 846 (1974) ("by means of instilling.., a fear"); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-3-77 (1973) ("through fear of some injury threatened to be inflicted ... which fear
shall have been produced by the threats of the person so receiving or taking such prop-
erty"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05(2) (e) (McKinney 1975) ("by means of instilling ... a
fear").
364 Some statutes do not require threats to induce specific types of harm, and thus in
effect prohibit many types of conduct that induce fear. See, e.g., Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1951 (1976). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted in
text accompanying note 373 infra).
365 See, e.g., People v. Rollek, 280 A.D. 437, 439, 114 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (4th Dep't 1952),
aff'd, 304 N.Y. 905, 110 N.E.2d 734 (1953). Where the victim's state of mind is an element
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result excludes threats that fail to instill fear only because the vic-
tim is uncommonly steely-nerved or is cooperating with the au-
thorities. In jurisdictions requiring fear, such transactions may, as
a matter of law, constitute attempted extortion at most.3 6
In jurisdictions proscribing threats accompanied only by the
intent to appropriate, the victim's state of mind is immaterial. 6 7
In addition, it may be that in such jurisdictions, "[the jury will not
inquire into the 'probable force and power' of the threat ... even
though the threat is not of the type which will produce terror." 3 8
This reasoning should also apply where appropriation is re-
quired but fear is not, ' 69 at least when the defendant's threats
result in delivery of the property.370
Almost every statute enumerates discrete harms that must be
threatened to give rise to the offense of extortion.3 7 ' Threats to
injure person or property, to accuse of a crime, and to expose a
secret injuring another's reputation are universally proscribed. 7
Most jurisdictions go beyond these common law staples and ap-
proximate Model Penal Code § 223.4, which also prohibits threats
to:
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an offi-
cial to take or withhold action; or
(e) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other col-
lective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or re-
ceived for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor
purports to act; or
(f) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
of the offense, it may dominate the entire analysis by becoming the chief "circumstance"
from which the other elements of extortion are inferred. See note 438 infra.
366 See id.; United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
367 See, e.g., People v. Percin, 330 Mich. 94, 47 N.W.2d 29 (1951).
311 Note, supra note 347, at 88. Under the decided cases, however, this approach seems
to ignore the definition of "threat." See note 381 and accompanying text infra.
31' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-13 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-513 (Supp. 1978).
370 This point is mainly of theoretical interest; it is difficult to hypothesize a case in
which appropriation results from a threat that does not inspire actual fear. The govern-
ment agent case, however, poses an interesting possibility. If the agent delivers property
after a threat is made, despite the absence of actual fear, the delivery arguably "results"
from the threat, for without the threat delivery would not have occurred.
31' See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1804 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-119(5)
(1979); DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 846 (1974). Exceptions include: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2202-
2203 (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-401 (1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, § 355 (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.4 (Supp. 1977).
372 See Appendix B infra.
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(g) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the ac-
tor.
373
The practice of enumerating specific harms springs from the be-
lief that a "law which included all threats made for the purpose of
obtaining property would embrace a large portion of accepted
economic bargaining." 37 4  On the other hand, residual provisions
such as the Model Code's "any other harm" prohibition 3 75 reflect
the futility of attempting to anticipate all condemnable forms of
threats.
The Model Penal Code and most extortion provisions ap-
proximating it recognize an affirmative defense based on threats
to accuse, to expose, or to take or withhold official action. The
defendant can raise this defense if he was honestly seeking the
property either as restitution or indemnification for the harm that
was the subject of his threatened accusation, exposition, or official
action, or as compensation for property or lawful services.376
The threat is the core of any extortionate transaction. Proving
that the defendant threatened one of the enumerated harms
is frequently difficult, and determining whether the defendant's
words or acts were likely to intimidate the victim requires close
scrutiny of all relevant circumstances.3 7 7 Courts have shown a
willingness to search for implicit threats in apparently innocent
circumstances.37 8  For example, a Michigan court grappled with
the distinction between an "intelligible" and "unintelligible" threat
while reviewing the extortion conviction of an individual who,
during an assault trial involving a friend, told a female witness in
the assault trial that "'[s]omebody needs to beat your butt; you
ain't going to stay in this courthouse forever . . . . , ,79 The
court affirmed the conviction.3 80 Under the federal statute,
373 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
374 Id. § 206.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
375 Id. § 223.4(g).
376 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 570.010(4) (Vernon Supp. 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.15(2) (McKinney 1975); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3923(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
377 See, e.g., People v. Massengale, 261 Cal. App. 2d 758, 764-66, 68 Cal. Rptr. 415,
419-20 (1968); Iozzi v. State, 5 Md. App. 415, 419, 247 A.2d 758, 760 (1968), cert. denied,
253 Md. 734 (1969); State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 266-67, 274 A.2d 742, 745 (1971).
378 See, e.g., People v.. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 269-70, 271-72, 168 N.E.2d 683, 689,
690-91, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 878, 880 (1970) (jury could infer threat from evidence that
defendant instilled belief that he would not use his power and influence to stop employer's
labor troubles unless employer made payoffs).
37' People v. Atcher, 65 Mich. App. 734, 736, 238 N.W.2d 389, 391 (1976).
380 Id. at 738, 238 N.W.2d at 391.
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threats may be inferred if the defendant's conduct would have
induced fear in a reasonable person. 381
b. Attendant Circumstances. Where the requisite conduct is "ob-
tains," the specified object of acquisition is "property of
another. 3 '-  Defining "property" and "another" have posed few
difficulties; many codes specifically define these terms. 38 3  The
former is ordinarily "anything of value. ' 38 4  "Another" may or
may not include the defendant's business partner or spouse. 385
Some jurisdictions in which threatening without appropria-
tion satisfies the statute recognize that such threatening may be
effectuated either orally or in writing. 386
Several of the jurisdictions that include fear as an element of
extortion limit violations to its "wrongful" use.387 In United States
v. Enmons,388 random acts of violence punctuated an otherwise
bona-fide labor dispute. In holding that "wrongful," as used in
the federal Hobbs Act, modified the entire acquisitive scheme and
not solely the use of fear, the Supreme Court limited the statute's
reach to instances where the defendant had no lawful claim to the
property obtained. 3 9  "[T]he use of force to achieve legitimate
collective-bargaining demands" is therefore not a federal of-
fense.390
38 See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 955 (1976). The same result took a different form in United States v. Rastelli, 551
F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir.) (victim's fear must be both actual and reasonable), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 831 (1977).
382 It is possible to view "obtains" as a result, rather than a conduct, requirement.
313 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(10) (Supp. 1978) (definition of "property"); ARZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-105 (21, 27) (1978) (definitions of "person," "property"); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 155.00 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-79) (definition of "property").
'' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(10) (Supp. 1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(27)
(1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
385 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00, Practice Commentary at 104 (McKinney 1975)
(one cannot wrongfully appropriate partnership property from co-partner) with People v.
Morton, 308 N.Y.96, 123 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1954) (Married Women's Acts, N.Y. Dom. REL.
LAW § 50 (McKinney 1977), § 51 (repealed 1964, now N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 3.301.3-
511 (McKinney 1978)), abrogated common-law rule and brought wife within definition of
"another").
386 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.05 (West 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 25
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1968).
387 See, e.g., Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) (1976); CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West
1970); IDAHO CODE § 18-2801 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1481 (West 1958).
388 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
389 Id. at 399-400.
390 Id. at 408. The holding is apparently confined to the labor dispute context. See Un-
ited States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1266 n.18 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955
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c. State of Mind. Extortion involves an intent to deprive
another of his property. Precise statutory formulations vary. The
broadest are found in laws punishing mere threats, and include
the intent to compel another to act against his will. 3 9 1 Some
jurisdictions specify that the threat must be made "maliciously." 392
Others require that property be obtained "knowingly." 393 The
state of mind requirement rarely necessitates a special inquiry
since felonious intent is ordinarily inferred from the threat it-
self.3 94
No extortion statute expressly prescribes a mental state for
attendant circumstances. General provisions governing culpability
may identify the requisite state of mind. These provisions nor-
mally direct that the mental state specified in the statute be
applied to all the elements of the offense unless a contrary pur-
pose plainly appears.3 95
3. Other Statutory Provisions
The basic extortion provisions may not exhaust a jurisdic-
tion's treatment of the illicit use of threats. In jurisdictions where
extortion entails actual appropriation, unavailing threats may con-
stitute blackmail 396 or criminal coercion.3 97  Threatening with the
intent to compel behavior, even if it is not extortion, may be
punished as coercion 398 or intimidation.399 Mere threatening,
without any specific intent, is a crime in some jurisdictions; the
(1976). The Senate Judiciary Committee "has proposed in effect to overturn the Enmons
result by treating the parties engaged in a labor dispute no differently from other persons"
under Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1722 (1977). S.
REP. No. 95-605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 625 (1977).
3" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.05 (West 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 25
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); MICH. Comp. LAws § 750.213 (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.410
(1962)).
392 See, e.g., FIA. STAT. ANN. § 836.05 (West 1976); MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 265. § 25
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-2 (1969).
193 See, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. § 18-4-401 (1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1 (1975);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2 (Burns 1979).
394 See, e.g., United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1978).
35 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(A) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-5 (1979);
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17A, § 11(2) (1978).
39' See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 21-3428 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118 (1969); OKLA. STAT.
ANN,, tit. 21, § 1488 (West Supp. 1977).
397 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 509.080 (Baldwin 1975).
39' See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60 (McKinney 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2905.12 (Page 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2906 (Purdon 1973).
3" See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-203 (1978).
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offense is variously denominated as menacing, 400 criminal
threatening, 40 1 or terroristic threatening. 40 2 Conduct less severe
than threatening may constitute harassment. 40 3  Finally, an as-
sortment of provisions punishes particular forms of intimidation;
examples include procuring prostitutes by threats,40 4 sending
threatening letters 40 5 and telephoning threats. 406
III
PROOF OF THREATS, FEAR, AND UNDERSTANDING
A. Direct Evidence
The testimony of the victim provides the best means of prov-
ing "threats," "fear," or an extortionate "understanding." Plainly,
the victim's recollections most persuasively recreate alleged crimi-
nal transactions for the jury. In a recent Georgia case, for in-
stance, the victim testified that the defendant threatened to "'blow
my head off and burn down both of my houses.' "407 The court
found this evidence, corroborated by another witness, sufficient
for conviction.40 8
Many jurisdictions require an objective showing that the de-
fendant's conduct was threatening. 4 9 New Jersey, for instance,
requires that the threat be "such as may reasonably be regarded
as capable of moving an ordinarily 'firm and prudent' person to
comply with the offender's extorsive demand." 410 By establishing
the degree of harm threatened, the direct evidence may dem-
onstrate that the threat would "move" the "firm and prudent per-
son."
400 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.21, 2903.22 (Page 1975).
401 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17A, § 209 (1978).
402 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.080 (Baldwin 1975).
403 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1967).
404 See MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-51 (1972).
405 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1486 (West 1958).
406 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.16 (West Supp. 1978) (eff. July 1, 1980).
407, Cagle v. State, 141 Ga. App. 392, 392, 233 S.E.2d 485, 486 (1977).
408 Id.
409 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 595, 266 N.E.2d 314, 316
(1971); State v. Morrissey, 11 N.J. Super. 298, 78 A.2d 329 (County Ct. 1951). Case law
interpreting the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), also mandates this showing, See
United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 288 (2d Cir. 1962).
410 State v. Morrissey, 11 N.J. Super. 298, 301-02, 78 A.2d 329, 330 (County Ct. 1951).
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The victim also provides the best evidence of his own fear
when fear is an element of the crime. 411  His state of mind tes-
timony is obviously critical to the question of his actual fear, and
his description of the threat is probative, although not necessarily
determinative, on the issue of the reasonableness of his fear.
412
Similarly, in establishing an extortionate "understanding"-a
modified version of "threat" and "fear" 413 --the victim provides
the best evidentiary source.414 The extortionate credit transaction
laws apply the term "understanding" to the creditor (defendant)
as well as the debtor (victim). 415  As in proving the standard ex-
tortionate threat, the victim will often provide crucial testimony
from which the jury may infer the existence of the parties' "un-
derstanding." 
416
Where the prosecution is unable to prove these elements
through direct evidence, it must search for other evidence, and
resulting problems have required a rethinking of basic evi-
dentiary principles.
B. Equivocal Conduct and Circumstantial Evidence
In many loansharking and extortion cases, threats are veiled;
the defendant uses implicit rather than explicit threats to induce
"" Under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), the victim's testimony suffices to
prove actual fear. United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1962) (victim
testified that he was "overwrought"). See United States v. Mazzei, 390 F. Supp. 1098, 1106
(W.D. Pa.) (dictum), modified on other grounds, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1014 (1975).
412 People can make gruesome threats they are obviously unable to carry out. The pros-
ecution should introduce evidence showing that the defendant had the power to carry out
his threats, or that the victim reasonably believed the defendant had the power. See United
States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1962) (business agent for local union de-
manded $100 per week to maintain victim's "good labor setup"); United States v. Bianci,
219 F.2d 182, 189-90 (8th Cir. 1955) (local labor representatives threatened "prolonged
illegal strike" and destruction of equipment if not paid off).
43 See notes 210-23 and accompanying text supra. Among the statutes imposing this
requirement are: 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976); Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 13-2302 (1978); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-15-102 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-390(c) (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 687.071(1) (e) (West Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.1(f) (Purdon 1973)
(repealed statute still in force in view of state rule of statutory construction); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 943.28(1) (b) (West Supp. 1979).
414 "Where this offense can be proved by direct evidence, it may be unnecessary for the
prosecution to make use of [the special evidentiary sections]." CONFERENcE REP., supa note
194, at 30.
415 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976).
411 See United States v. Annoreno, 460 F.2d 1303, 1305 (7th Cir.) (prosecution presents
26 loanshark customers), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 852 (1972).
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fear.417  Moreover, loanshark victims may be unable or unwilling
to testify. The very fear which must be proved often silences key
witnesses and threatens to sabotage the prosecution.41 s In either
situation, proof of criminal conduct requires heavy reliance on
circumstantial evidence.
As long ago as 1884, the New York Court of Appeals recog-
nized the potential difficulty of showing intimidation. Speaking of
a letter which appeared friendly, but was alleged to carry a threat,
the court said:
No precise words are needed to convey a threat. It may be
done by innuendo or suggestion. To ascertain whether a letter
conveys a threat, all its language, together with the cir-
cumstances under which it was written, and the relations be-
tween the parties may be considered, and if it can be found that
the purport and natural effect of the letter is to convey a
threat, then the mere form of words is unimportant.419
More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
allowed the jury to find a threat where the language was equivocal
but where the defendant brought a "big, bald-headed man [who]
looked like a wrestler" to a meeting with the victim. 420
Perhaps the most devastating and significant circumstantial
evidence results from the defendant's fear-inspiring character it-
self. The reputation of the loanshark or extortionist, or knowledge
of his prior criminal activities, impresses upon even the most coura-
geous the potential consequences of a refusal to comply with his
wishes. Nevertheless, the introduction of character evidence, even
"I "For example, if a known 'hit' man is used to secure money or property, express
threats may be entirely unnecessary, the reputation of the 'hit' man (with the implicit threat
carried by his presence) being sufficient to achieve the desired effect." S. REP. No. 95-605,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 629 (1977) (speaking of extortion statute).
418 The major difficulty which confronts the prosecution of offenses of this type is
the reluctance of the victims to testify. That is, if they are in genuine fear of
the consequences of nonpayment, they are apt to be equally or even more in
fear of the consequences of testifying as a complaining witness.'
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 194, at 29. See United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285,
1288 (E,.D.N.Y 1977) ("We know, from cases we have tried, that fear of reprisal shuts off
sources of vital evidence. Terror is particularly acute when cruel mobs ... are threatened
[by prosecution].").
'" People v. Thompson, 97 N.Y. 313, 318 (1884).
420 Commonwealth v. De Vincent, 358 Mass. 592, 593, 266 N.E.2d 314, 315 (1971). In
De Vincent, the "equivocal language" referred to count one, alleging that the defendant told
his victim that failure to pay would result in his "crap[ping] out." The language charged in
count two was far from equivocal: the bald-headed man "said he would cut out [the vic-
tim's] tongue and shove it up his rectum .... "
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if relevant, entails a high risk of prejudice to the defendant.
Therefore, courts have often viewed it unfavorably. 421  Gases of
loansharking and extortion, however, reveal great judicial latitude
in admitting character evidence.
C. Character Evidence
The Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States 422 rejected
the use of character evidence to show the defendant's propensity
to commit a crime:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unani-
mously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any
kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant
with a presumption of good character .... but it simply closes
the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on
the prosecution's case-in-chief. The state may not show defen-
dant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill
name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logi-
cally be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpe-
trator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because charac-
ter is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much
with the jury and to so over-persuade them as to prejudge one
with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to
defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of
excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is
the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 423
Courts admit character evidence, however, if it is "substan-
tially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability
that [the defendant] committed the crime on trial because he is a
man of criminal character."424 If character evidence passes the
421 McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 188, at 445 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]: "But in what are probably the greater number of
cases when character could be offered for this purpose, the law sets its face against it."
422 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
423 Id. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted). See also FED. R. EVID. 403.
424 McCoizicit, supra note 421, § 190, at 447. The quoted passage refers specifically to
evidence of other crimes (prior-act evidence), but would apply to reputation evidence as
well, since "[m]odern common law doctrine makes the neutral and unexciting reputation
evidence the preferred type, which will usually be accepted where character evidence can
come in at all ...." Id. § 186, at 443. See also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 677-78
(1975); State v. Belisle, 79 N.J. 444, 445, 111 A. 316, 317 (1920).
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relevance test, the trial court must then balance probative value
against prejudicial effect in determining admissibility.425 There
are three recognized methods to evidence character:
(a) testimony as to the conduct of the person in question as
reflecting his character (prior acts);
(b) testimony of a witness as to his opinion of the person's
character based on observation; and
(c) testimony as to his reputation.426
This discussion is limited to the two types of character evi-
dence most often utilized in loansharking and extortion prosecu-
tions: prior-acts and reputation evidence.
-1. Decisional Authority for the Introduction of Character Evidence
a. Reputation Evidence. The leading recent case on reputation
evidence is United States v. Carbo,427 a Ninth Circuit decision inter-
preting the Hobbs Act. 42  In Carbo, a group of defendants tried
to obtain managerial control over a welterweight boxer through
extortionate demands on his manager.429  Defendant Joseph Sica,
convicted of extortion and conspiracy to extort, appealed, claim-
ing that evidence of his reputation as an "underworld man" and
"strong arm" man was improperly admitted at trial. 30
Rejecting Sica's claim, the court noted that while the usual
reason for disallowing character evidence was the probability of
undue prejudice to the defendant, 43' here the proof
was not introduced into the case for the purpose of characteriz-
ing him as a bad man likely to resort to the conduct with which
he is charged. This was not the source of its relevance.
The courts, for example, admit character evidence "to prove the character of a person
where the question of what that character is or was, is one of the ultimate issues in the
case ... " MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 186, at 442. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
425 See FED. R. EVID. 403; United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc); A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 368, at
1-370.3 (1967).
426 McCoRMICK, supra note 421, § 186, at 443 (footnotes omitted).
427 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963).
428 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976). This statute has no special evidentiary provisions; Carbo,.
therefore, is not a case of statutory interpretation, and should provide valuable guidance in
jurisdictions in which the law of evidence is based on common law, or set out in broad
strokes by rules or general statutes.
429 314 F.2d at 723.
".0 Id. at 740.
4.1 Id.
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Instead the prosecution relied on the reputation of Sica as
a probative fact enabling the jury to infer that Sica had inter-
vened with [the victims] knowing that his presence would instill
fear in them and intending to manipulate this fear ....
.... That [the victims] considered [Sica] to be dangerous
and that fear reasonably resulted from his appearance because
of his reputation consitituted relevant facts upon this part of
the prosecution's case. 432
Carbo's importance rests in its close scrutiny of the classic
balance between prejudice and probative value, and its conclusion
that it is sometimes reasonable in extortion cases to risk the possi-
bility that "the jury may [permit] this evidence to bear upon the
probability of guilt." 433 Admissibility is reasonable because if
reputation evidence is not admissible the prosecution
is precluded from establishing a material part of its case.
The question ... is not whether the United States may use
Sica's reputation as a sword against him, but whether he may
himself make use of it as a shield to immunize himself from
proof of the means by which the conspirators planned to
frighten their victims into submission. If he may, then all who
are known to live by violence are free to extort by the tacit
threat of violence conveyed by their reputations; for the
reasonableness of the resulting fear, as determined by its cause,
may not be presented to the jury.43 4
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Carbo decision was
its approval of the use of reputation evidence on the issue of the
defendant's intent.43 5  While there appears to be ample eviden-
432 Id. at 740-41.
433 Id. at 741. The court held that this was a proper case for application of what has
been termed the multiple admissibility doctrine:
When an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose, and becomes admissi-
ble by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in that capacity, it is not inadmissi-
ble because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some other capacity,
and because the jury might improperly consider it in the latter capacity. This
doctrine, although involving certain risks; is indispensable as a practical rule.
Id. at 741-42 (quoting I J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 13, at 300 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WsIMORE]).
434 Id.
4" See quotation accompanying note 399 supra. The lower court also seems to have al-
lowed the jury to infer the defendant's intent from reputation evidence. The jury instruc-
tion read:
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tiary precedent for using prior acts evidence for this purpose,43 1
this precise application of reputation evidence was unusual.43 7
The logic of this application, however, seems sound. If a man
makes vaguely menacing statements, aware that he is commonly
known as a violent man, then it is a reasonable inference that he
intends to instill fear. If this were not his intention, we may infer
that he would take special care to counteract the communication
of an implied threat.4 38 It is unlikely that the defendant is
Now, it is contended here by the Government that this witness ... was put
in fear of Mr. Sica and I think they are entitled to show or ... tell why he was
afraid and to look at the situation to see if it was one which was reasonably calculated to
produce that fear. But the reputation of Mr. Sica per se is not before you, except
in this limited way.
Id. at 742 n.35 (emphasis added).
The jury was also allowed to infer the co-conspirator's intent from Sica's reputation,
which "enabl[ed] the jury ... to conclude that [they] had secured Sica's participation with
full realization that his effectiveness was based upon the fear his reputation could inspire in
the victims." Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
436 See United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1958) and cases cited
therein. See also FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
137 General evidence law draws a closer connection between a person's prior acts and his
intent than between his reputation and his intent.
Where the issue addressed is the defendant's intent to commit the offense
charged, the relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant's
indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both the
extrinsic and charged offenses. The reasoning is that because the defendant
had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful
intent in the present offense.
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). This prop-
osition makes sense. A single isolated incident may be the product of chance or bad for-
tune. If, however, a pattern is shown, it is unlikely that one of its many parts results from
chance, accident, or coercion. We do not infer from the prior acts that a person is bad and
therefore a likely candidate for commission of the crime in issue. Rather we infer that if the
defendant committed the act in question, he did so intentionally.
In many instances, the law clearly recognizes the relevance of prior acts to intent. See
United States v. Czarnecki, 552 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 939 (1977);
United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102
(1977); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
955 (1976); United States v. Stirone, 168 F. Supp. 490, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1957), affd, 262 F.2d
571 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); FED. R. EvID. 404(b); McComiuxcK,
supra note 421, § 190(5), at 450. The law's emphasis on prior bad acts evidence, however,
may not apply in the loansharking and extortion context, where special considerations
suggest a close linkage between reputation and intent. See note 438 and accompanying text
infra. Of course, this observation does not imply that prior acts evidence is any less admis-
sible in these cases; it merely indicates that courts should be more willing to admit reputa-
tion evidence to prove intent.
438 See also United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 8 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977): "[T]he victim's
understanding is one of the factors from which the jury may infer the lender's intent ... 
This conclusion is hardly self-evident and warrants closer scrutiny.
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unaware of his own reputation for violence; reputation, by defini-
tion, reflects general knowledge in the community, and, if anyone
is a member of the relevant community, it is the defendant him-
self.
Reputation evidence is often used to help establish the victim's
state of mind-as proof of his fear and the reasonableness
thereof.439 The state may establish the existence of reasonable
fear by showing the victim's knowledge of the defendant's reputa-
tion for a violent character or underworld association at the time
the crime was committed; 440 it need not show, however, a specific
reputation for violence in connection with extortionate schemes. 441
b. Prior-Acts Evidence. The Second Circuit in United States v.
Palmiotti 44 2 also faced the peculiar evidentiary problems posed by
the extortion case. In Palmiotti, the business agent of the Granite
Cutters Union had demanded a payoff from a construction firm
in return for overlooking union regulations requiring more work-
ers on the job.'"3 The court first addressed the broader eviden-
tiary issue:
[W]e hear so often in extortion cases [that] unless the threat
which induces fear in the victim is spelled out in words of one
syllable and in plain terms of a threat, there is no case for the
jury. But common sense must be used iA this class of cases as
well as others. If the jury believed [the victim's] testimony of
439 E.g., United States v. Billingsley, 474 F.2d 63, 65 (6th Cir.) (defendant's bad reputa-
tion relevant to victim's fear and its reasonableness), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973);
United States v. De Masi, 445 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir.) (defendant's reputation for violence
relevant to victim's fear), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 882 (1971); United States v. Tropiano, 418
F.2d 1069, 1081 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendants' bad reputations relevant to victim's fear), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
440 An analogy can also be drawn to homicide cases in which the defendant pleads self-
defense. Courts commonly admit evidence of the deceased's reputation for violence or
dangerousness to show that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force was neces-
sary for his own protection. See State v. Miranda, 24 CRINI. L. REP. (BNA) 2008 (Conn.
Sept. 12, 1978); 2 WmoIGaOR, supra note 433, § 246, at 44; Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 571 (1965).
In a loansharking case, the government may similarly attempt to prove the reasonable
tendency of all the circumstances to instill fear. In situations where conduct is equivocal,
character emerges as a key factor. The analogy is useful, however, only inasmuch as it
demonstrates relevancy. Prejudice to the defendant need not be considered in the
homicide cases because it is not evidence of the defendant's reputation, but of the de-
ceased's, that is introduced.
441 United States v. De Masi, 445 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 882
(1971); United States v. Carbo, 314 F.2d 718, 740 (9th Cir; 1963).
442 254 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958).
443 Id. at 493-94.
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what appellant said to him, it was certainly within their pro-
vince to infer that appellant intended [to commit extortion]. 444
The court then ruled on the admissibility of the victim's tes-
timony that he knew the defendant was involved in a similar
scheme two years earlier. It held this evidence "clearly admissible
both to show the state of mind of [the defendant] and the state of
mind of his victim,"' 445 pointing out that the trial judge had in-
structed the jury that it "must not be considered by you as any
proof of the acts charged in this indictment. ' 446  Subsequent
cases have followed Palmiotti in admitting prior-acts evidence to
show fear 4 47 and its reasonableness.
4 48
The prior acts offered as evidence need not be identical to
the acts feared. In Callanan v. United States, 44 9 the Eighth Circuit
allowed the victim to testify that he knew the defendant was re-
sponsible for an assault on one of his employees; 450 the court
ruled that this testimony was relevant to the victim's fear not only
of a similar assault, but of economic loss and injury to his equip-
ment.45 1  As similarity diminishes, however, so does relevancy,
444 Id. at 495.
445 Id. at 497. The trial court did not go this far, admitting the evidence "only for the
purpose of showing the [victim's] state of mind as to why the payments were made ...
[not] for any other purpose." The use of this evidence to show the defendant's intent,
however, has support. See, e.g., United States v. Blount, 229 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1956)
(evidence of subsequent similar acts properly admitted to show defendant's state of mind).
See also note 437 supra.
4" 254 F.2d at 497.
447 See, e.g., United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1962).
448 See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 177-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 862 (1955).
In Palmiotti, the prior bad act involved a shakedown nearly identical to the crime
charged in the indictment. The same defendant threatened the same witness. Obviously,
both parties knew of the prior act. More complex fact patterns may arise, however. If, for
example, the prosecution witness knew of a prior act of intimidation directed by the de-
fendant at a third party, that fact should be relevant to prove the witness' fear and its
reasonableness. Whether the court should admit evidence of this knowledge to show the
defendant's intent to instill fear is a more difficult question. When the defendant knows
that the alleged victim is aware of his prior extortive acts, intent is readily read into
equivocal conduct in the same manner as in cases in which the defendant capitalizes on his
vicious reputation. But if the prosecution cannot show that the defendant believed that the
victim knew of his previous bad acts, the conclusion that the defendant would have taken
precautions to avoid instilling fear if that were not his intent is less easily inferred.
449 Id.
4-0 Id. at 178.
451 Id. Courts are, however, more likely to admit prior acts evidence when of the same
type as the acts feared and not too remote in time. See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 514
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and courts therefore examine the degree of similarity in initially
assessing relevancy and in striking the balance between probative
value and prejudice.4 52
2. Statutoy Authority for the Introduction of Character Evidence
Legislatures as well as courts have recognized the reasonable-
ness and importance of using character evidence to prove extor-
tionate activity. 453  The ECT laws, 454 for instance, contain de-
tailed provisions for the admissibility of reputation and prior-acts
evidence. 45
5
The critical element of the ECT offense is the "understand-
ing" that violence "could result" if repayment is not timely. 456
The law provides two methods of showing this "understanding."
First, as part of a prima facie case, the state must show the
debtor's reasonable belief that the creditor had used or had a
reputation for using "extortionate means" 457 to collect or punish
nonpayment. 458  Second, if direct evidence of this sort is unavail-
F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); United States v. Adder-
ley, 529 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1976). Courts, however, are less likely to admit evidence
which may be especially influential in persuading the jury that the defendant is a bad man,
such as a prior conviction for sodomy. See United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1003 (3d
Cir. 1976).
452 See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
453 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 194, at 29, quoted in note 418 supra.
'5' See note 413 supra.
"5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 892(b)-(c), 894(b)-(c) (1976).
456 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1976).
4.7 18 U.S.C. § 891(7) (1976) states: "An extortionate means is any means which involves
the use, or an express or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means to
cause harm to the person, reputation or property of any person."
458 18 U.S.C. § 892(b) (1976) provides:
In any prosecution under this section, if it is shown that all of the following
factors were present in connection with the extension of credit in question,
there is prima facie evidence that the extension of credit was extortionate, but
this subsection is nonexclusive and in no way limits the effect or applicability of
subsection (a):
(1) The repayment of the extension of credit, or the performance of
any promise given in consideration thereof, would be unenforceable,
through civil judicial processes against the debtor
(A) in the jurisdiction within which the debtor, if a natural per-
son, resides or
(B) in every jurisdiction within which the debtor, if other than a
natural person, was incorporated or qualified to do business at the
time the extension of credit was made.
(2) The extension of credit was made at a rate of interest in excess of
an annual rate of 45 per centum calculated according to the actuarial
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able (as when the victim is dead or too frightened to testify) and
certain other prerequisites are met,459 the court may "allow evi-
dence to be introduced tending to show the [creditor's] reputation
as to collection practices" to prove the "understanding" ele-
ment.46 0 Neither method changes the elements of the crime; in-
stead they help to illuminate the often subtle and complex crimi-
nal backdrop which the creditor exploits and to guide the court in
its decision as to which inferences to allow.46 '
method of allocating payments made on a debt between principal and in-
terest, pursuant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated
interest and the balance is applied to the unpaid principal.
(3) At the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably believed
that either
(A) one or more extensions of credit by the creditor had been collected or
attempted to be collected by extortionate means, or the nonrepayment thereof
had been punished by extortionate means; or
(B) the creditor had a reputation for the use of extortionate means to
collect extensions of credit or to punish the nonrepamnent thereof.
(4) Upon the making of the extension of credit, the total of the exten-
sions of credit by the creditor to the debtor then outstanding, including any
unpaid interest or similar charges, exceeded $100.
Id. (emphasis added). See also note 413 supra. Florida and Wisconsin have omitted the
prima facie case provision from their ECT laws. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(i)(e) (West.
Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.28(i)(b) (West Supp. 1979).
"I Under the federal ECT law, the prosecution must first show that the extension of
credit is unenforceable or that the annual rate of interest is over 45%. 18 U.S.C. § 892(c)
(1976).
460 18 U.S.C. § 892(c) (1976). While this section of the statute does not specifically au-
thorize the introduction of prior acts evidence to show "understanding," it is unlikely that
the statute excludes such evidence, when admissible under general evidence law. The lack of
hearings or floor debate over these specific provisions, combined with the general congres-
sional intent to ease the evidentiary burden on the government, argues against the negative
implication that Congress wanted to be more restrictive than the common law with regard
to prior-acts evidence.
See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 405[04] (1977) [hereinafter
cited as WEINSTEIN]:
[Tihe statute, read literally, would seem to limit the prosecutor's power to use
reputation and could be read by implication to exclude other threatening acts
of the defendant. Since Congress obviously had the intention of making proof
easier rather than more difficult, such a restrictive reading seems unsound.
Thus the statute seems to be without substantial effect in changing the rules of
evidence.
46, The ECT law language could be read as restricting the use of character evidence to
certain limited situations where direct evidence of the actual belief of the debtor as to the
creditor's collection practices is not available. See 18 U.S.C. § 892(c) (1976). Nonetheless,
courts have shown little regard for the intricacies of the statute in admitting character
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 463 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (5th Cir.) (reputation
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These provisions withstood constitutional challenge in United
States v. Bowdach,462 where the defendant "contend[ed] that the
introduction of reputation evidence [was] so prejudicial that it de-
prive[d] him of Due Process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment." 463  The court's response was unequivocal:
Fear is the central element in crimes of extortion, and often the
victim may reasonably be in fear without possessing knowledge
of specific acts of the victimizer. This fear may extend beyond
the act or transaction involved, and may even follow the victim
to the witness stand .... The legislative history of the Act shows
that Congress felt it was necessary to permit the use of reputa-
tion evidence under certain circumstances, due to the reluc-
tance of loansharking victims to testify; otherwise, it might be
virtually impossible to demonstrate the victim's state of mind
toward the transaction.
[W]here such evidence is admitted [only to show the
victim's state of mind], the Constitution is satisfied. 464
In a similar constitutional challenge to the evidentiary provi-
sions of an ECT companion provision,465 another federal court
spoke even more broadly:
When such evidence is relevant to and probative of the state of
the victim's mind and the use of implicit threats, it is admissible for
that purpose under the aforementioned established principles
of the law of evidence [citing Carbo]. Thus, the sections in ques-
tion merely represent a codification of these principles.466
By linking the ECT evidentiary provisions to the Carbo hold-
ing, the court moved toward an important goal: the liberal em-
ployment of character evidence in all prosecutions involving
threats, fear, or an extortionate understanding.
evidence admitted despite direct testimony of debtor's actual belief as to creditor's collec-
tion practices), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 986 (1972). This approach appears unobjectionable,
assuming the evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. See note 425
and accompanying text supra.
.2 501 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 (1975).
463 Id. at 226.
464 Id. at 226-27 (footnotes omitted).
465 18 U.S.C. § 894 (1976) (prohibiting the collection of credit by extortionate means).
466 United States v. Curcio, 310 F. Supp. 351, 357 (D. Conn. 1970) (emphasis added).
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IV
PROTECTING INFORMANTS AND WITNESSES-THE
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH
FEAR IN OBTAINING CITIZEN ASSISTANCE
A. The Duty to Report
The crime of misprision, historically a criminal neglect "either
to prevent a felony from being committed, or to bring to justice
the offender after its commission," 467 has long embodied the call
to "accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense." 468 At
common law, if an individual knew a felony had been committed
in his absence, yet neither disclosed it to the authorities noi did
anything to bring the offender to punishment, he was "guilty of a
breach of the duty due to the community and the govern-
ment."' 469 Although modern jurisdictions criminally punish only
the failure to report treason, 470 courts still recognize the moral
obligation of citizens to advise authorities of criminal wrongdo-
ing.47 1 The legal duty of every citizen to testify when called upon
to do so complements this moral duty. The Supreme Court has
endorsed Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's "pithy phrase" that "[t]he
public has a right to every man's evidence." 47 2 Buttressed by
immunity statutes and the court's contempt power, the duty to
testify is not relieved even by fear of physical reprisal against the
witness or his family.473
Notwithstanding these lofty ideals, violence, threats of vio-
lence, and fear take a relentless toll on the successful investigation
and prosecution of organized crime. Professional informants may
be hard to recruit or may balk at assuming "difficult" assign-
ments. Fearful of retaliation, potential informants and witnesses
may refuse to volunteer information or otherwise cooperate in law
enforcement efforts. Intervening intimidation may silence citizens
467 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 348, § 717, at 396.
468 Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575 (1822).
469 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 348, § 720, at 397.
170 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.33 (West 1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 264, § 3
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1968).
47' Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 83, 154 N.E.2d 534, 538, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265, 271 (1958).
472 Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961).
473 Id.
206 [Vol. 65:127
1980] LOANSHARKING 207
who initially supply information, or result in would-be prosecution
witnesses "turning" in favor of the defendant at trial.47 4
Although witnesses in all types of cases commonly experience
fear, the fear factor rises dramatically in prosecutions involving
organized crime. Moreover, violence-related crimes, such as loan-
sharking and extortion, magnify this effect.475
Pressures upon informants and witnesses are hardly chimeri-
cal. Coupled with actual threats communicated in specific in-
stances is the aura of fear born of past mobster reprisals for
cooperation with law enforcement agents. Horror stories are
numerous. Informants and witnesses have been discovered in riv-
ers wearing "concrete boots," 47 6 while the bodies of others have
474 The victims of organized criminal activity usually do not testify either be-
cause the crime is consensual, as I suggested above, or because they fear for
their lives.
I have had to face this problem directly during my years as a United States
Attorney in Maryland. Victims did not testify then, they did not testify when
my predecessor held office, and they do not testify today, for those reasons.
The addict will not turn in his pusher, because he relies on that criminal for a
"fix." The victim of extortion, already forced by fear to pay, will not then risk
his life.
Insiders are kept quiet by an ideology of silence, underwritten by a com-
pletely realistic fear that death comes to those who talk-often not mere death,
but death by torture.
Photographs of some of those grisly crimes have been shown to loan shark
victims to secure repayment of their debts. Can people such as these victims
really be expected to step forward to testify?
Unimplicated witnesses have been, and are now, regularly bribed,
threatened, or murdered. Scores of cases have been lost because key witnesses
turned up in rivers in concrete boots. Victims have been crushed-James Bond
like-along with their automobiles by hydraulic machines in syndicate-owned
junkyards.
Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Pro-
cedures of the Comm. of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1969) (Statement
of Sen. Joseph Tydings).
17' "This also explained why almost all the charges ever brought against him, even in the
beginning, were dismissed. No witnesses. Once people got to know that careless talk was
liable to bring Joe Gallo around to remonstrate and maybe make his point with an ice pick,
witnesses in Brooklyn became as scarce as woodpeckers." JoEY, supra note 91, at 34.
171 Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1158 (1965) (statement of
Att'y Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach) [hereinafter cited as Invasions of Privacy Hearings]. See
also SMALL BusINEss REPORT, supra note 120, at 67:
Mr. Doe testified in graphic detail of the method of collection used by his
creditors: "Around September of 1965, 1 went to his home and to.d him this
thing should be paid up now. He said, 'What do you mean, paid up? You have
rocks in your head. You will be paying this thing for the rest of your life. And
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been deposited in automobile junkyards to be crushed by
hydraulic compactors.4" After hanging one suspect informant
from a butcher's hook, mobsters tortured him, and left him to die
three days later.47 8
Other forms of mobster terror aim directly at deterring fu-
ture cooperation with authorities. The "stool pigeon," for exam-
ple, may turn up with a bullet hole in his throat and a dime-the
sign of an informer-resting on his chest.47 9 One wiretapped
conversation revealed an even more gruesome method of dealing
with informants:
Like I said, I don't want to be bloodthirsty. Leave a couple of
fucking heads hanging on a fucking pole. The stool pigeons
that are floating in our face, they'll think twice. They'll think
fucking twice before going over to the Law...
[H]ang him on the lamppost. You understand? ... You got to
give him a nice slash and leave him up there, that's what you
gotta do. That will serve notice to every fucking rat stool pi-
geon what's gonna happen when and if he finks.480
Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach testified in
1965: "We have lost more than 25 informants ... in the past four
years. We have been unable to bring hundreds of other cases be-
cause key witnesses [against organized crime members] would not
testify for fear of the same fate." 481
The law has responded to these harsh realities through a
cluster of interrelated rules. Tort law imposes a duty on the gov-
ernment to provide reasonable protection to informants and wit-
nesses. Similarly, the law often upholds prosecutorial refusals to
release informant and witness identities. Together these rules
provide protection to deserving citizens while supporting effective
law enforcement.
if you don't pay, you know what can happen to you.' He showed me an article
(in the newspaper)-where a body was found in Jamaica Bay weighted down
with concrete.
177 N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1967, at 64, col. 2.
478 Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
272 (1966) (statement of F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover).
479 Chicago Daily News, Feb. 22, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
480 Intercepted conversations between Michael Scandifia and Petey "Pumps" Ferrara,
Scandifia and Larry Pistone, March 1963, Brooklyn, N.Y. (on file with Cornell Institute on
Organized Crime).
481 Invasions of Privacy Hearings, supra note 476, at 1158.
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B. The Duty to Protect
A humane society can neither capitulate to its criminal ele-
ment nor exact martyrdom as the price for performing basic civic
duties. Courts have therefore responded to the problem of wit-
ness and informant fear with a tort doctrine aimed at neutralizing
criminal intimidation. Recognizing a reciprocal obligation born of
citizen cooperation and the general goal of encouraging aid to law
enforcement authorities, tort law imposes a duty to reasonably
protect endangered informants and witnesses.
At times, this duty corresponds directly with law enforcement
interests. For example, the prosecution's desire to ensure the ap-
pearance of key witnesses at trial may result in pre-trial protective
efforts. More often, however, the government has little immediate
interest in providing protection. Informants who have "blown
their covers" and witnesses who have already testified can gener-
ally provide little, if any, additional assistance to prosecutors and
police. Notwithstanding these practical considerations, the law
may mandate government protection and condemn failure to
provide it as tortious.
1. Fact Patterns
In Schuster v. City of New York, 482 the initial and leading case
on the duty to protect, the plaintiff's intestate recognized the notor-
ious bank robber, Willie Sutton, from an FBI flyer posted in his
father's store. Schuster supplied information leading to Sutton's
apprehension, and his role in the arrest was highly publicized.
After receiving threats on his life, he notified the police. Law en-
forcement officials initially provided partial protection, but soon
withdrew it, assuring Schuster that the threats were not serious.
Nineteen days after identifying Willie Sutton, Schuster was
shot and killed while approaching his home.
The duty to protect government witnesses and informers
arose for the second time in Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridge.483
Police officers asked the plaintiff to identify four meu who had
assaulted him earlier in the evening. In the course of the identifi-
cation, the officers left the assailants near the plaintiff, and the
four men again attacked him, inflicting serious injuries.
482 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
4" 71 Ill. App. 2d 373, 219 N.E.2d 147 (1966).
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In Swanner v. United States,484 the plaintiff, a regular, paid in-
formant for the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, was scheduled to testify before a grand jury investigating an
illicit whiskey operation. When Swanner learned of a threat on his
life, he promptly notified federal officials, who assured him there
was no danger and afforded him no protection. Three days be-
fore he was to testify, a bomb exploded under the plaintiff's
house injuring him and members of his family.
In each of these cases, the court upheld the plaintiff's damage
action against the government for failing to discharge its duty to
protect. Many other reported decisions recognize the existence of
such a duty to protect witnesses and informants in dicta. 485
2. Maturation of the Duty to Protect
At common law, no one was obliged to warn or rescue per-
sons endangered by the conduct of third parties.48 6  Courts, how-
ever, have carved out exceptions to this rule when the defendant
stands in a "special relationship" to the foreseeable victim of
harmful conduct. 48 7  The causes of action 488 in Schuster, Gardner,
and Swanner rested on the "special relationship" created when
each of the plaintiffs (or his decedent), upon cooperating with the
government in its efforts to apprehend criminals, became a
foreseeable victim of third-party reprisals.489 While services
rendered as an informant or witness suffice to create a "special
relationship," not all informants and witnesses have a right to
police protection.
484 309 F. Supp. 1183 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
485 See, e.g., Henderson v. City of St. Petersburg, 247 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971), cert. denied, 250 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1971); Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 111. 2d
361, 363, 243 N.E.2d 214, 216 (1968).
486 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976).
487 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-20 (1965).
488 Before a citizen may sue any governmental unit, he must determine if the govern-
ment has waived its defense of sovereign immunity and exposed itself to liability for the
tortious acts of its employees. The United States is amenable to most such suits by virtue of
the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976). The states have consented to
suit in varying degrees. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, 975 (4th ed.
1971).
489 While neither Swanner nor Gardner specifically endorsed so broad a proposition,
Schuster declared that the duty potentially applied to all persons collaborating in the arrest
or prosecution of criminals. 5 N.Y.2d at- 80, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The
precise nature of the plaintiff's status may vary. Arnold Schuster was just the type of
public-spirited citizen contemplated by the common law; the Willie Sutton episode was
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The duty to protect matures when it "reasonably appears"
that an individual's cooperation with authorities places him in
danger.490  The endangered person need not formally request
protection; 491 it suffices that the government is aware of facts
warranting a reasonable inference of danger.492  In Gardner, for
example, if more than the request to identify the assailants was
necessary to activate the duty to protect, it was supplied by the
policemen's knowledge that one of the attackers had previously
been arrested in a tavern brawl, had a violent temper, and was
generally prone to violence. 493  In Schuster and Swanner, the duty
to protect arose when the victims told the authorities of threats
upon their lives, although in both cases there were reasons for
discounting the gravity of existing danger.494
The courts in Schuster and Swanner may have unduly enlarged
the scope of the duty to protect by viewing the government's
"heedless" assurances of safety as an indicator of negligence. If
courts and juries choose to emphasize this factor, authorities may
invite potentially staggering liability by dismissing a witness's fears,
even where there is no clear indication of danger. Confirming
fears out of cautiousness, however, without providing protection,
may well terminate continued witness cooperation or subject
authorities to claims of estoppel if they assert the absence of rea-
sonable danger in a subsequent damage action. To avoid these
consequences, authorities may find themselves forced to provide
protection even in cases involving remote possibilities of harm.
3. Scope of the Duty to Protect
Once a duty to protect arises, the government must exercise
"reasonable" care to protect the person or persons endangered, 495
apparently the extent of his relationship with law enforcement officials. Swanner, on the
other hand, was an undercover agent, a "special employee" of the federal government, and
the opinion in that case proceeds on that assumption. 309 F. Supp. at 1187. The Gardner
court indicated that the officers' request sufficed to sustain a duty to protect so long as
Gardner was in their company at their behest. 71 Il. App. 2d at 379, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
490 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d at 81, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at
269.
'91 Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. at 1187.
492 Id.
493 71 111. App. 2d at 380, 219 N.E.2d at 150.
194 In Schuster, the authorities believed that the threats were not made seriously. 5
N.Y.2d at 79, 154 N.E.2d at 536, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 268. For a discussion of mitigating
factors in Swanner, see text following note 502 infra.
495 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d at 80, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d at
269; Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. at 1187.
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including members of the informant's or witness's family.4 9 6 In
determining the reasonableness of precautions taken, courts
should look to the gravity of the foreseeable harm, the resources
and other responsibilities of the police department, the probability
of injury, and the extent of protection necessary to alleviate the
threat.497
4. Practical Considerations
The decision in Schuster immediately engendered predictions
of dire financial consequences; skeptics predicted frequent and
substantial court awards 498 and burdensome outlays in providing
protection. 499  For various reasons, these consequences have not
materialized. First, the law does not mandate protection until it
reasonably appears that the informant or witness is in danger.
This requirement normally obviates the duty to protect absent a
credible showing of threats. Second, the protection need only be
reasonable. Personal bodyguards are seldom required, and protec-
tion may be limited to a reasonable period of time.
The effectiveness of witness relocation programs constitutes a
final, and perhaps the most significant, reason for the generally
moderate cost of protection.500 If an individual requires constant
protection for an extended time, the government may give him a
new identity and relocate him in another part of the country. Re-
location efforts have met with substantial success. The federal
government's $11,000,000-a-year program relocates approxi-
mately five hundred persons annually.50 1 In 1976 the program's
director asserted that to his knowledge, no one in the program
had ever been killed because of his or her cooperation with gov-
ernment authorities. 50 2
496 Swanner v. United States, 309 F. Supp. at 1187.
197 Comment, Municipality Liable for Negligent Failure to Protect Informer: The Schuster
Case, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 487, 503 (1959).
498 See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d at 80, 154 N.E.2d at 537, 180 N.Y.S.2d
at 269 (noting such predictions). See also Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523,
456 P.2d 376, 381 (1969).
499 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d at 94, 154 N.E.2d at 545, 180 N.Y.S.2d at
280 (dissenting opinion, Conway, C.J.).
500 See generally F. GRAHAM, THE ALIAS PROGRAM (1977).
501 See id. at 48.
502 Speech by Gerald Shur, Cornell Institute on Organized Crime, Summer 1976 (re-
cording on file with Cornell Institute on Organized Crime).
[Vol. 65:127
LOANSHARKING
5. Implications for Law Enforcement Officers
Faced with the prospect of costly tort actions, government of-
ficials must take precautionary steps to avoid liability. In consider-
ing the source and scope of the protection duty, the finder of fact
will be viewing the government's actions with 20-20 hindsight. In
Swanner, for example, the federal officers' conclusion that the
plaintiff was not in danger may have been wholly reasonable.
Swanner lived in Montgomery, Alabama, and the officers believed
that the leader of the whiskey ring was in Tennessee, at the site of
the still. Authorities had no apparent reason to believe that any
ring members were in the Montgomery area. Moreover, Swanner
learned of the threat solely through hearsay.
The distorting effects of hindsight also appeared in a recent
New York case 50 3 in which a former boyfriend threatened and
subsequently killed his lover and her husband. The appellate divi-
sion reversed the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful death
complaint, even though the police warned the victims of the
threat, advised them to take precautions, and maintained a patrol
in the vicinity of the victims' home.
C. Nondisclosure of Witness Identities
Modern commentators have advocated a system of liberal
criminal discovery, including disclosure of prosecution witnesses,
as a wise alternative to a sporting theory of justice.50 4  Timely
identification of witnesses facilitates defense planning and pretrial
investigation. Most importantly, it increases the defendant's ability
503 Zibbon v. Town of Cheektowaga, 51 A.D.2d 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 152 (4th Dep't 1976).
While Zibbon did not involve a witness or informant, it bears directly on the scope of the
protection duty. The duty to protect may arise out of circumstances other than cooperation
with government authorities. Although such cases are of limited importance in determining
when the duty to protect witnesses or informants arises, they may cast substantial light on
how much protection is reasonable. In Zibbon the duty to protect matured out of an "as-
sumption of duty," which requires nonnegligent performance of tasks voluntarily under-
taken. Even if a jurisdiction were not to follow Schuster and its progeny, this doctrine might
impose on governmental units the duty to protect witnesses and informants. See Schuster v.
City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 87, 154 N.E.2d 534, 541, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 275 (1958)
(concurring opinion, McNally, J.).
504 American Bar Associations standards recommend broad disclosure in criminal cases
"to provide adequate information for informed pleas, expedite trials, minimize surprise,
afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet the requirements of due proc-
ess." ABA STANDARDS, DIscOVERY AND PROCEDuRE BEFoRE TRIAL § 1.2 (Approved Draft,
1970). See also 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 252, at 493
(1969) ("There is vast literature on the subject, and it is almost entirely favorable to broad
criminal discovery.").
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to prepare for cross-examination. Thus, it is maintained, disclo-
sure goes far toward ensuring revelation of the truth at trial.505
While this general thesis has much to recommend it, it is of
limited validity in cases involving organized crime- especially pros-
ecutions of fear-based crimes such as loansharking and extortion.
In these cases, refusing disclosure protects prospective witnesses
from violence, ensures the availability of vital evidence, and
minimizes the possibility of threat- or bribery-induced perjury at
trial. When the prosecution can demonstrate a genuine possibility
of these consequences, nondisclosure of witness identities is likely
to advance, rather than frustrate, the search for the truth.
1. Constitutional Dimensions of the Duty to Disclose
Invoking the due process guarantee of a "fair trial," defense
attorneys have attempted to constitutionalize a duty to disclose
witness identities. In Brady v. Maryland,506 the Court held that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment." 50 7  Although Brady
does not address the issue of witness anonymity, proponents of a
constitutional right to obtain pretrial disclosure of witness iden-
tities have relied on its rationale.50 8
The Brady-based argument for witness disclosure rests on the
practical effects of nondisclosure: absent knowledge of his accus-
505 See United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Holmes, 343 A.2d 272 (D.D.C. 1975). Others have argued that strict limits on discovery
advance the truth-finding goal of trial by minimizing intimidation of witnesses and de-
ployment of artifices designed to obscure the actual facts. See Flannery, Prosecutor's Position:
Arguments and Illustrations Against Liberalization of Defense Discovery Rules; Need for Prosecutor's
Discovery of Specific Defenses (Alibi, Insanity, Etc.), 33 F.R.D. 74, 78-80 (1963) (liberal discov-
ery in criminal cases would encourage perjury, bribery, and intimidation of government
witnesses); Speeches Delivered at the Conference of the National District Attorneys Association, Panel
on Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 320, 326 (1965) (liberal dis-
covery in criminal cases would encourage "fabrication of spurious defenses by the defen-
dant") (statement of Paul B. Johnson, Fla. State Attorney).
506 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
507 Id. at 87. In Brady, petitioner and a companion were found guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced to death. At his trial, Brady admitted participation in the crime but
claimed that his companion did the actual killing. In an extrajudicial statement, the com-
panion admitted to the killing, but the prosecution withheld this statement until after
Brady's conviction.
508 See note 514 and accompanying text infra.
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ers' identities, the defendant will be unable to gather rebuttal evi-
dence and prepare for cross-examination by investigating the
background and pending testimony of key prosecution witnes-
ses.50 9 Moreover, absent pretrial disclosure, prosecution witnesses
will frequently surprise defense counsel, making it more difficult
to challenge the prosecution's case.5 10 Similarly, without disclo-
sure, the defense will lack the opportunity prior to trial to refresh
the witness's memory, raise questions regarding the accuracy of
his account, and thereby influence his direct testimony. Finally,
nondisclosure precludes meeting with the witness while the events
are freshest in his mind; a faltering memory might be averted by
prompt prodding. Citing these factors, defense counsel have ar-
gued that nondisclosure violates the "fair trial" right recognized in
Brady.
Despite this argument, the Supreme Court distinguished
Brady from the typical witness-disclosure case in Weatherford v.
Bursey.511 Prosecution witnesses, by definition, provide evidence
unfavorable to the defendant; thus the defendant's legitimate in-
terest in obtainingfavorable information and the prosecution's ob-
ligation of fair play-at least as defined in Brady-are absent in
this context.51 2
Weatherford involved a prosecution for vandalizing Selective
Service offices in Columbia, South Carolina. After Weatherford, a
government informer, testified for the prosecution at trial, Bur-
sey, the defendant, was convicted. After serving his sentence, Bur-
sey sued for violation of his civil rights, asserting that the prosecu-
tion's refusal to identify Weatherford as a witness before trial de-
prived him of due process.513 Citing Brady, the court of appeals
held that the state was constitutionally forbidden to "conceal the
identity of an informant from a defendant during his trial prep-
509 Cf A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 270, at
1-283 (3d ed. 1976) ("as any experienced trial lawyer knows, uninformed cross-examination
is worse than no cross-examination at all").
510 American trial procedure emphasizes broad discovery privileges. The practice of
withholding all information until trial has been supplanted by discovery standards that
encourage the parties to exchange all relevant information bearing on the case. See, e.g.,
Introduction to ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (1969); cf. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b) (endorsing broad discovery in civil proceedings).
429 U.S. 545 (1977).
512 See People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76, 375 N.E.2d 41, 404 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1978) (pros-
ecutor not obligated to reveal death of complaining witness because information not excul-
patory).
513 429 U.S. at 549.
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aration," at least when he "den[ies] up through the day before his
appearance at trial that he will testify against the defendant," and
then "testif[ies] with devastating effect. ' 514
The Supreme Court rejected the circuit court's analysis:
It does not follow from the prohibition against concealing evi-
dence favorable to the accused that the prosecution must reveal
before trial the names of all witnesses who will testify unfavora-
bly.... [A]s the Court wrote recently 'the Due Process Clause
has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the
parties must be afforded ....... Brady is not implicated here
where the only claim is that the State should have revealed that
it would present the eyewitness testimony of a particular agent
against the defendant at trial.51 5
2. Judicial Discretion to Compel Disclosure
a. Sources of Discretion. Notwithstanding Supreme Court re-
jection of a constitutional mandate, courts recognize a general dis-
cretion to compel disclosure of witness identities even in the ab-
514 528 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1975).
5 429 U.S. at 559-60. Related to the due process claim is an argument based on the
sixth amendment, which guarantees the criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses
against him. Although the defendant always will receive the opportunity to face and cross-
examine the witness at trial, he may nonetheless argue that pretrial nondisclosure so seri-
ously hinders effective cross-examination that it renders the confrontation clause a hollow
guarantee. See note 509 supra.
Apparently no reported decision addresses the sixth amendment claim; but such an
argument is not likely to succeed. Policies underlying the sixth amendment claim closely
parallel those underlying the due process argument. Thus, rejection of the due process
claim portends repudiation of the confrontation claim. In State v. Booton, 114 N.H. 750,
329 A.2d 376 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 919 (1975), for example, the defendant ap-
pealed from the trial court's denial of her motion for disclosure of a list of witnesses prior
to trial. Although the court noted that "providing defendant with a list of witnesses prior
to trial promotes fairness, adequate preparation, and courtroom efficiency" (id. at 754, 329
A.2d at 380), it rejected the defendant's due process claim, concluding that there was no
error in the denial of the motion. The court's refusal of disclosure in the face of considera-
tions of fairness and adequate preparation strongly suggests that a right of confrontation
claim would meet a similarly negative response, since those considerations necessarily un-
derlie the "empty right" argument based on the sixth amendment.
This conclusion finds further support in the Supreme Court's broad language in
Weatherford: "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and
Brady did not create one .... " 429 U.S at 559. See also notes 661-64 and accompanying text
infra (confrontation right normally not violated even in case of declarant absence where
proferred statement falls within hearsay exception).
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sence of an authorizing statute. 516  Courts differ as to the source
of this discretion. Some courts have cited the "inherent power" of
courts.517  Others have analogized to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16, which specifically allows criminal discovery in other
situations.5 1 8  The most sensible source of judicial authority, how-
ever, rests on a common-sense proposition: due to his active in-
volvement in the administration of criminal justice, the trial judge
is in the best position to administer the law and protect the rights
of all. 51 9
"' See, e.g., United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1975). See also United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
517 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 1975) (upholding,
on basis of trial court's "inherent power," dismissal of indictment on grounds of govern-
ment's refusal to comply with pretrial order to identify witnesses).
518 See generally note 520 infra.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973), looked to
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 in establishing a procedure to balance the conflicting interests involved
in the witness disclosure issue. Recognizing that the rule applies only to documents and
physical objects, the court concluded that it could nonetheless help solve witness disclosure
problems. 488 F.2d at 174. The court asserted that if a defendant desires discretionary
disclosure of the government's witnesses, he should make a showing similar to that re-
quired by rule 16(a)(l)(C):
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents ... which are within
the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to
the preparation of his defense or are intended for use by the government as evi-
dence in chief at the trial ....
(Emphasis added). After noting the mandatory character of the provision, the court
pointed to rule 16(d)(1), a companion section which allows courts to issue protective orders.
The court concluded that, "[f]ollowing these procedures will insure that there is an
adequate basis for requesting such discovery and will afford the government a known
method for resisting the request." 488 F.2d at 175. But cf. United States v. Larson, 555
F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1977) (under rule 16, "[i]t is clear that defendant is not entitled to
the names of government witnesses"); United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1007 (7th
Cir. 1975) ("the discretion employed by the district court ... need [not] be limited to a de-
fense showing of materiality and reasonableness"); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp.
863, 867 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("[Richter's] continued validity is suspect.").
Although rule 16 provides a procedural scheme for dealing with disclosure requests, it
fails to articulate useful factors to be considered in reaching a decision. The rule gives no
guidance in determining what is "material to the preparation of [defendant's] defense."
Nor does the rule specify when protective orders should issue, although it is obvious that
one would be appropriate where there is reason to believe that a witness would be subject
to physical or economic harm if his identity is revealed.
Given the rule's lack of guidance, the analogy drawn to rule 16 does little more than
establish a procedural framework for the presentation of motions to disclose. While appli-
cation of rule 16 tends to tip the scales against the prosecutor by requiring a "sufficient
showing," the court must still balance interests without guidance as to which "interests" are
relevant or crucial.
"' See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309 (1967) (dictum) (Roviaro balancing test re-
garding disclosure of informant identities rests on courts' supervisory powers); United
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b. Balancing Interests. Regardless of its source, judicial author-
ity to compel disclosure unquestionably exists. In exercising this
discretion, courts must determine whether, in a particular case,
the benefits of disclosure outweigh its costs.
520
States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170, 173-74 (9th Cir. 1973) (district court empowered to effec-
tuate "speedy and orderly administration of justice").
520 An issue closely related to witness disclosure concerns whether an indictment alleging
extortion or other loanshark-related crimes must identify the alleged victim. As a general
rule, the indictment must state the elements of the offense ,charged and describe the acts
alleged in sufficient detail to allow preparation of the defense and protect the defendant's
double jeopardy claim in the event of a second prosecution. Russell v. United States, 369
U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962). Problems arise in at least two situations.
First, in some cases the grand jury will not know who the victim is, but will be able to
state the time, place, and method of the crime. In such cases failure to name the victim
should not prove fatal to the indictment. Because the prosecution's proof will not focus on
the victim or include hi testimony, specific identification of the alleged criminal act by
time, place, and language used provides the defendant with sufficient information to pre-
pare his defense and preserve his double jeopardy claim. Cf United States v. Rizzo, 373 F.
Supp. 204, 205-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court upheld indictment that "spell[ed] out alleged
extortion scheme in considerable detail, [but did] not state name of [victim]," but suggested
that the fact that conspiracy was charged and not substantive crime of extortion was cru-
cial), aff'd, 492 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 944 (1974).
Second, cases arise in which the grand jury knows the victim's identity, but-in order
to protect the victim-hands down an indictment which, while alleging specific facts, is
sufficiently ambiguous to render the victim's identity uncertain. Such a situation might
occur, for example, when a loanshark has made a number of usurious loans of similar size
during a limited time period.
Eight reasons favor judicial liberality in upholding indictments in such cases. First, all
the considerations favoring witness nondisclosure (see notes 525-26 and accompanying text
infra) are especially applicable in this context; since the victim is likely to be the key pros-
ecution witness, he is particularly vulnerable to attempts to eliminate or alter his testimony
at trial. Second, nondisclosure in the indictment may protect the victim from any chance of
reprisals, since if the defendant pleads guilty to the offense alleged or a lesser related
offense, disclosure need never occur. Third, nondisclosure benefits the defendant, since it
provides him with an enhanced plea negotiation position. Because of the prosecution's
interest in protecting the would-be witness, the defendant may obtain a more favorable
disposition by foregoing any potential right to discover the victim's name.
Fourth, nondisclosure in the indictment alleviates the need for the police to provide
protection throughout the entire pre-trial period; this not only saves taxpayer dollars, but
avoids the unacceptable result of requiring the state to forego prosecution in cases where
the defendant is likely to be able to "reach" the victim prior to trial. Mandatory witness
disclosure statutes implicitly recognize this problem by requiring disclosure only a short
time before trial. See notes 544-46 and accompanying text infra.
Fifth, double jeopardy concerns may be minimized by careful delineation of facts in
the indictment and liberal construction of the initial indictment in the event of a second
prosecution.
Sixth, nondisclosure in the indictment will not adversely affect the defendant in prepar-
ing his defense. He can always request disclosure via a bill of particulars, and, at the very
least, will-learn the victim's identity at trial. As in the typical witness nondisclosure case, a
mid-trial continuance can protect-and indeed improve-the defendant's ability to present
his defense. See notes 541-43 and accompanying text infra.
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On one side of the balance lies the defendant's interest in
preparing his defense, 521 an interest that arguably increases with
the severity of possible punishment 522 and the complexity of the
underlying factual situation. 523  Considerations of judicial con-
venience and expediency, as well as problems in effectiiely con-
ducting voir dire, also support disclosure.524
Against these benefits, however, courts must weigh the possi-
ble harms of pretrial identification. Intimidation 525 or injury 526 of
Seventh, it is theoretically inconsistent to permit nondisclosure if the grand jury is
unaware of the victim's identity, but to require it in this context. The sufficiency of an
indictment's allegations does not depend on the grand jury's subjective state but on the
objective notice provided. In either context the most sensible result is to uphold the in-
dictment and deal with the disclosure issue if identification is requested in a bill of particu-
lars.
Eighth, existing authority supports this result. In Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d
379, 380 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 940 (1965), the First Circuit upheld nondisclosure
of the purchaser's identity in a narcotics prosecution, reasoning that a specific description
of the alleged transaction, notwithstanding nondisclosure, prevented the prosecution from
"roaming at large." Accord, Llamas v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1963),
affd, 327 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1964). See also United States v. Tomasetta, 429 F.2d 978 (1st
Cir. 1970) (mere failure to name victim "might not have" warranted dismissal of indict-
ment). An arguably contrary case, United States v. Agone, 302 F. Supp. 1258, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), is distinguishable. In Agone, the status of the victim was an element of the
offense; since the applicable statute prohibited only threats to union members, the court
focused on the particularity of the statute and the large number of potential victims in
mandating disclosure. See also United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360 (1878); Lauer v.
United States, 320 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1963).
521 See United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1975); Carnivale v. State,
271, So. 2d 793, 795, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (per curiam).
522 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1976), for example, provides for mandatory disclosure of witnesses
in capital cases. See note 544 supra. Courts might analogize to the statute in reasoning that
the greater the severity of the possible sentence, the greater the need for disclosure.
52 See United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.) (court upheld denial of
defendant's motion for discovery of witnesses' names, in part because of "simple nature of
the underlying factual situation"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973).
524 See United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 1975) (suggesting prob-
lem of juror who discovers relationship with witness after trial begins).
521 United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (evidence of threats
against witnesses). Cf People v. Andre W., 44 N.Y.2d 179, 186, 375 N.E.2d 758, 762, 404
N.Y.S.2d 578, 582 (1978) (danger of intimidation of witness whom prosecution did not
intend to call).
52 United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.) (disclosure of names and exact
whereabouts of inmates who planned to testify might endanger witnesses), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 963 (1976). Cf. United States v. Baum, 482 F.2d 1325, 1331 (2d Cir. 1973) (witness in
federal custody secure from danger).
Concern for the safety of the witness is especially strong where the witness is also
an informer. In United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1051 (1974), the Tenth Circuit observed that "informers whose identity is revealed
prior to trial are often among the missing when the trial date rolls around."
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witnesses and subornation of perjury are recurrent dangers,5 27
especially in organized crime prosecutions.52 8  The courts have
isolated a number of factors supporting nondisclosure due to the
possibility of these abuses. Where the defendant's position might
facilitate reprisals, for example, disclosure appears undesirable.529
In People v. Lopez,53 ° the court delayed disclosure, citing the
witnesses' actual fear inspired by knowledge of the defendant's
past conduct; 531 in addition, a probation officer had characterized
the defendant as a "desperate inmate and leader of disorder and
likely to be a continuous menace and source of trouble." 532
Harassment of others associated with the case also militates
against disclosure.533 In United States v. Cannone,534 the Second
Circuit held that the district court erred in sustaining without
meaningful explanation the defense's motion for pretrial discov-
ery of witness names. The appellate court noted the indictment of
several of the defendants for beating a grand jury witness as well
as "the absence of specific evidence of the need for disclosure." 535
Since Cannone involved alleged attacks on actual participants
in the judicial process, it is arguably distinguishable from typical
loanshark and extortion prosecutions which involve allegations of
violence outside the judicial setting. Cannone's logic, however,
applies to all cases involving indictments for violent crimes. A
grand jury indictment-a source independent of the prosecutor-
indicates probable cause to believe the defendant has engaged in
violence. 536 This independent source bolsters the prosecutor's as-
sessment of the potential danger of reprisal for witness coopera-
tion.537
527 United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Per-
cevault, 490 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1974).
528 See Harrington v. State, 110 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), quoted in text
accompanying note 555 infra.
529 See United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 693 (4th Cir. 1973) (defendants were
powerfully placed officials in small county where witnesses lived).
530 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963).
' Id. at 246, 384 P.2d at 29, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
532 Id.
533 United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 693 (4th Cir. 1973).
13' 528 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975).
535 Id. at 302.
536 Id. at 302 n.6.
537 Thus, government attorneys should emphasize the violent character of the offense
charged in seeking to justify nondisclosure in loanshark prosecutions. Cf Moore, Criminal
Discovery, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 890 (1968) (character background of defendant and his
counsel proper considerations in deciding whether to require disclosure of witness list to
defendant).
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c. Impact of the Tort-Based Duty to Protect. Tort law imposes an
affirmative duty on government officials to provide witnesses and
informants with reasonable protection. 538  Although courts have
yet to tie this doctrine to nondisclosure of witness identities, the
duty to protect and witness nondisclosure interact in three impor-
tant ways. First, nondisclosure is itself an effective means of pro-
viding protection; the defendant cannot injure a witness he can-
not identify. Second, nondisclosure advances the important
policies underlying the duty to protect: encouragment of coopera-
tion, reciprocation for citizen service, and prevention of injury.
Finally, witness nondisclosure responds to the primary criti-
cism of the "reasonable protection" rule. Commentators have chal-
lenged the duty to protect witnesses as ultimately frustrating law
enforcement efforts by imposing excessive costs on the state and
demands on authorities' time.53 9  By refusing to order disclosure
of witness names, courts can blunt this criticism. Nondisclosure
eliminates the need for costly physical protection during the cru-
cial pre-testimony period.540 Once the witness has testified, the
scope of the duty to protect should diminish significantly; since
the witness has already done his damage and sentencing may be
imminent, the defendant will normally hesitate to kill or injure
the witness who has told his story at trial.
d. Use of Continuances to Facilitate Preparation. By allowing the
defense to prepare for cross-examination, mid-trial continuances
may mitigate the deleterious effects of nondisclosure. Several
courts have focused on the defense's failure to seek a continuance
in upholding convictions against wrongful nondisclosure at-
tacks.54' Mid-trial continuances protect the defendant's right to
Arguments for nondisclosure are even stronger where the prosecution intends to call a
witness only for purposes of rebuttal. United States v. Windham, 489 F.2d 1389, 1392 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("Rebuttal witnesses are a recognized exception to all witness disclosure re-
quirements."); Breedlove v. State, 295 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). But see
People v. Manley, 19 Ill. App. 3d 365, 371, 311 N.E.2d 593, 598 (1974) (prosecutor must
disclose rebuttal witness once he forms intent to call that witness).
538 See e.g., Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 80-81, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537, 180
N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (1958) ("[Tlhe public ... owes a special duty to use reasonable care for
the protection of persons who have collaborated with it in the arrest or prosecution of
criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration.");
see generally notes 468-503 and accompanying text supra; see also Comment, note 497 supra.
"9 See notes 498-99 and accompanying text supra.
540 Other possible means of protection include relocation of the prospective witness, and
the assumption of an alias. These devices, however, are unavailable in providing pre-
testimony protection.
541 See United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 187 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1051 (1974); Siblisk v. State, 263 Ind. 651, 656, 336 N.E.2d 650, 653 (1975).
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confrontation without infringing upon his right to a speedy
trial.542
The prosecutor willing to accept a continuance in return for
witness nondisclosure 543 should impress upon the court the un-
usual benefit the mid-trial continuance confers on the defendant.
Even when the defendant knows the identities of prosecution wit-
nesses and can therefore prepare for cross-examination, he can-
not know precisely what evidence the prosecutor will develop on
direct examination. The defense attorney usually must overpre-
pare to insure his ability to neutralize all possible prosecutorial
lines of attack. Moreover, he must prepare for cross-examination
largely in the dark. The post-direct-examination continuance
eliminates these problems. Counsel need not speculate; he can
prepare for cross-examination with perfect knowledge of the pre-
cise points drawn out on direct. Thus, where the court grants a
mid-trial continuance, the refusal of the prosecution to release the
names of witnesses may well enhance, rather than undermine, the
defendant's ability to prepare his defense.
542 A number of factors work against the defendant faced with long pretrial delays. See
generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). If the defendant is imprisoned, time spent
in jail disrupts family life and enforces idleness. As proceedings drag on, the defendant
may be unable to gather evidence, contact witnesses, and otherwise prepare his case.
For defendants on pretrial release, the denial of a speedy trial may result in
loss of employment or make it impossible to find work; restraints are placed on
the accused's liberty, and he may be forced to live under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion, and hostility. The defendant's resources may be drained and his as-
sociations curtailed; and he may be subjected to public obloquy which creates
anxiety in his family, friends and the defendant himself.
H. R. REP. No. 1508, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7401, 7408.
These problems are almost entirely inapplicable to mid-trial continuances designed to
facilitate the defendant's preparation for cross-examination. Concern with the defendant's
inability to prepare evaporates; the very purpose of the continuance is to facilitate prepara-
tion. By restricting the duration of the mid-trial continuance, courts can avert undue pro-
longation of anxiety and incarceration, while minimizing inconvenience to the court and
jury. But see United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting con-
tinuances as full solution for harm done by nondisclosure); Howe v. Alaska, 589 P.2d 421,
424 (Alas. 1979) (continuance "an awkward and disruptive substitute for pre-trial discov-
ery").
543 In arguing for nondisclosure, prosecutors might suggest a continuance to protect the
defendant. On the other hand, prosecutors might fear that a continuance would allow the
defendant to "reach" the witness and induce him to change his story during the break in
trial proceedings. A complete reversal on cross-examination, however, may do the prosecu-
tion less harm than good. A perceptive jury, with prosecutorial prodding on re-direct,
would be likely to discern the actual sequence of events, and infer, from coercion of the
witness, commission of the crime charged.
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e. Effect of Rules and Statutes Upon the Disclosure Question. A
number of jurisdictions have dealt with the disclosure issue by
statute or rule. Three types of disclosure provisions are common.
The first, which mandates disclosure without exception, generally
applies only to cases in which the accused is charged with a capital
crime. 544  The rationale for limiting such provisions to capital of-
fenses 545 is not surprising-where capital punishment may be
imposed, the defendant's need for access to witness identities out-
weighs the potential dangers accompanying disclosure.5 46
A second type of statute provides for the exchange of witness
lists between prosecution and defense. 47 Such provisions in ef-
fect amount to conditional disclosure rules. In Wisconsin, for
example, a defendant's discovery of prosecution witnesses is con-
ditioned upon his tender to the prosecutor of a list of prospective
defense witnesses.5 48
544 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1976) provides:
A person charged with treason or other capital offense shall at least three
entire days before commencement of trial be furnished with a copy of the in-
dictment and a list of the veniremen, and of the witnesses to be produced on
the trial for proving the indictment, stating the place of abode of each venire-
man and witness.
See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 604.1 (1974) (must disclose witness list 24 hours before
trial where indictment is for offense punishable by death).
A distinctive feature of some provisions is that the prosecutor must disclose witness
identities "in time to permit [the defendant] to make beneficial use thereof." FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.220(h) (West 1975); see ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, Compilation, at 260 (1974); UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
421(b)(3)(i) (1974). Invariably, these provisions leave the time of disclosure to the discretion
of the trial judge.
545 United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 466 (4th Cir.) (disclosure required in only
capital cases), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967).
546 The federal statute does not provide for the issuance of protective orders allowing
the criminal defendant to obtain information that may be necessary to his defense. The
statute mandates disclosure with "no strings" attached.
5 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(3) (a) (West 1971) provides:
A defendant may, not less than 15 days nor more than 30 days before trial,
serve upon the district attorney an offer in writing to furnish the state a list of
all witnesses the defendant intends to call at the trial, whereupon within 5 days
after the receipt of such offer, the district attorney shall furnish the defendant
a list of all witnesses and their addresses whom he intends to call at the trial.
Within 5 days after the district attorney furnishes such a list, the defendant
shall furnish the district attorney a list of all witnesses and their addresses
whom the defendant intends to call at the trial. This section shall not apply to
rebuttal witnesses or those called for impeachment only.
548 See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.23, Comments (West 1971) ("If the defendant is unwill-
ing to disclose his own witnesses, then he is not entitled to learn the names of the state's
witnesses."). But in Washington, the courts have required defendants to disclose within a
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Finally, many states supplement mandatory disclosure provi-
sions with provisions allowing for the issuance of protective orders
upon a showing of'good cause by the prosecutor. Most jurisdic-
tions emphasize the same considerations in deciding whether to
issue such orders: threats of physical harm, bribes, intimidation,
economic harm, coercion, and interference with a criminal inves-
tigation.549 In short, application of protective order provisions
entails the same balancing process employed in the absence of
statutory guidelines.
f. Relation of Informant-Disclosure Balancing. With the growing
sophistication of criminal activities and methods of avoiding ap-
prehension, law enforcement agencies have grown increasingly
dependent on informants to combat crime. As with witnesses, 550
assorted policies favor nondisclosure of informant identities to a
criminal defendant, and courts have recognized a limited
prosecutorial privilege to refuse disclosure to encourage infor-
mants to assist the government. 551
The United States Supreme Court justified this approach in
Roviaro v. United States: 552
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection
of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The
privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate
their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforce-
ment officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages
them to perform that obligation.5 53
In short, nondisclosure keeps the flow of information regard-
ing criminal activity open. Disclosure of an informant's identity
may jeopardize the physical safety of both the informant and his
family. The involvement of organized crime members amplifies
"reasonable time" despite WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.37.030 (1961), which provides that
the defendant shall disclose witnesses within five days of receipt of the prosecutor's witness
list. See State v. Adams, 144 Wash. 699, 257 P. 387 (1927); State v. Sickles, 144 Wash. 236,
257 P. 385 (1927).
"9 See Wis. STAT. ANN § 971.23(6) (West 1971); cf. FLA. R. CRM. P. 3.220(h) (West
1975) (allowing issuance of protection order "[ulpon a showing of cause"); N.J. CT. R.
3:13-3(d) (showing of "good cause" required).
5 See notes 504-49 and accompanying text infra.
5 See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarles and Butler, 158
U.S. 532, 535-36 (1894); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884).
552 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
553 Id. at 59.
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the danger of death or bodily harm. The court suggested the
magnitude of this problem in Harrington v. State: 554
It is common knowledge that without the aid of confidential
informants the discovery and prevention of crime would pre-
sent such a formidable task as practically to render hopeless the
efforts of those charged with law enforcement. And the alarm-
ing fact that the underworld often wreaks vengeance upon in-
formers would unquestionably deter the giving of such infor-
mation if the identity of the informer should be required to be
disclosed in all instances. 555
The benefits of nondisclosure extend beyond particular crim-
inal transactions. Law enforcement officials rely on confidential
informants as continuing sources of information, often regarding
an interrelated network of criminal activity. In these situations,
disclosure of a confidential informant's identity terminates his
usefulness by "blowing his cover."
Despite these considerations, the privilege of nondisclosure is
not absolute. The sixth amendment promises the defendant a
right to confront his accusers and the fifth and fourteenth
amendments guarantee due process of law. Thus, when the de-
fendant can show that disclosure is necessary to ensure a "fair
trial," the government must reveal the informant's identity.556
In Rovario, the Supreme Court outlined in general terms the
basic considerations involved in this inquiry:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justi-
fiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public
interest in protecting the flow of information against the indi-
vidual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of
the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.557
554 110 So. 2d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
555 Id. at 497.
556 People v. McSchann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 810-11, 330 P.2d 33, 38 (1958); Priestly v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 818-19, 330 P.2d 39, 43 (1958); People v. Williams, 51 Cal.
2d 355, 359-60, 333 P.2d 19, 22 (1958). But see United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d
Cir. 1978) (where government offered to introduce sufficient corroborating evidence, trial
court erred in refusing to admit hearsay testimony of undisclosed informant).
557 353 U.S. at 62. The circumstances that justified disclosure in Roviaro included: (1)
the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the agents could not substitute for question-
ing the person "who had been nearest to him and took part in the transaction"; (2) the
informant played a prominent role in the transaction; (3) the informant's testimony might
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In applying the Roviaro balancing test, courts have uniformly
held that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating why
disclosure should be ordered; he can discharge this burden only
by showing that nondisclosure will prejudice his case or deny him
a fair trial.55 In the final analysis, resolution of the disclosure
issue rests within the discretion of the trial court. Only a clear
abuse of discretion will result in reversal. 559  Yet the courts have
also identified various factors informing this discretion. These
include: whether the informant participated in the criminal
transaction, 560 whether the informant witnessed the criminal
have revealed an entrapment; (4) the informant may have thrown doubt on the identity of
the package or the defendant; (5) the informant could testify to the defendant's "possible
lack of knowledge of the contents of the package." Id. at 64.
5-1 United States v. Hanna, 341 F.2d 906, 906 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Coke,
339 F.2d 183, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863, 881-82
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Treverrow v. State, 194 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1967); State v. Davis, 308
So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. Fielding, 353 N.E.2d 719,
731 (Mass. 1976).
559 United States v. Van Orsdell, 521 F.2d 1323, 1326 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1059 (1976); United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1027(1973).
560 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1973) (where the in-
former introduced undercover agent to accused's co-defendant and was present when sale
was consummated, court properly disclosed informer's identity); United States v. Kelley,
449 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1971) (not error to deny defendant's request for disclosure where
the informant neither witnessed the crime nor participated in the criminal activity);
Poutomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1955) (where sale of heroin
was made to government informer, court erred in denying defendant's request for disclo-
sure); Ricketts v. State, 305 So. 2d 296, 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (disclosure required
where informant supplied "lead," was present at the time of the illegal transaction, and
actively participated in the unlawful transaction); State v. Roundtree, 118 N.J. Super. 22,
30-32, 285 A.2d 564, 569 (App. Div. 1971) (disclosure required where informant, in the
presence of an undercover agent, gave defendant $10 with which to purchase narcotics);
People v. Simpson, 47 A.D.2d 665, 665, 364 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199-200 (2d Dep't 1975) (where
informant accompanied police officer to defendant's apartment to purchase large quan-
tities of marijuana, court erred in failing to order disclosure). See also Encinas-Sierras v.
United States, 401 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1968) (disclosure not required where informant
was not present and took no part in the arrangement for illegal import of heroin); Spataro
v. State, 179 So. 2d 873, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (disclosure ordered when only
proof of possession of contraband by defendant was testimony of state's witness; court
noted that "[i]f the informant had testified that the 'female' who sold him ... marijuana
was in fact the State's witness, it would have materially affected the credibility of her tes-
timony.").
In State v. Robinson, 89 N.M. 199, 549 P.2d 277 (1976), the New Mexico Supreme
Court retreated from a per se approach in active participant cases. The court concluded:
To require the state to reveal the informer's identity in every instance where
that person has witnessed and helped arrange the drug transaction, without
first determining whether the informer's testimony will be at all relevant or
necessary to the defense, would unreasonably cripple the state's efforts at drug
law enforcement.
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event,561 whether the identity of the crime's perpetrator is in is-
sue, 562 whether the defendant has claimed entrapment, 563 and
Id. at 201, 549 P.2d at 279.
Influencing the court's decision was the fact that at an in camera hearing, the infor-
mant neither contradicted nor varied the police account of the offense. The cQurt con-
tinued by distinguishing Roviaro:
[I]n Roviaro, the Government's informer was the sole participant, other than the
accused, in the transaction charged. The informer was the only witness in a
position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the Government witnesses. In
the case before us [the] agent ... was the dominant moving party in the trans-
actions, not the informer.
Id. The teaching of Robinson comports with Roviaro. An overeagerness to give determina-
tive effect to the informant's active participation ignores the balancing approach mandated
by Roviaro. Following Robinson, courts should consider all relevant factors in passing on the
disclosure issue.
For a discussion of the Robinson decision, see Note, 7 N.M. L. REv. 241 (1977).
561 Generally, the prosecution need not disclose the identity of an informer who merely
observed a criminal act. In Doe v. State, 262 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), for
example, the court ruled that disclosure of the informant's identity was not required where
the informant witnessed the sale of heroin to an undercover agent but did nothing in
advance to prepare for the sale. Id. at 13. See Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268,
331 N.E.2d 893, 898-900 (1975) (no error in failure of trial judge to require disclosure of
informant's identity where informer witnessed a robbery and defendant did not show that
informant was necessary to prepare defense); State v. Oliver, 50 N.J. 39, 42, 231 A.2d 805,
807 (1967) (disclosure of an informant who merely accompanied police officer to bar used
for bookmaking activities not required). Notwithstanding this general rule, the presence of
an informant at a staged offense may complicate the disclosure issue-at least when the
defense rests on allegations of entrapment or mistaken identity.
M See People v. Durazo, 52 Cal. 2d 354, 356, 340 P.2d 594, 596 (1959) (disclosure
warranted where informant could possibly contradict government witness's identification of
defendant); People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 359, 333 P.2d 19, 21 (1959) (disclosure
required when identity material to defense); State v. Anderson, 329 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (among relevant factors in judging propriety of disclosure is whether
identity of defendant is in issue and whether informant participated in the crime); Ricketts
v. State, 305 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (disclosure mandated because nonpar-
ticipant informant only witness who could possibly contradict prosecution's evidence); Mon-
serrate v. State, 232 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (disclosure necessary to
determine if appellant sold heroin to unnamed defendant); People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d
163, 172-73, 313 N.E.2d 41, 46, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 578 (disclosure of informant who ac-
companied police officer to bar required where high risk of mistaken identification
existed), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); People v. Rivera, 53 A.D.2d 819, 385 N.Y.S.2d
537 (Ist Dep't 1976) (also highlighting fact that agent only was in presence of narcotics for
short time and that agent spoke to several persons, including seller, at time of transaction).
53 Compare Richert v. State, 338 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (trial court erred in
not disclosing informant's identity where informant could corroborate defendant's account
of entrapment and possibly identify individual who gave defendant controlled substance),
with United States v. Eddings, 478 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1973) (disclosure properly withheld
where the defendant freely admitted purchasing non-tax-paid whiskey with the intent to
subsequently sell it); United States v. Fredia, 319 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir. 1963) (not error to
refuse disclosure where defendants confessed their participation in the sale of cocaine to a
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whether the informant "set the stage' for the crime. 564
Although the basic principle of balancing applied to infor-
mant disclosure cases clearly applies by analogy to witness disclo-
sure, the policies implicated in the two situations markedly di-
verge. The defendant typically seeks informant disclosure in his
search for exculpatory witnesses, while he seeks witness disclosure
merely to prepare for cross-examination. Similarly, while
prosecutors fear that "blowing the cover" of informants will elimi-
nate continuing sources of information, their reluctance to witness
disclosure normally involves only the case at hand. Two pros-
ecutorial concerns, however, apply in both situations-danger of
injury or death resulting from disclosure and the resulting detri-
mental effect on cooperation with law enforcement authorities.565
narcotics agent; "[ilt is inconceivable that anything the informer might have said ... would
materially have aided appellants in setting up a defense of entrapment"); United States v.
Simonetti, 326 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1964) (where record contained ample proof that defen-
dant was guilty of failing to register as a person in business of accepting bets; disclosure
not warranted where no evidence of entrapment existed and informant's testimony would
be only cumulative); State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 436, 197 A.2d 185, 192 (1964) (absent
testimony by defendant giving rise to inference that "his was an innocent mind free of
any intention to acquire stolen certificates until it was transmuted into a criminal mind by
the ... enticement of ... the officers," there was no need to require disclosure of infor-
mant's identity).
564 Defendants often request disclosure of an informant's identity when the informant
was instrumental in setting up the illegal transaction or contributed to the atmosphere that
facilitated its occurrence. Most courts deny disclosure despite these circumstances. See
United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.) (nondisclosure not error where informant
merely introduced government agent to defendant and then left while negotiations for sale
of narcotics proceeded), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 932 (1966); State v. Boone, 125 N.J. Super.
112, 113-14, 309 A.2d 1, 2 (A.D. 1973) (where informant's transaction merely confirmed
police suspicions that defendant possessed "dangerous substance" but informant did not
participate in the crime charged, trial court did not err in refusing disclosure). Some
courts, however, have considered the "set up" as a factor favoring disclosure. See Gilmore
v. United States, 256 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1958) (informant introduced defendant to
undercover agent and helped set up "friendly" atmosphere between them). There, the
Fifth Circuit stated:
Here [the informant] ... was an active participant in setting the stage, in creat-
ing the atmosphere of confidence beforehand and in continuing it by his close
presence during the moments of critical conversation [when the drug sale was
arranged] .... As [the informant] was a principal actor before and during this
performance, who he was and what he knew was certainly material and rele-
vant. In this testimony there might have been the seeds of innocence, of sub-
stantial doubt, or overwhelming corroboration. As the inferences from it cov-
ered the full spectrum from innocence to guilt, the process of truth-finding,
which should be the aim of every trial, compelled its disclosure.
565 See United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963
(1976); United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051
(1974), quoted in note 526 supra.
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Courts should note these differences and similarities, so as to
avoid applying inapposite principles. The defense's interest in
calling an informant who participated in the alleged criminal
activity-an interest forfeited entirely if the informant's name is
not disclosed-does not apply in the witness context. A witness, by
definition, will appear at trial, and the defense may question him
concerning the transaction whether or not his identity has previ-
ously been disclosed. On the other hand, the defendant's interest
in effective cross-examination is irrelevant to the informant disclo-
sure issue when the prosecution does not intend to transform the
informant into a witness.
V
PROOF PROBLEMS POSED BY WITNESS FEAR-EVIDENTIARY
OBSTACLES AND ALTERNATIVES IN COPING
WITH THE RECALCITRANT WITNESS
The scared witness may be no witness at all. Despite legal
doctrines designed to provide protection, a frightened witness
may refuse to testify, claim failure of memory, or spuriously in-
voke his fifth amendment rights.566 In other cases, a prospective
witness, after initially providing information implicating the de-
fendant, may completely reverse his story either at or prior to
trial. The law does not look lightly upon these derelictions of
duty. Subpoena authority, complemented by the contempt power,
enables the prosecutor to insist that fearful witnesses testify, while
sanctions for perjury increase the chance that they will testify
truthfully.
Contempt citations and perjury indictments, however, are no
panacea. Where a witness's fear is substantial, he may continue in
his reticence or fabrication notwithstanding the possibility of legal
reprisals. When such sanctions are imposed on the victim-witness,
they result in punishing the wrong party; the wrath of the state
falls on the manipulated contemptor or perjurer, while the
primary defendant goes free. These limitations of perjury and
I66 "Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testified in 1965 that, even after the
cases had been developed, it was necessary to forego prosecution hundreds of times be-
cause key witnesses would not testify for fear of being murdered." Measures Relating to
Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 508 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
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contempt, however, need not prove fatal to the prosecution's case.
Many cases will present opportunities for the employment of
other effective prosecutorial tools sufficient to bring a fear-
inspiring defendant to justice.
Effective cross-examination, introduction of prior inconsistent
statements, and use of extrinsic evidence to refresh recollection
are among the available options. To use these tools, however, the
prosecutor must first be able to put the recalcitrant witness on the
stand. At least where a claim of self-incrimination is asserted, the
prosecutor generally will be unable to do this. The law of evi-
dence compensates for this problem, however; recognizing the in-
creased need for evidence, all jurisdictions admit a wide range of
hearsay statements when the declarant is unavailable.
A. Calling the Frightened Witness: Recalcitrance and Fifth Amendment
Rights
Although witnesses invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination for a wide variety of reasons,567 the only legitimate
reason is to avoid subjecting himself to criminal penalties.5 6  The
constitutional privilege cannot be invoked to protect another per-
son or to avert reprisals. 56 9  Courts, however, often hesitate to
""' While the major concern of this section is the frightened witness, the doctrines dis-
cussed are equally applicable to a witness who invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination for reasons other than fear. Witnesses in the cited cases, therefore, include
accomplices, codefendants, and victims. Similarly, while this section focuses on a witness
who refuses to testify on fifth amendment grounds, policies relevant in the fifth amend-
ment context usually apply to refusals to testify based on other reasons. We do not
mean to oversimplify the issue. For example, the chain of inference created when a co-
conspirator tacitly acknowledges guilt by pleading the fifth differs from the inferential
sequence produced by an alleged victim openly refusing to take the stand. In both cases,
however, the likely result is the same-prejudice to the defendant based on technically
inadmissable "proof."
568 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67 (1905); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597
(1895). See also In re Master Key, 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974) (possibility, not likeli-
hood, of criminal prosecution required).
"' See State v. Abbott, 275 Or. 611, 616-17, 552 P.2d 238, 241 (1976); State v. Classen,
39 Or. App. 683, 694-95, 571 P.2d 427, 533 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 285 Or. 221, 590
P.2d 1198 (1979). In Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), the Supreme Court
held that as to "each question to which a claim of privilege is directed, the court must
determine whether the answer to that particular question would subject the witness to a
'real danger' of further crimination." Id. at 374.
Various considerations impinge on a witness's ability to invoke the fifth amendment.
For example, if a witness pleads guilty to a related charge, the privilege is not available as
to questions concerning that crime. See, e.g., Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 182
(1963); Commonwealth v. Martin, 362 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Mass. 1977); State v. Kendrick,
538 P.2d 313, 314 (Utah 1975). The privilege may be invoked, however, as long as a
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inquire into the prospective witness's motives or fail to require the
witness to 'justify his fear of incrimination." 570  Even if the court
decides that the invocation of the privilege is improper, the law
normally prohibits the prosecution from putting on the stand any
known recalcitrant witness.57 1
1. Goals in Calling the Recalcitrant Witness
For several reasons, the prosecution may wish to call a witness
even when forewarned of his intention to invoke the fifth
amendment. The prosecutor may believe that the witness, when
faced with the formality of the courtroom or the imminent possi-
bility of a contempt citation, will change his mind and testify. The
prosecutor may call the recalcitrant witness to avert the inference
that the witness's testimony was damaging to his case,572 or to es-
tablish the witness's unavailability and bring special hearsay rules
into play. 57 3  Finally, the prosecutor may wish to call the
recalcitrant witness to raise the improper inference from his si-
lence that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.
witness can appeal his conviction. See, e.g., State v. Abbott, 275 Or. 611, 617 n.2, 552 P.2d
238, 241 n.2 (1976).
570 Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995
(1971).
"' See Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 211-12, 307 A.2d 229, 231-32 (1973);
notes 572-601 and accompanying text infra. But see State v. Abbott, 275 Or. 611, 616-17
552 P.2d 238, 241 (1976) (affirming conviction where prosecution called known recalcitrant
witness who had "no privilege to remain silent"). See generally Note, Exercise of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination by Witness and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the Accused, 33 U. Cm.
L. REv. 151 (1965).
s72 Courts will usually not permit calling the recalcitrant witness solely for this purpose.
See, e.g., People v. Pollack, 21 N.Y.2d 206, 211, 234 N.E.2d 223, 225, 287 N.Y.S.2d 49, 52
(1967); Commonwealth v. Greene, 445 Pa. 228, 230, 285 A.2d 865, 866 (1971). But see
State v. Abbott, 24 Or. App. 111, 114, 544 P.2d 620, 621 (calling recalcitrant witness al-
lowed to rebut possible "adverse inference" from not calling), affd, 275 Or. 611, 552 P.2d
238 (1976). jurisdictions are split on whether or not a missing witness instruction is neces-
sary in these cases. One court has held that an instruction should be given where the
prosecution uses the witness's absence against the defendant. See United States v. Maloney,
262 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1959). Another placed discretion for an instruction's use solely
within the domain of the trial court. United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Still others find an instruction insufficient to counter the
prejudicial effect of calling such a witness. See, e.g., United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53, 57
n.4 (8th Cir. 1972).
s3 In those jurisdictions which permit the introduction of admissions against penal in-
terest and other forms of hearsay only if the witness is unavailable, a witness's refusal to
testify is properly classified as unavailability. As stated in People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88,
257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970):
[W]hether the person is dead, or beyond the jurisdiction, or will not testify, and
cannot be compelled to testify because of a constitutional privilege, all equally
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2. The Prohibition Against Calling The Recalcitrant Witness
Courts generally look with disfavor on any attempt by the
prosecutor57 4 to call a known recalcitrant witness. Three justifica-
tions support this view: (1) the risk of prejudice to the defendant,
(2) the protection of the defendant's right to confrontation, and
(3) the deterrance of prosecutorial misconduct.575
spell out unavailability of trial testimony. If the rule is to be changed to include
penal admissions against interest, it ought to embrace unavailability because of
the assertion of constitutional right which might be fairly common in the area
of penal admissions.
Id. at 93, 257 N.E.2d at 18, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 828. See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968). Although the Brown court employed language such as "where he is in court and
refuses to testify as to the fact of the admission on the ground of self-incrimination," (26
N.Y.2d at 94, 257 N.E.2d at 19, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 829 (emphasis added)), the decision never
specifically ruled on whether a simple declaration by the prosecutor or the witness's attor-
ney suffices to establish unavailability. In 1976, the New York Appellate Division specifi-
cally held that the witness must invoke his fifth amendment rights before being labelled
"unavailable." People v. Keough, 51 A.2d 808, 808, 380 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (2d Dep't 1976).
Holding an in camera hearing to determine the witness's unavailability probably would be a
better procedure. This method establishes unavailability as effectively as calling the recalid-
trant witness at trial, yet avoids the problems of prejudicing the defendant.
574 There is a dispute concerning the applicability of these rules to defense witnesses who
intend to invoke the fifth amendment. The majority view applies the same rule regardless
of who calls the witness:
There is no reason for distinguishing these cases on the basis that the party
calling the witness was the government. The fundamental point is that the
exercise of the privilege is not evidence to be used in the case by any party ....
If the claiming of the privilege is not evidence which the prosecutor can
use, there is no reason why it should be deemed to acquire probative value
simply because a codefendant rather than the state seeks to utilize it.
State v. Smith, 74 Wash. 2d 744, 758-59, 446 P.2d 571, 581 (1968) (emphasis in original),
vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 934 (1972). Accord, Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); Commonwealth v. Greene, 445 Pa. 228,
285 A.2d 865 (1971). In a strong dissent, Justice Roberts in Commonwealth v. Greene stated,
"This argument achieves an empty symmetry without significance." Id. at 233, 285 A.2d at
868. Chief Judge Bazelon, dissenting in Bowles v. United States, suggested that there was a
lesser potential for abuse when such a witness was called by the defendant because of the
"jurors' natural skepticism of any 'buck passing,' and ... the prosecutor's right to dem-
onstrate to the jury that the person accused by the defendant is someone on whom he has
prevailed (through friendship, or by threats of injury) to come to court and then refuse to
testify." 439 F.2d at 545 n.13.
575 Courts have adopted various approaches to determine whether reversible error re-
sulted from the prosecution's calling a recalcitrant witness. The Supreme Court in Namet
v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963), suggested two tests, each relating directly to one of
these justifications: the "conscious and flagrant attempt" test (id. at 186), concerned with
deterring prosecutorial misconduct; and the "critical weight" test (id. at 187), focused di-
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a. Prejudicial Effect. Whenever a witness invokes the privilege
against self-incrimination, "a natural, indeed an almost inevitable,
inference arises as to what would have been his answer if he had
not refused."5 7 6 Since the exercise by the witness of his fifth
amendment rights is not evidence and therefore has no probative
weight, any inferences drawn from it are improper.577  Further-
more, due to the "high courtroom drama"578 surrounding this
kind of confrontation, a witness's assertion of his privilege against
self-incrimination may "have a disproportionate impact on [the
jury's] deliberations." 57 9 If, for example, prior evidence has estab-
lished that the witness was an associate of the defendant and was
present at the time of an alleged loansharking incident, the wit-
ness's invocation of the self-incrimination privilege gives rise to
the inference that the defendant is guilty. Similarly, if an alleged
rectly on the defendant's right of confrontation. According to Namet, prosecutorial miscon-
duct occurs "when the Government makes a conscios and flagrant attempt to build its case
out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege." Id. at 186 (emphasis
added). This language indicates that the crucial inquiry is subjective, concerned with the pros-
ecutor's reasons for putting the witness on the stand. For example, a prosecutor who had a
weak case and called the witness for the express purpose of raising the inference of the
defendant's guilt probably made a "conscious and flagrant attempt" within the meaning of
Namet.
The Namet court further stated that a defendant's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion was denied if, "in the circumstances of a given case, inferences from a witness's refusal
to answer added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-
examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant." Id. at 187 (emphasis added). In
contrast to the subjective test established for prosecutor misconduct, the test for sixth
amendment violations is objective, focusing on the amount of evidence the prosecution
offered to the jury. It appears that when applying this standard, the court would look not
to the prosecutor's intentions, but to the sufficiency of the evidence without the adverse
inferences drawn from the witness's recalcitrance.
Although the two Namet tests were originally developed as discrete bases for decisions,
many courts have used the "conscious and flagrant attempt" test and the "critical weight"
test as mere labels, demonstrating little concern for the subjective and objective compo-
nents that distinguish them. Further confusion is caused by the courts' interchangeable use
of the three justifications, and their automatic use of "prejudice" as a catch-all for any type
of error that may result from the use of a recalcitrant witness.
576 United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
577 Id.
578 Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995
(1971).
s79 Id. In DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 432, 364 P.2d 374, 378 (1961), the court
went further and took judicial notice "that in the public mind an odium surrounds the
claim of constitutional privilege by a witness in refusing to testify." See also 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 433, § 2272, at 426 ("[t]he layman's natural first suggestion would probably be
that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime").
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extortion victim expressly refuses to testify, the jury might
attribute this reluctance to his fear of the defendant and conclude
that a criminal threat did exist.
b. Protecting the Confrontation Right. In Pointer v. Texas,5 s° the
Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental character of a de-
fendant's right to confrontation:
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and
other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their
expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal.581
Since a recalcitrant witness's invocation of the fifth amend-
ment is not considered testimony,58 2 the defendant has no right of
cross-examination. 5 3 By calling such a witness, therefore, the
prosecution may effectively advance its case without allowing the
defendant to rebut adverse inferences, undermine the witness's
credibility, or elicit favorable testimony.
c. Deterrence of Prosecutorial Misconduct. In United States v.
Maloney,5 s4 Judge Learned Hand stated that "[i]f the prosecution
knows when it puts the question that [the witness] will claim the
privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his
refusal upon the jury's mind. ' 5 5  Some courts combine this
notice concept with their concern for "fair play," 586 and conclude
that placing a known recalcitrant witness on the stand constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct. The American Bar Association's Project
on Standards for Criminal Justice concurs:
A prosecutor should not call a witness who he knows will claim
a valid privilege not to testify, for the purpose of impressing
upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege. In some in-
stances, as defined in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
doing so will constitute unprofessional conduct.58 7
580 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
581 Id. at 405.
582 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1964); Bowles v. United States, 439
F.2d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970), ceit. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
'" United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
584 Id.
585 Id.
586 See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897
(1955).
587 ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 5.7(c) (1974) (quoted in Common-
wealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 216, 307 A.2d 229, 234 (1973)). The reference to the ABA
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Thus, at least where the recalcitrant witness's privilege claim is
valid, the prosecutor's efforts to call him may warrant disciplinary
action as well as reversal.
While the basic formula for reviewing convictions involving
prosecutorial misconduct-the "conscious and flagrant attempt"
test 5S-focuses on the prosecutor's motives for calling the wit-
ness, some courts have simply asked whether the prosecutor knew
of the witness's intention to "take the fifth." 58 9 There is a split of
authority concerning the state of mind required by this test. Some
jurisdictions maintain that the prosecutor must know for a fact
that the witness will refuse to testify.590 Some go further and
place an affirmative duty upon the prosecutor to ascertain the
witness's intentions. 591  One jurisdiction applies a negligence
standard, basing the decisions on whether the prosecutor should
have known that the witness would remain silent.592
Courts also disagree about the effect of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Some jurisdictions, stressing deterrence, hold that miscon-
duct without more constitutes reversible error.595 Others main-
tain that misconduct alone does not suffice for reversal.594  In the
latter jurisdictions, courts couple inquiries into the prosecutor's
good faith with an evaluation of the prejudicial effect of his con-
duct.595
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY is apparently to DR 1-102(A)(5) ("A lawyer shall not...
[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."). See 96 ABA AN-
NUAL REPORT 294 (1971).
588 See note 575 supra.
589 See, e.g., United States v. Harding, 432 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States ex reL Fournier v. Pinto, 408 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1969); Burkley v. United States,
373 A.2d 878, 880 (D.C. 1977); Conway v. State, 15 Md. App. 198, 217-19, 289 A.2d 862,
872-73, cert. denied, 266 Md. 735, cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1972).
590 See, e.g., Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878, 880 (D.C. 1977) (no misconduct
where prosecutor did not know which questions witness would refuse to answer).
5' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fournier v. Pinto, 408 F.2d 539, 540 (3d Cir. 1969);
Mathis v. State, 469 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
592 See, e.g., Conway v. State, 15 Md. App. 198, 217-19, 289 A.2d 862, 872-73, cert.
denied, 266 Md. 735, cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1972).
53 See State v. Vega, 85 N.M. 269, 272, 511 P.2d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1973); Common-
wealth v. Terenda, 451 Pa. 116, 122, 301 A.2d 625, 629 (1973) ("Convictions should not be
obtained with any suspicions of prosecutorial misconduct.").
594 United States v. Harding, 432 F.2d 1218, 1220 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States
ex rel. Fournier v. Pinto, 408 F.2d 539, 541-42 (3d Cir. 1969) (prosecutor's misconduct
compounded by judge's instructions emphasizing witness's refusal to testify); Burkley v.
United States, 373 A.2d 878, 882 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977) (prosecutorial misconduct, if com-
mitted at all, was harmless error); Mathis v. State, 469 S.W.2d 796, 804 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970) (calling witness without knowing what he would testify to constitutes harmless error).
"' See, e.g., DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 430, 364 P.2d 374, 377 (1961) (good
faith sufficient to overcome possible prejudice). Those courts that focus on the prejudicial
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As an added deterrent measure, a defendant's failure to re-
quest a curative instruction concerning the evidentiary value of a
witness's silence has been held not to constitute a waiver of a
charge of prosecutorial misconduct. In such a case, the defendant
receives "the benefit of the doubt as to whether or not the error
could have been cured by an instruction." 596
effect of misconduct may ignore the "good faith" test altogether. See Commonwealth v. DuVal,
453 Pa. 205, 217-18, 307 A.2d 229, 234-35 (1973) (good faith of prosecutor irrelevant to
determination of prejudicial effect of testimony).
These decisions concern themselves with the issue of whether the impermissible infer-
ence added "critical weight" to the case by supplying a crucial factor favoring conviction.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Martin, 362 N.E.2d 507 (Mass. 1977), the court, in
affirming the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, stated: "For affirmance of the
conviction we need not find that no 'weight' was added, although that may indeed have
been the case; we need only find, as we do, that what was added could not have made the
difference between acquittal and conviction." Id. at 513. See also People v. Owens, 22
N.Y.2d 93, 98, 238 N.E.2d 715, 718, 291 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (1968) (proof of guilt was not
"so overwhelming that the error could be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
Whatever standard of review is employed, all courts look essentially to four basic fac-
tors in determining if the error caused by calling the witness was sufficient to justify rever-
sal. These are: (1) the type and number of questions asked, (2) the type of inference
obtained from the witness's silence, (3) the amount of unprivileged testimony the witness
gave, and (4) the sufficiency of the other evidence presented. See, e.g., Moynahan v. Man-
son, 419 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (D. Conn. 1976), affd, 559 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1978).
596 Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205, 218, 307 A.2d 229, 235 (1973). In United
States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959), Judge Learned Hand stated:
As res integra, it is doubtful whether such admonitions are not as likely to prej-
udice the interest of the accused as to help them, imposing, as they do, upon
the jury a task beyond their powers: i.e. a bit of "mental gymnastics," as Wig-
more § 2272 calls it, which it is for practical purposes absurd to expect of them.
However, the situation is in substance the same as. when a judge tells the jury
not to consider the confession, or admission, of one defendant in deciding the
guilt of another, tried at the same time; and, since it is settled that this rubric
will cure that error ... we do not see why it should not cure the error here.
Id. at 538. Judge Hand's argument by analogy to the codefendant confession rule has been
undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968). Moreover, a majority of cases have rejected he Maloney view and held the curative
instruction insufficient. See, e.g., People v.*Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 93, 97, 238 N.E.2d 715, 718,
291 N.Y.S.2d 313, 317 (1968) ("The stigmatizing effect ... is so powerful that it would be
unrealistic to suppose that instructions can cure it .. ."). Another court based its similar
decision on the belief that "[a]sking a jury not to draw an adverse inference from a wit-
ness's claim of privilege may underscore the inference; even if some or all the jurors had
missed the inference, the instruction will draw it for them." People v. Giacalone, 399 Mich.
642, 647 n.8, 250 N.W.2d 492, 495 n.8 (1977).
In a recent parallel development, the Supreme Court in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S.
333 (1978), upheld the court's right to give a cautionary instruction regarding prosecutorial
comments on the defendant's failure to testify on his own behalf, even over the defendant's
objection. The Court held that "the giving of such an instruction ... does not violate the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 340-41 (footnote omitted).
LOANSHARKING
3. The Recalcitrant Immunized Witness
If a witness initially refuses to testify and a subsequent grant
of immunity results in the witness's renewed willingness to speak,
acceptance of his testimony is not error. Once the "initial silence
[is] broken, the jury [is] no longer tempted to speculate or tacitly
infer the respondent's guilt .... [The] abandonment of the
privilege remove[s] the danger of suspicious inference."597
Some witnesses, however, express an intention to remain si-
lent even after a grant of immunity. Court decisions vary as to
whether these witnesses may be called to testify. Many jurisdic-
tions refuse to allow the prosecution to call even the immunized
witness who expresses an intention not to talk. As the court stated
in Commonwealth v. DuVal: 591
If the fact of invocation of the privilege is, as we believe, ir-
relevant to the issues and prejudicial to the defendant, it is that
much more prejudicial to permit the jury to observe that the
recalcitrant witness (a person likely to be associated in the
jurors' minds with the defendant) elects to remain silent not-
withstanding the order of the court that he testify.599
Nevertheless, one recent decision, recognizing that these wit-
nesses have "no privilege not to testify," 600 held that "it [was]
proper for the jury to hear [the witness] assert a nonprivileged
refusal to testify, whatever might be the inferences to be drawn
from that refusal." 601
B. Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements
When a fearful witness has made a statement implicating the
defendant but later claims the self-incrimination right or other-
wise refuses to testify, the prosecutor will normally seek to intro-
duce the prior statement at trial. In such situations the hearsay
rule and confrontation clause become the prosecutor's principal
obstacles. Exceptions riddle the hearsay rule, however, ensuring
that statements that are especially trustworthy and especially
597 State v. Reed, 127 Vt. 532, 537, 253 A.2d 227, 230 (1969).
598 453 Pa. 205, 217, 307 A.2d 229, 234 (1973).
599 Id.; accord, Aubrey v. State, 261 Ind. 692, 310 N.E.2d 556 (1974).
000 State v. Classen, 31 Or. App. 683, 695, 571 P.2d 527, 533 (1977) (inmate of state
penitentiary refused to testify after immunity granted because he feared for his life if
labeled a "snitch"), rev'd on other grounds, 285 Or. 221, 590 P.2d 1198 (1979).
601 Id.
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needed can be admitted. 6°2  And the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly recognized that actual confrontation at trial is not always
necessary to satisfy the confrontation clause. Liberal hearsay ex-
ceptions designed to admit earlier statements made by an unavail-
able declarant are particularly useful in cases complicated by wit-
ness fear.
1. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Not Requiring Unavailability
Sometimes the prosecutor need not demonstrate the witness's
unavailability to introduce hearsay evidence; rather, an exception
under which the availability of the defendant is immaterial will
provide a vehicle for introducing hearsay statements.6 0 3  The
prior statement, for example, may appear in an admissible busi-
ness record6 0 4 or constitute an admissible present sense impres-
sion 605 or excited utterance. 60 6  In a recent case 60 7 the Sixth Cir-
cuit admitted as a "recorded recollection" 608 a statement based on
comments the witness made to the Secret Service shortly after an
illegal check-cashing incident. At trial the witness apparently re-
membered the relevant events, but feigned forgetfulness to avoid
implicating the defendant. The court admitted the hearsay on the
grounds that the witness's "in-court testimony would be incom-
plete because of his insufficient recollection." 609  By refusing to
look beyond the witness's allegation of memory failure to inquire
whether the witness's memory had actually lapsed, the court
averted a. difficult subjective inquiry and avoided the anomalous
result of having to exclude evidence because a witness falsely tes-
tified that his memory had faltered precisely to avoid presentation
of the evidence.610
60 See MCCORMICK, supra note 421, at 670.
0 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803.
04 See FED. R. EVID. 830(6); MCCORMIC, supra note 421, § 311, at 728-29 (unavailability
requirement for business records "has for all practical purposes been abandoned").
605 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
606 See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see generally MCCORMICK, supra note 421, §§ 288-98.
107 United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
600 FED. R. EvID. 803(5).
609 United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
610 Prior statements reduced to writing may also be used to refresh the witness's recollec-
tion. See FED. R. EvID. 612; note 674, infra. Such use does not run afoul of the hearsay rule
because the statement is not offered as evidence. Although the general rule allows all re-
corded statements, subject to the court's discretion, to be used to refresh recollection (see
Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 597-602 (1962)), some courts have declined to follow the rule
when the prior statement was not made at the time the event occurred, or while the event
was still fresh in the witness's mind. See MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 9, at 16.
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2. Unavailability-Based Hearsay Exceptions
Although hearsay exceptions not dependent on the declar-
ant's unavailability sometimes come into play in cases involving
fearful witnesses, utilization of unavailability-based exceptions611
is more important and more common. This is not surprising; the
usual purpose and common effect of instilling fear is to render
the potential witness, for all practical purposes, unavailable. 612
In order to invoke unavailability-based hearsay exceptions, how-
ever, the government must make a good-faith effort to present
the witness at trial. 61 3
Exceptions founded on declarant unavailability reflect the
need to admit otherwise unobtainable evidence. Therefore, the
court's inquiry logically should focus on whether the declarant's
testimony, rather than his body, can be produced at trial.61 4  In
federal courts and most state courts, a declarant is considered un-
available if he pleads the fifth amendment,1 5 invokes some other
privilege, 1 6 or flees beyond the reach of process. 61 7  A few states
still condition admission of out-of-court statements upon physical
unavailability, such as death, absence, or incapacity. 61 8  Even
in these jurisdictions, however, the traditional category of "mental
incapacity" may encompass refusals to testify because of witness
fear .619
611 See generally FED. F. EVID. 804.
612 Witnesses who are slain before trial also become "unavailable" for purposes of hear-
say exceptions. See United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
613 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); cf. United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d
180, 182 (4th Cir. 1976) (trial court properly admitted out-of-court statement where gov-
ernment was proponent of prior testimony and had inadvertently caused the witness's un-
availability), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977). See generally 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 133 (1975).
614 Mason v. United States, 408 F.2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993
(1971).
615 See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to testify
on fifth amendment grounds after receiving threats from defendant), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977); United States v. Wolk, 398 F. Supp. 405, 411 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (unavailability
exists where there is likelihood that declarant would have refused to testify on fifth
amendment grounds).
616 FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(1). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 460, § 804(a)[01], at 804-37
(exemption on grounds of privilege requires ruling of judge).
7 See 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 133 (1975).
61 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 670.10, 670.20 (McKinney 1971) (witness unavail-
able if dead, ill, incapacitated, absent from jurisdiction and cannot be found with due
diligence, or in federal custody).
619 See People v. Rojas, 15 Cal. 3d 540, 551-52, 542 P.2d 229, 236, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357,
364 (1975) (fear is "mental infirmity" and witness who refuses to testify because of threats
made against him is unavailable under CAL. EVID. CODE § 240(a)(3)); McComincK, supra
note 421, at 140.
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In the fearful witness situation, the declarant will often claim a
failure of memory or simply refuse to testify.6 20 Under the better
rule, failure of memory constitutes unavailability,6 21 a notion
comporting with the common-law concept of competence.
6 22
Similarly, persistent refusal to testify in the face of court orders
serves to establish unavailability in most jurisdictions. 623  Again,
common-law competency principles, as well as sound policy, sup-
port this view of unavailability. 62
4
a. Former Testimony. While most courts classify testimony given
at a prior proceeding as hearsay even where the defendant actu-
ally cross-examined the witness, 25 they admit many such state-
ments under the "former testimony" exception when the declar-
ant is unavailable.62 6  If the prior testimony was given under oath
and th& defendant had an adequate opportunity and incentive to
cross-examine the witness, the statement is generally admissible ir-
respective of the character of the earlier proceeding. 627 Courts
sometimes require identity of parties and issues before applying
the former testimony exception, but this is "merely a means of
fulfilling the policy of securing an adequate opportunity of cross-
examination by the party against whom testimony is now offered
or by someone in like interest.6 n8 The need to show an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine, however, bars admission of grand jury
statements under the former testimony exception.62 9
620 See People v. Rojas, 15 Cal. 3d 540, 542 P.2d 229, I5 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1975).
621 See Green v. California, 399 U.S. 149, 168 n.17 (1970); MCCoRMICK, supra note 421,
§ 253, at 611-12.
622 To be competent to testify, a witness must have perceived the relevant events and be
able to recall and communicate concerning them at trial. See MCCORMICK, supra note 421,
§ 62, at 140 ("witness's capacity to observe, remember, and recount"). Failure of memory
thus renders the witness incompetent as to matters outside his recollection.
623 See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusal to testify
despite grant of use immunity and a six-month contempt citation rendered witness un-
available), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th
Cir.) (holding unavailable a witness who, granted use immunity and threatened with con-
tempt, equivocated concerning willingness to answer), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); FED.
R. EVID. 804(a)(2).
624 A failure to testify can be viewed as a failure of the communication component of
competence. See note 622 supra.
625 WEINSTEIN, supra note 460, 804(b)(1)[01], at 804-49.
626 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
62"7 See United States v. Mathis, 550 F.2d 180 (4th, Cir. 1976) (testimony given at prior
mistrial admissible on retrial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977); Crawford v. State, 282
Md. 210, 383 A.2d 1097 (1978) (preliminary hearing testimony admissible).
628 McCoRMICK, supra note 421, § 257, 'at 620.
629 The presence of certain guarantees of trustworthiness, however, may make grand
jury testimony admissible under catch-all exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as FED. R.
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b. Statements Against Interest. The hearsay exception for state-
ments against interest 6 30 rests on the common-sense proposition
that self-interest counsels against the making of statements sub-
jecting oneself to criminal liability or pecuniary loss. 63 1  There-
fore such statements are vested with special reliability, on the as-
sumption the declarant would not so jeopardize himself unless the
statement was true. Statements against interest inculpating
another, however, entail a danger of unreliability, because they
may be made by a codefendant seeking immunity or wishing to
plead guilty to a lesser crime.632 Courts have therefore taken
special care to separate statements against interest from state-
ments against others.633
EvID. 804(b)(5). See United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
333 (1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). But see United States v.
Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971) (grand jury testimony inadmissible where witness had
refused to take oath), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973).
6:o See e.g., FED. R. Evin. 804(b)(3); MCCORMICK, supra note 421, §§ 276-80.
63' WEINSTEIN, supra note 460, 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-77.
6"2 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
633 On the other hand, courts have admitted declarations implicating others as well as
the speaker where the statement is sufficiently inseverable that guarantees of reliability
inherent in the contradiction of the declarant's interest permeate the entire statement. As
Wigmore states:
Since the principle is that the statement is made under circumstances fairly
indicating the declarant's sincerity and accuracy ... , it is obvious that the situa-
tion indicates the correctness of whatever he may say while under that influ-
ence. In other words, the statement may be accepted, not merely as to the
specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same state-
ment.
5 WIGNIORE, supra note 433, § 1465, at 339 (emphasis in original). It is unlikely, however,
that this principle applies to hearsay statements of codefendants, coconspirators, and ac-
complices. Wigmore himself appears to recommend a special rule for confessions that im-
plicate others-specifically, that such confessions should be admissible only against the de-
clarant.
The limitation [on admitting statements against penal, rather than pecuniary
interest] is apparently supported by the doctrine ... that the confessions of an ac-
complice are not to be used by the prosecution against the accused except so far
as they are the admissions of a coconspirator; for A.'s confession implicating
himself, and B., the accused, is at least against his own penal interest, and
therefore might seem to fall under the present supposed principle. But (1) the
interest of A. in obtaining a pardon by confessing and betraying his cocriminals
is in such cases usually so important that, according to the doctrine of prepon-
derance of interest .. ., the statement would not even under the present ex-
ception be admissible; (2) the question has usually been dealt with according to
the doctrine of admissions ... and the present aspect has not been considered;
(3) according to the present exception, the accomplice must be shown deceased
or otherwise unavailable, and this showing usually has not been attempted in
such cases.
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Although some states admit only statements against the de-
clarant's pecuniary interest, most jurisdictions follow the better rule
in admitting declarations against penal interest as well.634  Since
Id. § 1477, at 358 n. 1. The constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation appears
to require this rule. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Supreme Court
held that, in a joint trial, the admission into evidence of a codefendant's confession im-
plicating another codefendant violated the latter's right of confrontation because the de-
clarant was unavailable for cross-examination at trial. The Court found the admission of
the statement prejudicial despite a limiting instruction by the trial judge advising the jury
that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 126. Bruton has been limited by later
cases. See Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979) (evenly divided court) (exception to
Bruton in cases of "interlocking" confessions of codefendants); Harrington .v. California,
395 U.S. 250 (1969) (Bruton violation may constitute harmless error); Smith v. Montanye,
505 F.2d 1355, 1359-60 (2d Cir. 1974) (Bruton applies only where the risk is great that the
jury will not or cannot follow a limiting instruction), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); Duff
v. Zelker, 452 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1971) (limiting instruction adequate where defen-
dant's testimony placing him at scene with "implication of knowing participation" sup-
ported incriminating confessions of codefendants); People v. Rastelli, 37 N.Y.2d 240, 244,
333 N.E.2d 182, 184, 371 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (Bruton inapplicable to statements within co-
conspirator declaration rule), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). See also Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970). Its language also disclaims any intention of applying confrontation clause
prohibitions to any "recognized exception to the hearsay rule." 391 U.S. at 128 n.3. But the
opinion does rest on the premise that the unavailable codefendant's hearsay statement im-
plicating the appellant was inadmissible to establish the latter's guilt. Even though Bruton
apparently does not bar all statements by partners in crime inculpatory to the defendant,
in such cases courts are likely to examine the evidence carefully to ensure protection of the
confrontation right. See United States v. Alvary, 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2292 (5th Cir.
Nov. 20, 1978).
It is doubtful that Bruton applies to statements against interest made by victims, since
in Bruton the Court emphasized the particular problems of untrustworthiness in statements
made by codefendants: "Not only are the incriminations devastating to the defendant but
their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand
and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motiva-
tion to shift blame onto others." 391 U.S. at 136. The inseverability doctrine is useful
where prosecutors seek to introduce the hearsay statements of victims as well. Assume, for
example, that the prosecution wishes to introduce against the defendant, Joe, the following
out-of-court statement of a loanshark customer to a friend: "I owe Joe $400; that's 5% per
week!" The acknowledgment of the debt probably constitutes a statement against the cus-
tomer's pecuniary interest. See MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 277, at 672. In addition, the
inseverability doctrine may render admissible the information incriminating Joe by reveal-
ing the usurious rate.
For an interesting discussion of the confrontation and evidentiary problems posed by
an inseverable nonconfession statement against penal interest made by an unavailable ac-
complice, see People v. Cepeda, 61 A.D.2d 962, 403 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.)
(concurring mem., Silverman, Pr. J.) (arguing for admissibility).
634 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970);
State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) (Supp.
1979); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966); FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.804(2) (c) (West 1978);
N.J. RuLts OF EvID. § 63(10) (1978).
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this exception requires that the statement subject the declarant to
criminal liability, it is inapplicable where the declarant has already
been convicted or has received immunity. 635
c. The "Catch-All" Exception. Under the federal rules, a state-
ment inadmissible under the forgoing enumerated exceptions may
still be admissible under a "catch-all" exception. This alternative is
of extreme importance in securing admission of many types of
statements, especially prior grand jury testimony. 636 The catch-all
exception is circumscribed, however; a statement falls within its
sweep only if it satisfies five requirements. 637
First, the offering party must establish circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness equivalent to those supporting the enum-
erated exceptions. 638  This limitation satisfies confrontation clause
concerns 639 and ensures presentation of evidence from which the
trial judge can evaluate the veracity of the proffered statement.640
In United States v. Carlson,6 41 a government witness implicated the
defendant before a grand jury, but refused to testify at trial be-
cause he feared reprisals. The Eighth Circuit held the declarant
unavailable and admitted his grand jury statement under the re-
sidual exception, citing three factors as sufficient indices of truth-
fulness: (1) the witness made the statement under oath and threat
of prosecution for perjury; (2) the witness testified to matters of
first-hand knowledge; and (3) the witness never retracted or indi-
6305 United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977).
636 See notes 669-70 and accompanying text infra.
637 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (applicable where declarant is unavailable). But see S. REP. No.
93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051,
7066 ("The residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the
hearsay rule, including its present exceptions. Such major revisions are best accomplished
by legislative action."). Although a general residual provision phrased in the same terms as
the unavailability-based catch-all appears in FED. R. EVID. 803(24), reported cases applying
the residual exception have generally involved only an unavailable declarant.
63 FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). See United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
639 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1970) (testimony admissible when de-
clarant unavailable if it bears "indicia of 'reliability' "). See generalv notes 665-66 and ac-
companying text infra.
640 For cases satisfying the reliability requirement, see United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d"
490, 501 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977); United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d
285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 222, 383 A.2d 1097, 1103-04
(1978). But see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973).
641 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
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cated reservations about his testimony. 642  In another fearful-
witness case, 643 however, the Fifth Circuit excluded grand jury
testimony of an unavailable declarant where: (1) the prosecutor
and grand jury pressured the witness to answer questions; (2) the
witness responded to leading questions which would not have
been allowed at trial; (3) the fear of reprisals by persons other
than the defendant provided the witness with an incentive to lie;
(4) the threat of prosecution for perjury did not guarantee relia-
bility because the prosecutor threatened to call the witness before
successive grand juries where he would face an unlimited number
of contempt charges if he remained silent; 644 and (5) the witness
did not support his testimony with any detailed facts concerning
the defendant. 645 Furthermore, unlike Carlson, the defendant
never directly threatened the witness. 646  These cases point up
the fact-bound character of catch-all exception determinations, as
well as the care with which courts explore indications of reliability.
Second, the government must offer the statement as evidence
of a material fact.647  This requirement wisely ensures that courts
do 'not apply the catch-all exception to "trivial or collateral mat-
ters."648  In practice, however, it would seem that this require-
ment does little more than restate the basic rule of relevance. For
example, the government satisfied this requirement in Carlson by
offering the declarant's statement to show "intent, knowledge, a
common plan or scheme and the absence of mistake or acci-
dent." 649
642 Id. at 1354. See also United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) (grand jury
testimony of witness who died before trial admissible where police recordings of witness's
conversations with defendant corroborated prior testimony, witness was kept under con-
tinual surveillance, and policemen who recorded conversations were available as witnesses
at trial); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978) (corroboration of fearful
witness's grand jury statement consisted of fellow first-hand witness confirming testimony
concerning defendant's trip abroad to purchase heroin, records of airline tickets, customs
declarations, passport endorsements, and European hotel registrations), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 936 (1978).
643 United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
644 Ordinarily, testimony given under oath bears strong guarantees of reliability since
the declarant faces possible perjury charges if he lies. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d at
1354. The Gonzalez court, however, suggested that the guarantee of reliability provided by
the oath is negated where the prosecutor confronts the witness with open-ended contempt
penalties. 559 F.2d at 1273.
615 559 F.2d at 1273.
646 Id. at 1274.
647 FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(A), 804(b)(5)(A).
648 United States v. laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y.), afrd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
649 547 F.2d at 1354.
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Third, the statement must be the most probative evidence
reasonably available on the point for which the government seeks
support. 50 The meaning of this requirement remains unclear;
one court found it satisfied by a showing that the testimony in
question is necessary to the government's case. 651
Fourth, the government must notify the defendant before
trial that it plans to offer an out-of-court statement into evidence
under the residual exception.6 52  Notice allows the defendant to
prepare an objection to the statement's admission; but again this
requirement has been watered down.6 53  Finally, admission of the
statement must comport with the purposes of the rules and the
interests of justice. 654  This sweeping requirement merely restates
rule 102,655 and should rarely bar admission if the other four tests
are met.
Only the Federal Rules and a small number of state statutes
or rules provide for admission of hearsay statements under a
catch-all provision. 656  There is, however, also common-law au-
thority recognizing such a residual exception.6 57
3. Constitutional Limits on Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements
a. Unavailability and Confrontation. A court may admit an out-
of-court statement only if it satisfies sixth amendment confronta-
650 FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(B), 804(b)(5)(B).
65 United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1355.
652 FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
653 H. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in (1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7106. Courts have generally interpreted this requirement flex-
ibly. See United States v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1976) (where need for
out-of-court statement did not arise until after start of trial the court admitted the evi-
dence, noting both impracticability of giving notice before trial and defendant's failure to
request continuance), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); accord, United States v. Evans, 572
F.2d 455, 489 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777, 784 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976). But see United States v. Oates,
560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[tihere is absolutely no doubt that Congress intended
that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly enforced").
654 FED R. EVID. 803(24)(C), 804(b)(5)(C).
655 "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
FED. R. EVID. 102.
656 See, e.g., ARK. R. EViD. 804, reprinted in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001-804 (Supp. 1977);
MINN. R. EvID. 804; MONT. R. EvID. 804, reprinted in MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-804
(1978); N.M.R. EvID. 804; N.D.R. EvID. 804, reprinted in 5B N.D. CENT. CODE (Supp.
1977); Wis. R. EVID. 8.04, 8.045, reprinted in Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 908.04, 908.045 (West
1975).
657 See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 396-97 (5th
Cir. 1961).
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tion clause requirements, 658 as well as subconstitutional eviden-
tiary principles governing the scope of the hearsay rule.659  The
constitutional requirements are easily met in the case of an avail-
able witness since, by definition, an available witness can be called
and cross-examined at trial. 66
0
Although a more serious confrontation problem arises when
the court invokes an unavailability-based exception to admit hear-
say evidefice, admission of such statements when made by a
declarant afraid to testify at trial will often survive sixth amend-
ment challenge. 661  The confrontation clause does not necessarily
require actual confrontation. 662  Even in the absence of the ability
to cross-examine, the right of confrontation may be satisfied if the
proffered statement bears equivalent guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. Because all hearsay exceptions are based on peculiar indices
of trustworthiness that accompany certain forms of utterances, 663
application of a hearsay exception to admit statements of a
declarant unavailable for confrontation rarely violates the con-
frontation clause. 664
In California v. Green 665 the Supreme Court mandated an
examination of circumstantial "indicia of 'reliability'" in applying
the confrontation clause to admission of out-of-court state-
618 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
659 The Supreme Court recognizes that the two requirements overlap, but has consis-
tently refused to find them coterminous. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970); Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (confrontation clause may be violated by admis-
sion of testimony that meets all evidentiary requirements); see also United States v. Yates,
524 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
660 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1970).
661 See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977).
662 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1971).
66' See Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 532-33 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972).
But see note 629 and accompanying text supra.
664 United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The application of...
virtually all the exceptions to the hearsay rule, does not involve any deprivation of the
right of confrontation as the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted and construed"), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966). There has been a recent flurry of scholarly efforts to treat the
interface of hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause. The long list of articles and
comments is collected in the most recent contribution addressing the topic: Western, The
Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1185 (1979). An article with greater emphasis on
the problems identified in this Article is Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule,
and the Forgetful Witness, 50 TExAs L. REv. 151 (1978). See also Younger, Confrontation and
Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 32 (1975).
66- 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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ments. 666  In Green itself, the Court admitted testimony presented
during a preliminary examination. The Court held that since the
testimony had been given under oath and there had been an op-
portunity to cross-examine during the preliminary examination,
confrontation clause requirements were met. The Court noted,
however, that even in the case of an unavailable witness and no
opportunity to cross-examine, hearsay may satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements provided it is marked by sufficient "indicia of
'reliability' " 66 -an observation borne out in Dutton v. Evans.6 8
Grand jury testimony has been held constitutionally admissi-
ble under the test of Green; 669 since the grand jury witness tes-
tifies under oath and is subject to prosecution for perjury, "indicia
of reliability" are invariably present.6 70
b. Waiver of the Confrontation Right. The confrontation right, a
personal privilege intended for the benefit of the accused, may be
waived.6 7 1 Waiver can occur in numerous ways: by voluntary and
express relinquishment; 672 by stipulation to the admission of evi-
dence; 673 or by a guilty plea. 4  Waiver may also arise out of the
666 Id. at 161-62. For cases satisfying the reliability requirement see note 640, supra. See
also United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971) (oath is required for admission
of all testimonial statements); United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611, 613-14 (10th Cir. 1969)
("demeanor evidence is not an essential ingredient of the confrontation privilege"); Craw-
ford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 383 A.2d 1097 (1978) (cross-examination at preliminary hear-
ing, though not as extensive as it would have been at trial, was adequate for purposes of
confrontation clause where witness was unavailable at trial). But see Ohio v. Roberts, 55
Ohio St.2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978) (requiring actual cross-examination to render pre-
liminary examination testimony admissible), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 904 (1979). There are
limitations on the defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("[Ihe right to confront and to cross-examine is not abso-
lute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process").
667 399 U.S. at 161-62.
668 400 U.S. 74 (1971).
669 On use of hearsay exceptions to introduce grand jury testimony, see note 629 and
accompanying text supra.
670 See United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garner,
574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346, 1356 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
671 United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1357.
672 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). As a general rule, a waiver is valid only if
there is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege" by
the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
673 United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948
(1974); see Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 451 (1912).
674 Boykin v. Alabama, "395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
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defendant's misconduct, such as intimidation of the declarant. 675
The court need not expressly advise a defendant of his confronta-
tion right prior to waiver; the issue in every case is whether he
forfeited that right personally. 676  A waiver made by defendant's
lawyer, for example, will constitute a forfeiture of the confronta-
tion right if the defendant acquiesces.677
C. Coping with the Turncoat Witness.
Sometimes referred to as the "spun witness" or "turned with-
ess," the "turncoat," after initially assisting the prosecution, revises
his story to support the defendant either prior to trial or while on
the stand. Since, by definition, the turncoat made a prior state-
ment implicating the defendant, the prosecutor may attempt to
use that statement at trial to refresh the witness's recollection,6 78
to impeach him with his inconsistent remarks, 679 or as substantive
evidence admissible under the hearsay exceptions already discus-
sed.
68 0
675 United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1358 (defendant impliedly waived his right of
confrontation when "he intimidated [the witness] into not testifying and, thus, created a
situation in which the Government's only means of ... [introducing witness's] relevant and
probative testimony ... was by offering the grand jury testimony in evidence"); cf.
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1973) (waiver resulted when defendant volun-
tarily absented himself from trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (waiver
resulted from removal of defendant from courtroom due to disruptive conduct); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (right of confrontation may be waived by defen-
dant's misconduct).
676 United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1358 n.11.
677 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966).
678 The Supreme Court supported this technique in Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S.
303, 309 (1894). Chief Justice Fuller, writing for the majority, stated:
When a party is taken by surprise by the evidence of his witness, the latter may
be interrogated as to the inconsistent statements previously made by him for
the purpose of refreshing his recollection and inducing him to correct his tes-
timony; and the party so surprised may also show the facts to be otherwise than
as stated, although this incidentally tends to discredit the witness.
Accord, Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N.Y. 230,.231 (1873) (inquiries calculated to elicit true facts
or to show witness that he is mistaken, consequently inducing him to correct his testimony,
should not be excluded simply because they may reflect unfavorably on his credibility).
Counsel may use memoranda to refresh the witness's memory so long as the witness's
subsequent testimony is based upon his own recollections and not upon the writing. United
States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 1975). Once the witness denies making the
prior statement, however, the examination must end. Furthermore, the prosecutor may not
read the more incriminating statement in its entirety, thus placing it before the jury under
the guise of refreshing the witness's memory. See People v. Welch, 16 A.D.2d 554, 229
N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't 1962).
679 See notes 715-27 and accompanying text infra.
666 See notes 604-57 and accompanying text supra.
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These strategies, however, pose substantial difficulties. The
general rules of challenging credibility, as well as special restric-
tions on impeaching one's "own" witness, limit the ability to use
prior statements to impeach. Similarly, in most jurisdictions the
hearsay rule presents an imposing barrier to the prosecutor seek-
ing to introduce a prior inconsistent statement as evidence-in-
chief.
1. Restrictions on Impeaching One's Own Witness
As a general rule, a party calling a witness at trial may not
challenge his credibility. This rule, among the oldest of eviden-
tiary principles, 68 ' applies not only to attack by inconsistent state-
ments, but to all ipodes of impeachment.6 82  Where the witness
turns at trial, the rule threatens to preclude impeachment, permit-
ting the witness's devastating testimony to go unchallenged. If the
witness turns prior to trial, the rule may bar the prosecutor from
using the witness or his previous statement at all.
a. History of the Rule. At earliest common law, a party's "wit-
nesses" were his friends and relatives, specifically chosen by him
to appear at trial and take a prescribed oath. Part juror and part
witness, these "oath-helpers" testified only as to the veracity of the
party calling them, rather than to the facts of the case.6 3 Since
the calling party had complete freedom of choice in his selection
of witnesses, he could not dispute the testimony of those he
called. 84 As the modern concept of trial by jury emerged, how-
ever, the role of the witness dramatically changed. No longer
called merely to swear an oath on behalf of a friend, the witness was
obliged to have some knowledge of the facts bearing on the issue
at bar.6 5 Resulting limitations on parties' freedom to select wit-
nesses, combined with the complexity of modern courtroom pro-
cedure, raised questions as to whether the no-impeachment rule
impeded just decisions.6 86  In response to increasing dissatisfac-
tion with the rule, significant exceptions developed. This trend
presaged a more dramatic response; within the past decade, a
number of jurisdictions have rejected the rule altogether.6 8 7
681 See Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996 (1963).
682 McCotaMICK, supra note 421, § 38.
61 51 NEB. L. REv. 352, 353 (1971).
684 3 WIGMoCR, supra note 433, § 896; 51 NEB. L. Rv. 352, 353 (1971).
685 51 NEB. L. REv. 352, 354 (1971).
686 Id. See Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 69
(1936).
687 See notes 713-14 and accompanying text infra.
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b. Rationale and Repudiation. Courts have offered two main
justifications in support of the rule against impeaching one's own
witness: first, ,that the party, by inviting the witness's testimony,
vouches for his trustworthiness; and second, that the power to
impeach the witness's character amounts to the power to coerce
self-serving testimony.6 88
The vouching theory, an antiquated justification, overlooks
the lack of free choice in modern-day witness selection; except
when choosing character witnesses and experts, modern-day par-
ties, for all practical purposes, have witnesses foisted upon
them. 689  The reasoning of the coercion theory is also
questionable. It assumes a significant likelihood that witnesses can
be forced to lie, and overlooks more direct and effective means of
inducing desired perjury. Moreover, the rules of evidence narrow
the types of "coercive impeachment." The defense can impugn
only the witness's veracity, and general evidentiary principles
aimed at avoiding prejudice further circumscribe available tac-
tics.6 90
Strictly applied, the no-impeachment rule leaves the calling
party at the mercy of his witness and his adversary. If the truth
supports the calling party, but the witness possesses a character
for untruthfulness, honest testimony will precipitate attacks by the
adversary; if, on the other hand, the witness lies, the adversary
will waive cross-examination while the calling party is unable to
impeach. 691 This pincer movement aimed at the prosecutor frus-
trates a reasoned search for truth,692 but despite these criticisms,
the no-impeachment rule remains in effect in most jurisdictions.
The severity of the rule is mitigated, however, by two important
exceptions.
c. Exceptions to the No-Impeachment Rule. Jurisdictions following
the common-law rule have embraced one basic exception, 693 sup-
688 McCoRmICK, supra note 421, § 38, at 75; WIGMORE, supra note 433, §§ 898-99; Ladd,
supra note 686, at 76.
689 SeeMcCoRMICK, supra note 421, § 38, at 76; Ladd, supra note 686, at 77.
690 See McCoRmicx, supra note 421, § 41, at 76.
691 See id., § 38, at 75.
692 See Note, supra note 681, at 1019.
693 See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 421, § 38, at 76 & n.74. Pennsylvania common
law, for example, provides that if a party can show he had no reason to expect hostility
and was surprised when his witness turned, he may impeach his witness. Commonwealth v.
White, 447 Pa. 331, 338, 290 A.2d 246, 250 (1972); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 267 Pa. 361,
363, 110 A. 158, 159 (1919). In New Jersey, one may generally impeach his own witness,
but not by use of prior inconsistent statements except in the case of surprise. N.J. STAT.
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ported either by statute or decision. Courts have generally recog-
nized two components to this exception. 694  First, the party seek-
ing to impeach must show that he is surprised by his witness's
testimony. This requirement will disarm the prosecutor who dis-
covers before trial that his witness has spun.695 Second, the party
must demonstrate that the witness's testimony is "positively harm-
ful to his cause." 696
The formulation of the "harmfulness" or "prejudice" re-
quirement varies from state to state. 697  As a general rule, how-
ever, the testimony must affirmatively injure the calling party's
case. A witness's forgetfulness or mere denial normally will not
justify impeachment.6 98  California, however, has liberally applied
the prejudice concept. In People v. LeBeau,699 a prosecution rebut-
tal witness denied making an out-of-court statement that con-
tradicted the defendant's testimony; the trial court then permitted
the prosecutor to impeach by extrinsic evidence the witness's prior
statement. The Supreme Court of California upheld the trial
court's ruling, rejecting the defendant's view that "all negative
answers are harmless" since they are not favorable to either
side.7 0 0  Distinguishing a case involving similarly "neutral" tes-
ANN. § 2A:84A, rule 20 (West 1976). Florida, on the other hand, permits impeachment of
one's own witness when that witness proves adverse, regardless of surprise, but not by
evidence of bad character. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608 (West Supp. 1978). In Johnson v.
State, 178 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), the court interpreted the term "ad-
verse" to mean "giving evidence that is prejudicial to the party producing the witness."
194 See MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 38.
695 See Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938) (prior statement erroneously
admitted where prosecutor expected witness to disavow it).
696 McCoRMICK, supra note 421, § 38, at 77. Prior to 1975, federal evidence law provided
that a pretrial statement could not be admitted for purposes of impeachment unless the
prosecution could show that it was both surprised and affirmatively damaged by the wit-
ness's in-court testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 485 F.2d 287, 290-91 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Scarbrough, 470 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1972).
697 See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 180, 140 A.,64, 67 (1927)
(material and prejudicial: "[I]t is not sufficient to show that it is not beneficial to [the
prosecutor] or, that it disappoints his expectations, even though justified"); Malone v.
Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 582, 242 S.W.2d 516, 523 (1951) ("unfavorable" and "material");
State v. D'Ippolito, 22 N.J. 318, 324, 126 A.2d 1, 5 (1956) (willful and material testimony);
Commonwealth v. Bynum, 454 Pa. 9, 12, 309 A.2d 545, 547 (1973) (more than merely
disappointing; testimony must contain "something ... which, if not disbelieved by the jury,
will be harmful or injurious to the party [calling the witness]").
698 See Commonwealth v. Strunk, 293 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Ky. 1956) (requiring that "wit-
ness testif[y] positively" as to "fact prejudicial to the party, or to a fact clearly favorable to
the adverse party"); Note, supra note 681, at 1004; see also People v. Newson, 37 Cal. 2d 34,
41-42, 230 P.2d 618, 622-23 (1951).
699 39 Cal. 2d 146, 245 P.2d 302 (1952).
700 Id. at 149, 245 P.2d at 303.
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timony in which impeachment evidence was excluded, the court
stated: "[I]t is necessary to determine on the facts of each case
whether the testimony of the witness sought to be impeached has
actually damaged the party calling him." 701 Applying this open-
ended standard liberally, the court found that the impression
created by the witness's denial-that the prosecutor had harassed
the defendant with questions lacking factual support-damaged
the prosecution's case. How far LeBeau's "harassment" logic ex-
tends is unclear, but arguably the prejudicial appearance of spuri-
ous harassment arises whenever the prosecution's questioning
points toward the defendant's guilt, yet fails to elicit evidentiary
support.
A second standard exception to the no-impeachment rule
applies to the "compelled witness." Jurisdictions that require the
prosecutor to call all known important witnesses normally permit
the prosecutor to impeach them.70 2  This exception is of limited
importance because in federal court,70 3 as in most state jurisdic-
tions,70 4 there is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce all
known eye-witnesses to a crime. Prosecutors in these jurisdictions,
however, may find refuge in another branch of the "compelled
witness" exception. A number of cases recognize that where a
party must, for all practical purposes, call a witness to the stand,
impeachment is permissible. 70 5  In loansharking cases, the victim
should qualify as such a witness.
701 Id. (emphasis added).
702 MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 38, at 77; Ladd, supra note 686, at 1014-15.
703 United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 916 n.1 (6th Cir. 1972).
704 In Pennsylvania, if the prosecutor believes that a potential witness is unreliable or
unworthy of belief, there is no duty to call that witness even though his name appears on
an indictment or he is an eyewitness. Commonwealth v. DiGiacomo, 463 Pa. 449, 453, 345
A.2d 605, 606 (1975); Commonwealth v. Gray, 441 Pa. 91, 100, 271 A.2d 486, 490 (1970).
In New York, the prosecution is under no duty to call at trial every witness to a crime.
People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 163, 359 N.E.2d 688, 690, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1976); People v. Stridiron, 33 N.Y.2d 287, 292, 307 N.E.2d 242, 245,
352 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (1973). Florida also acknowledges the prosecutor's discretion when
faced with a material witness (even an eyewitness) who might prove hostile or attempt to
conceal material facts. See Pride v. State, 151 Fla. 473, 474, 10 So. 2d 806, 807 (1942).
Similarly, the courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey recognize the prosecutor's wide dis-
cretion in calling witnesses whom the prosecutor does not trust. Commonwealth v. Sacco,
259 Mass. 128, 141, 156 N.E. 57, 61 (1927); State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 178, 175 A.2d
622, 625 (1961); State v. Laganella, 144 N.J. Super. 268, 280-81, 365 A.2d 225, 231 (A.D.
1976).
705 See, e.g., Fine v. Moomjian, 114 Conn. 226, 231-32, 158 A. 241, 244 (1932); Atwood
v. Hayes, 139 Okla. 95, 99-100, 281 P. 259, 263 (1929).
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Of course, if the defense calls the turncoat, the prosecution is
free to challenge his credibility. 0 6 Fearing introduction of prior
statements, however, defendants will normally hesitate to call such
witnesses. In some jurisdictions the prosecutor may solve this
problem by requesting the court to call the turncoat witness to the
stand.07 Once the witness is called by the judge, either party
may impeach. 0 8
There are varying rules regarding when a court may or must
exercise its authority to call witnesses; it is clear, however, that the
decision rests primarily within the trial court's discretion.70 9 The
judge should exercise this power in order to produce a satisfac-
tory record, to render a reasonable decision on matters of fact, or
to discover the real issues in the case. 10 In a number of cases,
courts have supported judicial witness-calling by citing the refusal
of either party to vouch for a witness who seemingly possessed
706 An interesting and difficult question arises as to the prosecutor's ability to impeach
when a witness is first called by the prosecutor and then by the defendant. See generally
McCoMgicK, supra note 421, § 38, at 78-79 (outlining four different resolutions of prob-
lem).
707 See, e.g., Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850, 859-60, 130 So. 582, 586-87 (1930); see gener-
ally Note, The Trial Judges Use of His Power to Call Witnesses-An Aid to Adversary Presentation,
51 Nw. L. REv. 761, 769-70 (1957); see also Note, supra note 681, at 1015.
708 3A WIGMORE, supra note 433, § 392, at 703.
700 See Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 678-79, 187 So. 392, 406-07 (1939) (state attorney
asked court to call witness, jury was sent out while pros and cons of request argued, and
court granted the state's motion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.615 (Supp. 1978) (court in its discre-
tion can call witnesses to be cross-examined by both parties). Pennsylvania cases also have
recognized the court's power to call witnesses and emphasized the judge's broad discretion.
Commonwealth v. Crews, 429 Pa. 16, 21-23, 239 A.2d 350, 353-54 (1967); Commonwealth
v. DePasquali, 424 Pa. 500, 504, 230 A.2d 449, 450 (1967); Commonwealth v. Burns, 409
Pa. 619, 635-37, 187 A.2d 552, 561 (1963) ("In certain instances it is not only proper for
the court to call a witness as the court's witness but it is necessary and imperative to do so
in the interest of justice"). New Jersey also recognizes the authority of the trial judge to call
witnesses. State v. Andreano, 117 N.J. Super. 498, 502, 285 A.2d 229, 231 (A.D. 1971).
Offsetting this authority, however, is "the necessity of judicial self-restraint and the
maintenance of an atmosphere of impartiality." Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of
Fair Lawn, 62 N.J. Super. 533, 548, 163 A.2d 465, 479 (App. Div.), modified, 64 N.J. Super.
1, 165 A.2d 216 (App. Div. 1960).
710 Note, supra note 707, at 774. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a court
"may [call witnesses] on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party." FED. R. EVID.
614(a). While neither the rule nor the accompanying Advisory Committee Note suggests
what standards should be applied when a party requests judicial calling of a witness,
common-law principles provide useful guidance. Under federal common law, "a judge
[could], in the exercise of a sound discretion, and in the interest of justice and the ascer-
tainment of truth, call witnesses whom the parties [had] not seen fit to call." United States
v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 814 (1963). Only if calling the
witness was an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the defendant would a conviction
be reversed. Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 265, 273 (8th Cir. 1964).
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important information.7 1 1  Thus, in the turncoat witness context,
the prosecutor may wish to inform the judge of his dilemma and
resulting refusal to vouch for the witness. Recognizing the truth-
seeking function of the trial, courts should, under these cir-
cumstances, call the witness to the stand.7
12
d. Rejecting the Traditional Rule-The Modern Trend and the
Federal Rule. Departing from the traditional rule, several jurisdic-
tions now permit impeachment without regard to which party cal-
led the witness.7 1 3  This liberalization wisely protects the pro-
secutor obliged by the circumstances of the case to call a witness
where there is uncertainty as to what the witness will say. The
witness may be called in the hope that he will testify favorably;
however, if the witness proves adverse, impeachment will be al-
lowed. Evidentiary limitations on prejudicing the defendant, how-
ever, may prohibit otherwise permissible prosecutorial impeach-
ment even in jurisdictions that embrace the modern rule.71 4
2. Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements to Impeach the Turncoat
Witness
The prosecutor who is able to establish an exception to the
no-impeachment rule, or who is fortunate enough to be in a
jurisdiction that permits impeachment of one's own witness, can
normally challenge the turncoat witness on the basis of corrup-
tion, reputation for untruthfulness, and certain types of prior
convictions.1 5  In addition, the components of competency-such
711 E.g., Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 678-79, 187 So. 392, 406-07 (1939); Commonwealth
v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, 635-36, 187 A.2d 552, 561 (1963).
712 See Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 678-79, 187 So. 392, 406-07 (1939). McCormick, citing
a number of cases, states:
The power to call witnesses is perhaps most often exercised when the prosecu-
tion expects that a necessary witness will be hostile and desires to escape the
necessity of calling him and being cumbered by the traditional rule against im-
peaching one's own witness. The prosecutor may then invoke the judge's discre-
tion to call the witness, in which event either party may cross-examine and im-
peach him.
MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 8, at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
713 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 607; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(2) (West Supp. 1978) (except
that party producing witness may not impeach character); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 23
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1974) (except that party producing witness may not impeach charac-
ter); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, Rule 20 (West 1976) (except that surprise is required for
impeachment by prior inconsistent statement); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.35 (McKinney
1971).
714 See notes 723-27 and accompanying text infra.
715 MCCORMICK, supra note 421, § 33, at 66, § 43, at 86.
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as perception and memory-may be challenged to discredit the
witness.7 16  The most effective method of impeachment, however,
involves introduction of prior inconsistent statements. 711 Invari-
ably, the turncoat witness has made a prior statement implicating
the defendant; otherwise he could not "turn" at trial.
a. Defining Inconsistency. To be found inconsistent, the prior
statement need not diametrically contradict the witness's current
testimony. 18 In fact, "inconsistencies may be found in changes in
position; they may be implied through silence; and they may also
be found in denial of recollection.""7 1 9  The federal courts, in
evaluating "inconsistency," apply a reasonableness test. Introduc-
tion of the prior utterance is permitted if, upon comparing the
two statements in their entirety, a reasonable man would find that
their effect is to produce inconsistent beliefs:
The contradiction need not be "in plain terms. [Inconsistency
exists] if the proferred testimony, taken as a whole, either by
what it says or by what it omits to say, affords some indication
that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness
whom it sought to contradict." 7 2 0
For example, if a witness before the grand jury explained in detail
the loansharking operation of the defendant, yet at trial stated
that he could not recall the events in question, the court probably
would find his failure to remember inconsistent with his previous
grand jury testimony. Consequently, the prosecution would be al-
716 Id.
717 Id. § 38, at 75.
718 The court exercises its discretion in determining the inconsistency issue (United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 n.7 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242
(9th Cir. 1977) ) by looking to the circumstances of the individual case (United States v.
Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Gir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977)). Jurisdictions
vary as to the types of utterances that may be offered as prior inconsistent statements. New
York, for example, requires either that the statement be oral and given under oath, or that
the statement be written and signed by the witness. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35(1)
(McKinney 1971).
7" United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918
(1977). See 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 460, 607[06], at 607-23. Thus the concept of "incon-
sistency" departs markedly from the concept of prejudice as applied to the surprise excep-
tion to the no-impeachment rule. See text accompanying notes 696-701 supra. But see Lan-
gan v. Pianowski, 307 Mass. 149, 151, 29 N.E. 2d 700, 701 (1940) (failure to remember
does not constitute inconsistency).
720 United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 254 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Commonwealth
v. West, 312 Mass. 438, 440, 45 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1942)); see generally 4 WEINSTEIN, supra
note 460, 801(d) (1) (A) [011, at 801-76 to 76.1; see also United States v. Coppola, 479
F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973).
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lowed to introduce the grand jury statement for purposes of im-
peachment.
b. Measuring Prejudicial Effect. Use of prior inconsistent
statements to impeach necessarily increases the risk of prejudicial
error because juries, in spite of cautionary instructions, may con-
sider the statements probative of the defendant's guilt. 7 1' Con-
sequently, courts may refuse to allow the prosecution to place
otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury under the guise of
impeachment.7 12  The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example,
while no longer requiring a showing of surprise and affirmative
damage as prerequisites to impeachment of the turncoat wit-
ness, 723 subject all evidence to a "probative value versus unfair
prejudice" analysis, 72 4 an exercise assigned to the discretion of the
trial court.725
The concern with possible prejudice and misleading of the
jury is particularly well-founded where the prosecutor knows that
the witness intends to repudiate his earlier statement.726  Aware
that the witness will not provide helpful evidence, the prosecutor
would normally not call such a witness at all. The defense will
721 In United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979
(1964), the court refuted the notion that jurors could perform the mental gymnastics
necessary to separate the impeachment function of prior inconsistent statements from their
use as substantive evidence.
722 Both the length and detail of the prior statement bear on the issue of undue prej-
udice. While the precise amount of the prior statement ordinarily admissible to impeach
the witness is dnclear, it appears that the prosecutor may not read an entire, lengthy
affidavit. People v. Cathey, 38 A.D.2d 976, 331 N.Y.S.2d 837 (2d Dep't 1972).
723 FED. R. EVID. 607 provides: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him." See also United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542, 543
n.3 (5th Cir. 1977).
724 FED. R. EVID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
722 See United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611, 616 (2d Cir. 1976), affd on rehearing,
560 F.2d 507 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
726 In United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975), the prosecutor called a
witness whose testimony he knew would tend to exonerate the defendant. The appellate
court found that the "real purpose for calling [the witness] was apparently to elicit from
him a denial that he had ever had any conversation with a fellow prisoner in which he
implicated [the defendant]." Id. at 188. Once he received the denial, the prosecutor intro-
duced the incriminating prior statement. The appellate court reversed the conviction and
condemned the prosecutor's actions stating: "Despite the fact that impeachment of one's
own witness may be permitted, this does not go so far as to permit the use of the rule as a
subterfuge to get to the jury evidence otherwise inadmissible." Id. at 191.
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argue in such situations that the purpose of attempting to intro-
duce prior inconsistent statements after calling the witness is not
to impeach credibility, but to submit underhandedly the damaging
statements for consideration by the jury as substantive evidence.7 27
Courts, however, should not overlook other factors that coun-
terbalance this argument: the uncertainties of testimony, the po-
tential honesty-producing effect of placing the witness under oath,
and the need of both the defense and the prosecution to discredit
inaccurate testimony.
3. Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements as Evidence-in-Chief
Traditionally, courts have limited the use of prior inconsistent
statements to impeachment of witnesses or refreshing recollection,
reasoning that because such statements constitute hearsay, they
are inadmissible to prove the truth of their content.7 28  The logic
of the hearsay rule, however, seems inappropriate in this context.
In most instances in which the hearsay rule applies, opposing
counsel has no opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the
proferred hearsay statement. Therefore the hearsay rule serves to
protect the opposing party by barring admission of the statement
as substantive evidence. In the turncoat witness context, however,
the witness is the original speaker and is thus available for cross-
examination.72 9 Furthermore, given the effect of the passage of
time upon human memory, the prior statement is often likely to
be more accurate than testimony at trial.730
727 See generally Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still With Us: An
Analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A), and 403, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 65, 70
(1976).
When the prosecutor uses prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes,
the judge must give an immediate instruction cautioning the jury against considering the
evidence as probative of the defendants guilt. See People v. Welch, 16 A.D.2d 554, 558,
229 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (4th Dep't 1962). Failure to give such an instruction is reversible
error, whether or not the defendant requested the instruction. People v. Carroll, 37
A.D.2d 1015, 1017, 325 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (3d Dep't 1971). See also N.Y. CauM. PRoc. LAw.
§ 60.35(2) (McKinney 1971). The instruction must be precise (Commonwealth v. Blose, 160
Pa. Super. 165, 172, 50 A.2d 742, 745 (1947) (judge's failure to state unequivocally that
prior inconsistent statements apply only to question of witness's credibility constitutes er-
ror)), and may not leave any doubt that the statement affects solely the credibility of the
witness and not the guilt of the defendant (Commonwealth v. Pimental, 363 N.E.2d 1343,
1348 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977)).
728 McCoRmicK, supra note 421, § 251, at 601.
7129 See 56 YALE L.J. 583, 586 (1947). See also DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364,
367-68 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.) (when jurors decide that truth is not what witness says
now but what he said before, they are still basing decision on what they see and hear in
court).
730 McCoRMICK, supra note 421, § 251, at 602.
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Admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evi-
dence would help combat the fearful witness problem. 731  Such a
rule should reduce the frequency of threats made to prospective
witnesses since defendants would have little to gain from forcing a
witness to change his story. Furthermore, prosecutors would not
be forced to engage in subterfuge in order to introduce what is
potentially the most relevant evidence in their case. Largely as a
result of these considerations, the Model Code of Evidence pro-
vides: "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the jury
finds that the declarant ... is present and subject to cross exami-
nation.732
Despite the Model Code's wholesale abandonment of the or-
thodox rule and similar moves in several states,733 most jurisdic-
tions still refuse to allow the introduction of prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence. 734  The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the handiwork of both reformers and traditionalists, strike a
compromise between these extremes. Defining some prior incon-
sistent statements as nonhearsay, Federal Rule 801(d) (1) provides
for their admission as substantive evidence, when
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statment, and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition ....
Inconsistent testimony given before a grand jury, during a former
trial, or during an immigration hearing is admissable under this
provision.735 Any prior signed statement which the witness af-
firms as truthful may also be admitted as substantive evidence.
7 36
731 For an example of a case involving a fearful recalcitrant witness, see State v. Cac-
cavale, 58 N.J. Super. 560, 157 A.2d 21 (A.D. 1959).
732 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503(b) (1942). The same position is taken in UNIFOR
RuLE OF EVIDENCE 63(1) (1953).
733 See Gelhaar v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 230, 242, 163 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1969) (permitted
use of prior inconsistent statements in the form of police investigation notes as substantive
evidence), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970); N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:84A, rule 63(1) (West
1976); see generally Peeples, Prior Inconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of
One's Own Witness: The Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TExAS L. REv. 1383, 1392 (1974).
734 See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 289 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v.
Freeman, 9 N.Y.2d 600, 605, 176 N.E.2d 39, 42, 217 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1961); N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAw § 60.35 (McKinney 1971).
735 See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.) (immigration
hearing; short discussion of legislative history of federal rule), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983
(1976).
736 United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1964).
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APPENDIX A
LOANSHARKING STATUTES OF THE STATES
The following chart schematically presents all state credit-
related criminal laws potentially applicable to the loanshark.
These statutes included in the chart fall into eight categories: ex-
tortionate credit transactions, criminal usury, financing extortion-
ate credit transactions, financing criminal usury, possession of rec-
ords of extortionate credit transactions, possession of records of
criminal usury, collection of extensions of credit by extortionate
means, and assault and battery for the purpose of collecting a
loan. While individual states do not always apply the labels used in
this chart to identify their statute, these labels serve to categorize
statutes by functional characteristics.
Although the chart does not include the small loans laws or
statutes modeled after the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, these
statutes contain provisions of possible value in controlling loan-
shark activities. These statutes require that a person who engages
in the business of making loans must obtain a license and must
annually provide appropriate state authorities with information
concerning the business. The statutes usually set limits on interest
rates and require disclosure, usually in writing, to the customer of
all charges and rates.7 3 7 The chart also does not include statutes
proscribing racketeering7 38 or engaging in organized crime.7 39
The statutes in the chart have been separated into elements
to facilitate structural comparison. With only one exception, these
analyses incorporate no case law,
Footnotes for Appendix A begin on page 275.
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737 Criminal penalties for violation of these provisions are set forth in the following
statutes:
Small loans statutes: ALA. CODE § 5-18-24 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 06.20.320 (Supp.
1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-133 (1978); CAL. FIN. CODE § 24651 (West 1968); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2110, 2112 (1974), § 2111 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 516.19
(West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 25-9903 (1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 409-31 (1976);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74, § 37 (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE § 536.19 (1977); Ky. REv. STAT. §
288.991 (1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 58A, § 14 (Supp. 1978) & MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 12-316 (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN LAWS ch. 140, § 110 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1972); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 23.667 (19) (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 56.19 (West 1970); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-67-35, 75-67-119 (1972); Mo. ANN STAT. § 367.200 (Vernon 1968); MONT. REV
CODES ANN. § 32-5-406 (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-128 (Supp. 1978); NEV REV. STAT. §§
675.470, 675.480 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 399-A:2, 399-A:24 (Supp. 1977); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 58-15-3 (Supp. 1978) (See also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-7-8, 56-8-8, 56-8-14
(1978)); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 358 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-88 (1972);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 13-03-22, 13-03.1-18 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.99
(Page Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6218 (Purdon Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
19-25-36 (1968) (see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-25.3-26 (1968)); S.C. CODE § 34-29-250
(1977) (see also S.C. CODE § 37-5-301 (1977 and Supp. 1978)); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 54-4-27 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2233 (1970); VA. CODE § 6.1-308 (1973); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 31.08.210 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 46A-5-103 (1976); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 26-607 (West 1967).
Statutes modeled after Uniform Consumer Credit Code: COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 5-5-301,
5-5-302 (1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 28-35-301, 28-35-302 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§
24-4.5-5-301, 24-4.5-5-302 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE §§ 537.5301, 537.5302 (1977); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16-a-5-301, 16a-5-302 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3553 (West Supp.
1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 5.301 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 5-301,
5-302 (West 1972); S.C. CODE §§ 37-5-301, 37-5-302 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-5-
301, 70B-5-302 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.401 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. §§
40-14-540, 40-14-541 (1977).
78 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.46 to 943.463 (West Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1979).
739 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.04 (Page 1975).
7410 The prosecutor can establish a prima fade case by showing four factors: (1) repay-
ment of the extension of credit is unenforceable through the civil judicial process, (2) the
rate or interest is over 45%, (3) the debtor reasonably believed, at the time the extension of
credit was made, that the creditor had used or attempted to use extortionate means to
collect loans or punish a failure to pay or that the creditor had a reputation for so doing,
and (4) the outstanding credit extensions exceeded $100. AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-230-2
(B) (1978).
741 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(3) (1978) defines extortionate extension of credit as
"any extension of credit with respect to which [it] is the understanding of the creditor and
the debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make re-
payment could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the
person, reputation or property of any person."
742 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-202 (rule of construction that no culpable mental state
required unless statute expressly provides), 13-2302 (no mental state requirement) (1978).
713 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-102 (Supp. 1979) (12% per annum).
744 See note 743 supra.
745 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(4) (1978) defines this as "the use, or an express or
implicit threat of use, if violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person,
reputation or property of any person."
746 CAL. CONST. art 15, § 1 (10% per annum).
747 COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-15-101(4) (1973) defines this as making, renewing, or entering
an agreement, express or implied, that debt repayment will be deferred. COLO. REv. STAT.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:127
§ 18-15-103 (1973) allows the prosecutor to establish a presumption that the extension of
credit was extortionate by showing three factors: (1) the finance charge was in excess of
that established for criminal usury, (2) the debtor reasonably believed, at the time the
extension of credit was made, that the creditor had used or attempted to use extortionate
means to collect loans or punish a failure to pay, (3) that at the time the extension of credit
was made, the total outstanding extensions by the creditor to the debtor exceeded $100.
748 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-15-101(5) (1973) defines this as any means "which involves the
use, or an explicit or implicit threat of use, of violence or other criminal means .... "
749 The state of mind requirement is unclear. See generally Colo. REv. STAT. § 18-1-503
(1973).
750 See note 748 supra.
751 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-390(b) (1979) allows the prosecutor to establish a prima fade
case by showing four factors: (1) repayment of the extension of credit is unenforceable
through the civil judicial process, (2) the rate of interest was in excess of 12%, (3) the
debtor reasonably believed, at the time the extension of credit was made, that the creditor
had -used or attempted to use extortionate means to collect loans or punish a failure to pay
or that the creditor had a reputation for so doing, and (4) the outstanding credit extensions
exceeded $10.
752 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-389(6) (1979).
75' Defined by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-389(7) (1979).
754 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.071(1)(e) (West Supp. 1978) defines this as the use of violence
or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of any per-
son.
755 GA. CODE ANN. § 57-9901 (1977).
756 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 702-204 (1976).
757 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (8% per annum).
758 Enumerated by ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-6 (1975). Violation of § 12-6 is itself a
felony.
119 According to § 39-1(b), personal or constructive possession of records, memoranda,
or other documentary record of usurious loans is prima fade evidence of a violation of §
39-1.
760 Interest and expenses includes any amounts paid to any person for the making or
securing of the loan if such charge was known to the lender at the time of making the
loan, or might have been ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
761 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.021 (Vernon Special Pamphlet 1978).
762 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 31:1-1 (West Supp. 1979) (6% per annum, although can be in-
creased to 9.5% per annum by regulation).
763 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-11 (1978) (maximum of 12% per annum).
764 On any loan not exceeding $500, 4%, on any loan exceeding $500 but not exceeding
$2,000, 4% on first $500, 3% on the remainder; on any loan exceeding $2,000, 4% on the
first $1,000, 2% on the remainder.
765 N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (1978) sets this as 3% per annum higher than the
maximum rate of interest payable on time deposits maturing in 30 months, but that in any
event the maximum rate shall not be less than 7% and that the interest will not be com-
pounded.
766 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (1976).
767 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-02 (2) (1976) established a presumption of knowledge of
the civil unenforceability in the case of a person engaging in the business, if any, of the
following exist, and in the case of a person directly or indirectly providing, if he knew any
of the following: (1) it is an offense to charge, take, or receive interest or the rate involved,
(2) the rate of interest involved is 50% or more greater than the maximum enforceable
rate, (3) the rate of interest involved exceeds 45% per annum.
768 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.1(f) defines "extortionate extension of credit"
as an extension in which both the creditor and debtor understand that delay or failure of
repayment may result in extortionate methods of collection. The prosecutor may establish
276
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a prima fade case by showing three factors: (1) the rate of interest was at least equal to that
established for criminal usury; (2) the debtor reasonably believed, at the time the extension
of credit was made, that (a) the creditor had used or attempted to use extortionate means
to collect loans or punish a failure to pay or (b) that the creditor had a reputation for so
doing; and (3) the outstanding credit extensions, including unpaid interest, exceeded $100.
Id. § 4806.2(b).
719 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. app. § 4806.1(f) (Purdon 1973). "Extortionate extension of
credit" is defined as any means which involves the use, or an express or implied threat of
use, of violence or other criminal means. Id. § 4 806.1(g).
770 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 302(c) (Purdon 1973).
771 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4806.1(h) (Purdon 1973).
77 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c) (Purdon 1973).
77 Possession of usury records is presumptive evidence of possession with knowledge of
the cotents. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-10 (Supp. 1979).
774 S.C.' CODE § 34-31-30 (Supp. 1978) (6% maximum rate; if written contract, 8%
maximum permitted; 10% permitted, on loans greater than $50,000 but less than
$100,000; 12% permitted on loans greater than $100,000 but less than $500,000; no
maximum rate on loans greater than $500,000).
775 S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 54-3-7 (Supp. 1977) (10% simple interest per annum).
771 Trx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971) (10% per annum).
77 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 6.02(c) (Vernon 1974).
778 UTAH CODE ANN. § 70B-3-201 (Supp. 1979) (18% per annum).
779 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41(a) (Supp. 1979).
780 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.28(1)(c) (West Supp. 1979), defines "extortionate means" as
any means "which involves the use, or an explicit or implicit threat of use, of violence or
other criminal means .... "
711 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(1)(a) (West 1974) (12% per annum computed on declining
principal balance).
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782 An honest claim for restitution or indemnification is a defense to extortion in the
second degree. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-15(b) (1975).
783 ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4 (1975).
784 Effective Jan. 1, 1980.
78" An honest claim for restitution is a defense. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.520(c) (1978) (ef-
fective Jan. 1, 1980).
786 ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610 (1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
787 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (1978).
788 See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 524 (West Supp. 1978) (attempt to extort).
789 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503 (1973).
790 A claim of right is a defense to a prosecution for extortion. DEL. CODE tit. 11, §
847(a) (1975).
791 An honest claim of right is an affirmative defense. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1804(c)
(1978).
792 An honest claim for restitution is an affirmative defense. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 708-
834(4) (1976).
793 HAWAII REv. STAT. § 702-207 (1976).
7'4 See also IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2808 (attempt to extort) (misdemeanor), 18-2806 (extor-
tion not otherwise provided for) (1979).
'95 IDAHO CODE § 18-2803 (1979).
796 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3(b) (1975).
797 An honest claim for restitution is an affirmative defense. IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.4(7)
(West Special Pamphlet 1978).
798 See also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3428 (blackmail), 21-4401 (racketeering) (1974).
"' See also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 509.080 (criminal coercion), 508.080 (terroristic
threatening) (Baldwin 1975).
800 An honest claim for indemnification or restitution is an affirmative defense. Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 514.080(2) (Baldwin 1975).
s0 See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 209 (Supp. 1978) (criminal threaterling).
802 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 11(2) (Supp. 1978).
803 See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 562A (1976) (coercion to contribute).
804 See also MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979) (kidnap-
ping).
80- See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.275 (West 1964) (attempt to coerce).
806 See also Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-81 (robbery-threatening letters), 97-23-83 (threats
against business), 97-29-51 (procuring prostitutes by threat) (1972).
807 A claim of restitution or indemnification is an affirmative defense. Mo. ANN. STAT. §
570.010(4) (Vernon Special Pamphlet 1978).
808 See also MONT. CODES ANN. § 45-5-203 (1978) (intimidation).
889 A claim of restitution or indemnification is an affirmative defense. NEB. REv. STAT. §
28-513(2) (Supp. 1978).
810 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-518 (Supp. 1978).
81 See also NEv. REv. STAT. 88 207.180 (threatening letters or writings) (misdemeanor),
207.190 (coercion) (felony/misdemeanor) (1975).
81 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I) (1974).
813 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637:11 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
814 See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 13-5 (West 1979) (criminal coercion).
815 An honest claim of indemnification, restitution, or lawful compensation for property
or services is an affirmative defense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-5 (West 1979).
816 See also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.60 (McKinney 1975) (coercion in the second degree),
240.25 (McKinney 1967) (harassment).
817 N.Y. PENAL LAv § 15.15(1) (McKinney 1975).
818 See also N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-118 (1969) (blackmail).
819 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05 (1976).
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820 See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2905.12 (coercion), 2903.21-2903.22 (menacing),
2921.03 (intimidation) (Page 1975).
821 See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1487 (West 1958). (attempted extortion) (mis-
demeanor), 1488 (West Supp. 1978-79) (blackmail).
822 A good faith belief in restitution or indemnification is an affirmative defense. OR.
REv. STAT. § 16.035(2) (1977).
823 See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2906 (Purdon 1973) (criminal coercion).
824 An honest claim for restitution is an affirmative defense. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3923(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
825 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3903 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1979).
826 An honest claim of right or ignorance that the property belonged to another is an
affirmative defense. S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-30A-16 (Special Supp. 1977).
827 S.D. CoNiP. LAws ANN. § 22-30A-17 (Special Supp. 1977).
828 An honest claim of right is an affirmative defense. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402(3)
(1978).
829 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (1978).
830 Where the threat was to accuse another of a crime, and the actor reasonably believed
that his accusation was true and intended only to right the wrong done by the accused, the
actor has an affirmative defense. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.130 (1977).
831 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.110(25) (1977) (definition of "threat").

